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Problems of Communism

1989 Index

Essay-Reviews

Cynthia Roberts &
Elizabeth Wishnick
John P. Willerton, Jr.
Thomas F. Remington
William J. Duiker

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1989



Toward a Common European Home

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Note on Soviet Elections

Max E. Mote

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Problems of Communism

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COVER: Jubilant East Germans stream toward the newly opened Berlin Wall on the way to West Berlin. Photo by DPA from Photoreporters.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Toward a Common European Home

Zbigniew Brzezinski

In a speech to the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 27, 1989, Dr. Brzezinski noted the obstacles on the path to a common European home, including the economic difficulties, and discussed the need to articulate common principles and construct a cooperative institutional framework.

Estonia's Road to Independence

Rein Taagepera

Trends that emerged in the Soviet Union in the late 1980's indicate that the Soviet occupation of Estonia (and the other Baltic republics) will end sometime in the 1990's. Prompted by Moscow's policies of *glasnost'* and *perestroyka*, a number of grass-roots organizations—including the Popular Front of Estonia—emerged to push for fundamental political and economic changes. The leadership of the Communist Party of Estonia also has responded to popular demands for reform. These efforts have met with the organized resistance of Russian-speakers in the republic and at times vehement criticism from the Kremlin. In response, popular demands have become more and more radical. Thus, by September 1988, the Popular Front of Estonia came out for full independence, but it differed with other groups, such as the Estonian National Independence Party, over how that goal was to be attained.

New Cooperatives in the USSR

Anthony Jones and William Moskoff

As a means of spurring individual initiative the new Soviet cooperatives have been highly successful, providing a wide range of consumer goods and services, although at prices considerably higher than in the state sector. After an early wave of favorable legislation and publicity, the cooperatives are encountering strong public hostility, new official restrictions, and increasingly heavy taxation.

Glasnost' and Soviet Culture

Josephine Woll

The policy of *glasnost'* was first introduced, and most extensively applied, in the area of Soviet culture. Not only have long-suppressed works been shown on stage and screen, but there has also been a virtual explosion of publication of previously forbidden Soviet and foreign writers. The new policy has polarized the creative intelligentsia between "liberals" and "conservatives," and the literary journals have openly taken sides. While the resulting dialogue between the opposing camps is not always civil, it nevertheless continues; it has engaged Soviet readers, listeners, and viewers in the dynamic process that *glasnost'* signifies.

Note

Electing the USSR Congress of People's Deputies

Max E. Mote

While the spring 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in the Soviet Union did not shift power away from the party and the existing administrative apparatus, they did enhance the power of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The election campaign was clearly also seen as a way to cultivate new patterns of political behavior—the stormy debates in the new Congress being the most salient result so far. However, reforms have been reversed before in Soviet history; so one cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviets might put the "genie back in the bottle."

Abstracts continued on the reverse side

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Essay-Reviews

Ideology Is Dead! Long Live Ideology?

Cynthia Roberts and Elizabeth Wishnick

Examination of the evolving relationship between ideology and Soviet foreign policy requires the analysis of systematic connections between Soviet domestic politics and changing foreign policy concepts. Moreover, the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy advocated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisors cannot be grasped without an understanding of Soviet ideological terms of reference. New thinking does not denote de-ideologization. Rather, Gorbachev's recent foreign policy efforts indicate a modification of the functions performed by ideology, modifications that have been prompted by changes in the international environment and by a reassessment of domestic priorities.

Evolving Center-Periphery Relations in the Soviet Polity

John P. Willerton, Jr.

Expanding Western scholarship on relations between the center and the periphery in the Soviet political system reveals a rich mosaic in which the center continues to dominate even as local actors attempt, through elaborate institutional arrangements, to influence centrally determined decisions. Since the 1950's, local and regional governments have been acquiring an expanded share of total budgetary resources, but this has not been sufficient to cover the even broader range of policy implementation tasks devolved to them nor have they been granted a free hand in important areas such as housing. Only the most far-reaching reforms—encompassing institutions, attitudes, and behavior—could significantly transform the identified proclivity of the Soviet system toward policy rigidity and incrementalism.

Soviet Society under the Old Regime

Thomas F. Remington

The quality of Western literature on Soviet society in the pre-Gorbachev era, which was characterized by a range of methodological approaches, ultimately depended on the restricted nature of the source material available, but biases and controls also characterize the flood of published information emanating from the USSR in the age of *glasnost'*. Moreover, *glasnost'* highlights the need to address the new social forces that have emerged in a society undergoing *perestroyka*. Specifically, scholars must now turn to such topics as the role of the intelligentsia, the rise of the environmental movement, and the burgeoning national movements throughout the USSR.

Understanding the Sino-Vietnamese War

William J. Duiker

The origins of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, once generally thought to lie in border disputes and the treatment of Chinese nationals in Vietnam, have developed into a heavily debated issue. Recently, studies by scholars and other observers of Southeast Asia have focused on the historical rivalry between the two countries and the superpower competition that has dominated the postwar period, and their roles in the conflict. Although the authors whose works are reviewed here differ in the relative weight they assign to history and to strategic choices made by both sides, they agree that it will be some time before these uneasy neighbors reach an amicable and lasting solution to their differences.

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Toward A Common European Home

Zbigniew Brzezinski

The following is the transcript of an address given by Dr. Brzezinski to the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 27, 1989, while he was in Moscow as a member of the US delegation to a Soviet-American conference on "Changing Europe: American and Soviet Attitudes," October 24–31, 1989. The conference, sponsored on the American side by Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change, and on the Soviet side jointly by the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was a sequel to the conference on "The Place and Role of Eastern Europe in the Relaxation of Tensions between the USA and the USSR," which was held in Washington, DC, in July 1988. The US and Soviet discussion papers for the 1988 conference, as well as Dr. Brzezinski's speech to that gathering, were published in the May-August 1988 issue of this journal.

FIRST OF ALL, let me say how very deeply pleased I am to be here and to have the opportunity to speak to you. As many have noted, Moscow in recent years has become a city of surprises. For me, this has a very specific personal dimension because I learned that I would be giving a speech here only yesterday at six o'clock in the evening. You will therefore, I hope, forgive the somewhat informal character of my presentation.

Nonetheless, I am conscious of the fact that this is a very special occasion, which for me has particular meaning. This is the fourth time that I have had the opportunity to make a public address in this part of the world—which you call the socialist camp and which we call the Soviet bloc. On each occasion, there was a certain historical coincidence to the timing. The first time was in July of 1968 in Prague. The second time I made a major address was two years ago in Budapest at the beginning of the end of the Kádár era. The third time was in Poland a few weeks before the recent elections, and this is now the fourth.

Let me begin by saying that, as a private citizen, I think I can quite honestly tell you that the overwhelming majority of Americans share the view recently expressed both by the president of the United States and by the secretary of state that we wish *perestroyka* success. We believe that if *perestroyka* succeeds, this will contribute to a better world. By the success of *perestroyka* we do not mean a renewal of dogmatic or sectarian thinking but the triumph of certain universal values. I believe that most people in the world know what these universal values are because we live in an age in which human rights have become the moral and political imperative. This is what gives us a shared framework of belief, and this is what makes us sympathetic and hopeful about *perestroyka*.

The theme of the conference in which I am a participant is "Changing Europe." Change in Europe in recent months has been encapsulated in a captivating

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phrase, a phrase that originates in Moscow: the common European home or, if you will, the common European house. Yesterday, at the preliminary discussion of our group, someone made the point that there was a difference between the word "house" and the word "home." House has architectural implications. Home has relational implications. The first implies a structure; the second implies a family. I think the common European home, to be successful, has to be a house; and, to be a house that has life in it, it has to be a home. So, the use of both meanings is appropriate. It is to both meanings that I propose to speak and to share with you some of my own thoughts on how we go about creating such a desirable reality. To do so, in my view, we have to face up to certain objective difficulties that stand in the way of this reality. We have to face up to the need for more explicit articulation of certain shared principles so that the European house is, in fact, a shared home. And we have to face up to the requirement for cooperative institutional ventures, because we are dealing here with complex international dynamics that can only be given stability and direction if they have an institutional framework. Thus, in my remarks, I propose to address three items: the objective difficulties, the need for shared principles, and cooperative institutional approaches.

The Difficulties

As to the difficulties, there are many, although I would like to take particular note of three. But first let me emphasize that we are not yet familiar with a successful case of transition (I will use our terminology and hope you will forgive me for using our terminology, but this is the way I express my thoughts) from a communist dictatorial system to a pluralistic democracy, both in the political and economic dimensions of its meaning. There are simply no precedents. There have been instances of movement in such a direction, and currently the most important cases are those of Poland and Hungary. Both are undertaking profound political and economic changes. These political changes point toward the institutionalization of pluralist political systems with open competition between political parties. The economic restructuring involves the explicit commitment to the creation of free-market economic systems. These are truly ambitious goals: if they are successfully achieved, a historically unprecedented transition will have been accomplished to a system that elsewhere in the world has proven to be economically, socially, and intellectually dynamic and creative. But it is far from certain that this transition will be successfully negotiated, because there are enormous difficulties in the way.

The most serious of the difficulties are economic. It is terribly difficult to restructure a statist centralized economy into a truly operative market system. A truly operative free-market system involves not only an intricate set of economic relationships, but also the emergence of an effective entrepreneurial culture. It involves a change in psychology and not just a change in objective economic conditions. This is difficult to achieve. There are no precedents for it, and it is far from certain that the processes in Poland and Hungary will be successful. My own estimate is that in all probability they will be. But I am very conscious of the difficulties, and I think there will have to be very extensive Western aid in order to promote that success. It seems to me that we all have a stake in the successful transition, for if it takes place, a major step toward building a common European home will have been taken.

The second major difficulty in the way of a common European home involves the possibility of prolonged impasse, stalemate, or ferment in the Soviet Union itself. Not necessarily a failure of *perestroyka*, for this may, in some respects, be very difficult to define these days. I cannot imagine a return to some form of Stalinism, to some explicit readaptation of the past. But it is also very difficult to imagine concretely what in the foreseeable future would constitute something that would justify the word "success." This would require truly profound institutionalized political and economic changes, as well as a change in psychology and political culture of enormous magnitude. Great progress has been made. The efforts have been courageous, truly impressive. One is enormously encouraged by them. Intellectual creativity has clearly been unleashed. One senses this in the vibrance of the public intellectual discussions in Moscow and elsewhere. But I think you know better than I about the enormous difficulties in the way, about the forces of inertia, the institutionalized forces of the past, about the complexity of the problems that *perestroyka* confronts. Hence, there is at least a high probability that while there will be no failure of *perestroyka*—no development that would justify that single word as a definition of the actual condition of *perestroyka*—it is also possible that for many years to come there will be no condition emerging that justifies applying the word "success" to *perestroyka's* process. This absence of success would also inhibit the construction of the common European home. It is a possibility that we have to face squarely.

The third objective difficulty in building a common European home is that while the first two difficulties are being tackled and faced, and hopefully overcome, the gap between the objective conditions in what is called the West and in what is called the East is widening. There is no doubt that the West (the United States,

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Western Europe, Japan) are plunging headlong into a new age—the post-industrial age, the technetronic age, the age that not only in terms of economic indices but also in terms of the style of life and the quality of life is fundamentally different from the industrial age. That part of the world that we call the East is still essentially struggling with the legacies of the industrial age. In many respects, the transition that Poland and Hungary are undertaking, or the struggle for *perestroyka* in the Soviet Union, are struggles with the legacies of an unsuccessfully completed process of industrialization. Thus, the objective conditions involve a wide gap in the global condition, and it will be difficult to construct a European home if that gap becomes wider and wider.

I say these things not to indulge in pessimism, but to suggest that one needs to look beyond slogans and face hard realities if one is going to be successful in the otherwise ambitious and desirable task of building a common European home. To do that effectively, we have to have some shared principles, and we have to have some joint understanding of the need for cooperative institutional undertakings. Let me now turn to these two aspects of my presentation.

Shared Principles

Shared principles are important because we can only overcome some of the difficulties I have mentioned if we have a common understanding of them as well as common principles on the basis of which we undertake action in order to compensate for or overcome the difficulties. The first of these principles is that, insofar as the European political scene is concerned, we henceforth accept that there are shared geopolitical interests but not a shared ideological orthodoxy. In other words, alliances should be based on particular historical or geographical interests of the participants, the states which are part of such alliances, but they should not be instruments for ideological imperialism, for the imposition of a particular ideological concept of reality. On the contrary, alliances will be stronger, more effective, and more contributive to European stability if they are based on a diversity of social and political systems in the case of each alliance, because only then are such alliances true alliances, the reflection of genuinely shared aspirations and interests. I sense a movement in that direction in the Warsaw Pact because of the developments that have been taking place in the last two years. This is already the case in NATO, where a variety of governments, which often differ very sharply on some important international issues, collaborate.

The second principle that has to be the basis for building a European home is that it is acceptable to have cross-cutting memberships in security and other forms of cooperative organizations. In other words, organizational membership should not be an exclusive condition. It should be possible for members of one alliance system to be associated with the social and economic organizations of another type. One need not have uniformity in institutional membership. I think this is particularly important if some members of the Warsaw Pact begin in effect to move toward the adoption and maintenance of free-market economic systems. I can certainly envisage in the years to come a situation in which the European Community or the European Free Trade Association has members or associate members who are also members of the Warsaw Pact. This, too, will contribute to the building of a joint house, and also is compatible with the notion of a shared home.

The third general principle is that Europe is not a geographical reality, but is, most importantly, a philosophical, cultural reality. That is to say, one does not define Europe in geographical terms. The eastern geographical limits of Europe are ultimately an imaginary line on the map—the Ural Mountains. The western extremity of Europe is the seashore of Portugal. But Europe as a cultural and philosophical reality does embrace the United States and the Soviet Union, to the extent that both of these countries partake of certain cultural and philosophical values associated with the European civilization, with the Christian tradition—values which determine the relationship between the individual and society and between society and the state. These values are incompatible with notions of oriental despotism, of the totalitarian subordination of the society to the state or of the individual to society. It is its values which define Europe, and to the extent that the United States and the Soviet Union partake of these values, they partake of the European tradition and are an extension of Europe. This is the basis for measuring the extent of American and Soviet involvement in Europe and their participation in the emerging European home.

This brings me to my fourth and last principle. The construction of the European home has to be based on the principle of freedom of choice. This means the supremacy of democracy over any "ism." When I listened to President Gorbachev speak to the United Nations in December 1988, I was especially struck by one sentence in his speech. It is a remarkable statement, which I would like to read to you. I agree with it 100 percent. I think it is an important statement. I hope that Mr. Gorbachev meant it as seriously as it sounds—and I think he does—and it has major implications. It is a simple statement: "Freedom of choice is a universal principle which allows no exceptions." It means that democracy is

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more important than any "ism." That means that there is no possibility of saying, for example, "there is no retreat from socialism," which is what Mr. Gorbachev did say in a speech at the Sorbonne. That assertion is not compatible with the notion of freedom of choice as a universal principle. Every people can determine in what kind of a system they wish to live, and not have it determined for them on the basis of an arbitrary "ism." Socialism is merely one transitional definition of reality—derived, incidentally, from the early experience of Western Europe with the initial impact of the Industrial Revolution. Beyond that, it is an intellectual abstraction. Democracy is the basis for determining the kind of system under which a people wish to live. That, of course, has further implications, because freedom of choice, to be effective and to be irreversible, has to be institutionalized. Only when it is institutionalized does freedom of choice become an enduring reality. Freedom of choice is not a gift from a ruler to the people, it is a right of the people. And freedom of choice as the right of the people can only be effectively implemented if it is institutionalized. This means that it is incompatible with one-party rule. Any system of one-party rule is fundamentally unjust, because it involves a usurpation of the right of people's freedom of choice by a self-appointed elite that is not legitimated by the freely exercised will of the people. A common European home will only be a common European home when it is built on the principle of the universal applicability of freedom of choice. This is why Mikhail Gorbachev's UN statement is so fundamentally important philosophically. If we are serious about building a European home, we have to be serious about this principle.

Institutional Cooperation

If we share these principles, then we are advancing to a common European home. But in building a home, we have to build also the structure, the architecture, and this means that we have to undertake some cooperative institutional initiatives. It is to this point that I finally wish to speak. If we build a house, we have to have a secure structure for it. Europe today operates in the area of security on the basis of two alliances: NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

If there is to be a common European home, there will have to be a relationship between these two alliances that is institutionalized. I, for one, do not favor (and I have already said this publicly) the termination of the two alliances as part of the construction of a European home. I think the termination of the two alliances would contribute to anarchy. I favor the retention of the two alliances. In fact, in a speech in Poland a few months ago, I told the Poles that in my view a democratic Poland based on freedom of choice should remain a member of the Warsaw Pact. Not everybody in the audience agreed with me, and some were surprised to hear me say it. But I think the majority actually agreed with me. The European structure will have to involve a relationship between these two alliances. These two alliances—instead of being confrontational military adversaries—ought to become the two pillars of a larger European security system. Institutional cooperation between the two alliances would preserve geopolitical stability, preserve territorial stability in Europe, while permitting political and economic change on the basis of the universality of the principle of freedom of choice. This cooperation would be a framework of stability within which change is possible.

Second, we will have to think of institutionalized links in the economic area. Here, I think, it is quite likely that we will see in the not too distant future the emergence of new forms of associate status for some countries that have been outside the European unification process with the European Economic Community. Article 238 of the Covenant binding the European Community together provides for the possibility of associate status, and I think that before too long some of the East European countries can begin to exercise that option. Mr. Jacques Delors, in a conversation with me, suggested that perhaps a better transitional option might be membership for some countries of Eastern Europe in the European Free Trade Association. This alternative should also be considered. The point is that we will be engaging increasingly, as we build a European home, in these cross-cutting and formal membership structures, thereby creating the framework for genuine cooperation.

Third, we will have to give more serious thought to the promotion of new forms of regional cooperation. Eastern Europe for the last 40 years has been subordinated to external control by the Soviet Union. This is now changing, and the relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is becoming one of more genuine accommodation and mutual respect. But in that setting there is the real danger that old East European national conflicts will surface and that political and economic fragmentation will become the dominant reality. We see this already in the relationship between Hungary and Romania.

I think it is in the interest of the common European home that efforts be made to promote regional cooperation in Central Europe. Austria and Hungary provide a fertile example of what is possible. In a few years from now, a world exhibition will be held in both Vienna and Budapest. From this, additional cooperation is likely to emerge. It is in our collective interest that Poland and

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Czechoslovakia develop more viable forms of political and economic cooperation in the region lying between the Soviet Union and Germany. This is in the interest of European stability. It is also in the interest of European stability that cooperation in the Balkans be promoted, for there is a real danger of fragmentation in that part of Europe. These are issues to which no thought has been given for 40 years. Georgi Dimitrov and Tito wanted to have a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation, and Stalin stopped that. The Poles and Czechoslovaks wanted to have a federation, and Stalin stopped that. I think it is time to start thinking creatively as to what forms of regional cooperation in Central Europe will provide for stability and progress toward the emergence of a genuine European home.

Fourth, I think we will have to start thinking more and more seriously in this context about a new status for Germany. It is impossible to think of change in Central Europe, or to envisage the emergence of a common European home, while Germany remains arbitrarily divided. That is simply a fact of life. We can have a divided Europe with a divided Germany in it, but we cannot have a united Europe or a shared European home with an artificially divided Germany. It is not just a question of a slogan about the Berlin Wall, but it is a matter of sheer common sense. There is a genuine problem here. Hungary and Poland can liberalize themselves, can democratize themselves, and they will still remain Hungary and Poland respectively. The Czechoslovak neo-Stalinist regime probably has at most one or two years before Czechoslovakia begins to experience the same process as Hungary and Poland. But Czechoslovakia will still remain Czechoslovakia. If East Germany liberalizes itself and democratizes itself, however, at some point the question will arise, "what is East Germany?" Should there be an East Germany? The division of Germany is inherent in the division of Europe and in the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union that emerged in the aftermath of Europe's historical suicide. But if we are going to be building a European home on the principle of self-determination, of freedom of choice, a common home, a joint house, then we will have to think of some new arrangement for Germany.

What form it will take I do not know, but it is a subject regarding which we will have to start thinking and talking seriously. One can envisage, for example, some arrangement for a confederation which preserves a certain degree of heterogeneity in the heart of Europe, and particularly within Germany. That may be one solution. Perhaps a confederation can be combined with some transitional security arrangements, specifically for the eastern and the western parts, so that Germany's neighbors would not become frightened by the emergence of a more powerful Germany—and such fears would be shared by the Poles, the Czechs, the French, and others. But the point is that one has to start addressing this issue if one is serious about building a European home. The message which I wish to drive home here today is that the notion of a European home cannot be just a slogan. It is necessary to face squarely certain problems and address squarely the need for shared principles.

This brings me to my final point—at some point in the future, but in the not too distant future, the creation of a European home will probably require very major institutional changes in the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Union is a complex society, a multinational society, and if it is to be a viable member of the European home, if it is to share in the same philosophical principles and truly apply the principle of diversity of choice, institutional changes within the Soviet Union will have to be far-reaching.

This is not to deny the importance of what has happened here in the course of the last several years. What has happened is impressive. It is stunning in some respects. It is extraordinarily courageous, but there is still a long way to go before the Soviet Union becomes a viable member of the European home. Diversity of choice will have to be institutionalized. Perhaps a Soviet confederation might be a more appropriate way of describing what the Soviet Union will then be than the notion of a Soviet union, for the word confederation implies a much greater dispersal and division and separation of powers, and also the taking into account of the national mosaic of the Soviet Union. This is not something for us to suggest, but for you to reflect on. But it is not just your business. It is our business, too, if you are serious about the notion of a common European house. If we are going to live in the same house, then how we organize ourselves is our shared business. Hence, it is appropriate to raise this issue, even though the resolution of this issue will be entirely your own responsibility

In brief, we are hoping for enormous change. We are facing extraordinary opportunities. This is clearly the most interesting time historically since the era immediately after World War II. The era after World War II brought the end of the European phase in international affairs. As I said earlier, Europe committed political suicide in the course of the first and second world wars. Out of that emerged a superpower competition over Europe, waged largely by the Soviet Union. We now face the possibility of building a larger European home which embraces America and the Soviet Union.

This is an extraordinarily appealing and monumental challenge. It contains within it the seeds of a better and

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freer life for millions and millions of people. But we can only be successful in the construction of a common European home if we face the difficult realities that confront us, if we understand that there are massive impediments to be overcome, if we realize that we have to face squarely and directly the philosophical implications of the concept of a European home, if we are ready jointly to undertake the cooperative institutional homebuilding that this challenge requires from us. I think I can say for most Americans that we are ready to join you in this effort.

Following his address, Dr. Brzezinski responded to questions from the audience.

Q: Should states be run by politicians or by academics?

A: Subjectively, I know which I prefer. But then, I would have a personal interest in that. Let me put it this way: scholars generally don't make good governors. They are too much aware of nuances, too overwhelmed by complications; they find it difficult to make fundamental choices. However, politicians tend to be more generalist, and are more inclined to try to solve problems rather than to be dominated by problems. So, I prefer politicians, but I also think that politicians should be elected by the people and accountable to the people for the decisions that they make. Only then are they truly making decisions on the basis of popular will.

Q: How do you feel sitting before a bust of Vladimir Lenin, founder of the party, system, and country?

A: First of all, he was not the founder of the country. He was the founder of the system and of the party. I have respect for Lenin as a historical figure who had something very important and very interesting to say at a specific time in past history. So I am very pleased to stand in front of him and to discuss issues that are new, that are different, and for which answers contrived at the beginning of the century are no longer relevant.

Q: How do you assess Boris Yel'tsin's visit to the United States?

A: He was charming, he was very interesting, he was very lively, and he was a symptom of the change that is happening here. Whether one agrees with his views or disagrees with his views, the fact that he was able to say what he was saying and to be visiting the United States while saying it was viewed by us as an indicator of very positive change here in the Soviet Union. This is how we view his visit. We hope there will be more visits like his and that there will be more political figures like him in the Soviet Union, irrespective of what the ultimate choice regarding leadership is here.

Q: What are the possible scenarios for the evolution of the Anglo-American special relationship in the 1990's in view of the emerging special American-Japanese relationship?

A: I think the Anglo-American special relationship is a somewhat nostalgic term for a reality that is fading. That is to say, the special relationship reached its high point during World War II and in the years immediately after it. Now the special relationship is going to be increasingly between the United States and Europe, of which we hope Britain will be very much a part. In my own personal view, we should not be sympathetic in the United States to Mrs. Thatcher's attempt to slow down the political integration of Europe. From my perspective, the political and economic integration of Europe is a desirable historical process, and it would be a mistake for us to give the British the impression that we favor a retardation of that process.

As for the American-Japanese relationship, I think it has the makings of a new special relationship. We have, in the course of the 1940's, built an enduring relationship across the Atlantic with Europe as a whole. We are now in the process of building a similar relationship across the Pacific. In that relationship, Japan is clearly going to occupy a central place.

Q: The Anglo-American special relationship has long been considered in the Soviet Union as a kind of pillar of the cold war. What are the prospects for the relations between the US and Britain in the 1990's?

A: I have already answered that question in a way. I think that our relationship with Great Britain will remain close for cultural reasons—and, to some extent, for security reasons as well. But it will be increasingly subsumed, hopefully, in the context of a larger European relationship with America, of a Europe that becomes more united. We favor that. We think this is stabilizing. We think this is in keeping with the natural development internationally toward broader, larger units of political and economic integration.

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Q: Can we look forward to a book from you on the new international political world order? What will be its main message?

A: I have actually brought with me a copy of my latest book, which is not so much on international affairs as on what is happening in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. I have here the Russian translation of it, which has just come out. The title—*The Grand Failure: the Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*—gives you a basic idea of its message. If I were to write a book on international affairs, I would be tempted to write a book on the genuine historical necessity of wider international cooperation, based on some of the principles that I enumerated here. It seems to me the human condition is now ripe for cooperation based on the triumph of pluralism, on the primacy of human rights, and on the necessity of intercontinental cooperation in economic, technological, and security areas. We are clearly entering a new age in international affairs, and some of the things said by Mr. Gorbachev and by Mr. Shevardnadze before the United Nations are very much in the spirit of the kind of changes that are taking place. Our internal policies ought to be increasingly adjusted to them.

Q: How do you see the US practical role in promoting perestroyka *in the USSR?*

A: That is an extremely difficult question to answer, and to answer responsibly. I want, first of all, to reiterate what I said, and I said it in all seriousness. *Perestroyka* is viewed with enormous sympathy in the United States. There is genuine sympathy for *perestroyka* in the United States. It is true of the society at large and of the government. We think your experiment is a constructive, positive, and in some respects even a heroic undertaking. Some of us are skeptical as to whether it will succeed. I am one of those who is skeptical. I think the difficulties you face are so enormous and the cumulative legacy of Leninism-Stalinism so destructive that it will take a long time to overcome it. I think your situation objectively is much more difficult than that of Eastern Europe or even of China. In China, the cultural tradition of entrepreneurship, of business initiative, was not destroyed. In China, the peasantry was not destroyed. For China, there was an enormous community of overseas Chinese, very wealthy, inclined to invest very much in China. Hence, in China there are objective, as well as psychological and cultural conditions for reform, in spite of the current political retrogression, in spite of the current repression of political change.

In Eastern Europe, the opportunities are also similarly greater. The economies are smaller. The West is in a better position to help. You are a much larger system, and your problems are far more complex. Therefore, I personally do not think we can do very much that is going to be decisive to the outcome. We can help at the margin. We certainly should not make your efforts more difficult. We should certainly not try to intensify your internal problems. We should not exploit your internal tensions. We should not deliberately try to make your economic reforms more difficult. But those are all negatives. What can we do concretely?

I think in some respects we can increase our trade. But trade, for us, is not philanthropy. Trade has to be based on reciprocity of profit, of advantage, and many American and West European firms are very uncertain about your economic prospects and are very confused by the anarchy that today preponderates in your economy. It now is extremely difficult to make decisions here; it is very difficult to make long-term plans. The situation is very fluid. So I am not too hopeful about very major expansion of Western trade with the Soviet Union. I think there will be some, but it will be limited. I think we can help through expertise. We can help to plan innovative, advanced, and modern forms of economic management. We can help you through exchanges. We can help you in a limited fashion through greater technological access, but these are all marginal things.

You, yourselves, have to ultimately decide what your internal priorities are going to be, and I think one very major area which has not yet been sufficiently tackled in terms of your own *perestroyka* is the enormous percentage of your Gross National Product (GNP) devoted to military spending. The average West European country spends 3.5 percent of its GNP on defense. Japan spends 1 percent on defense. The United States spends about 6.5 percent. You spend somewhere in the range of 20 to 30 percent of your GNP, which is much smaller than ours. Professor Oleg Bogomolov says not more than 20 percent. I hope he is right. I strongly suspect that nobody knows, because you have an absurd system of statistics and pricing. So there is no way of knowing. But one can make some judgments even by looking at the condition of your cities, your shops, your consumer goods. In a country this rich, with such enormous natural resources, with such incredibly able people, with so much willingness to sacrifice for patriotic reasons—and you are an extremely talented, creative people—there is no reason for the economy to be in such a mess. I think a good deal of the explanation is the excessively massive

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spending on defense, the scale of which is much larger than most people realize. To this day, there is not even an open defense budget that is reasonably accurate. That, I think, is a very serious problem, and I think you have a great deal of flexibility here, so that defense spending could be redirected toward making *perestroyka* a success economically.

For *perestroyka* to be successful politically, I think there is one basic principle, which is most important of all, namely, the institutionalization of freedom of choice. Only if freedom of choice is institutionalized will *perestroyka* not be reversible. This, again, is something we cannot decide. It is something that you have to decide when the moment for it has come. I think if you decide on freedom of choice, then the inclination of the West to invest more, to be more involved in the Soviet Union, will grow enormously. Just in the last three months, the West has, in effect, decided to commit somewhat more than US$2 billion—close to $3 billion—just for Hungary and Poland, in the wake of the decision in these two countries to make institutional reforms, political and economic. I think there would be a much greater Western response if there is this kind of comprehensive breakthrough in the implementation of *perestroyka*. I know it is difficult. I know that enormous progress has been made. But I think the response of the West will be very much influenced by what is yet to come in the Soviet Union, and we all wish that what is yet to come will go in that direction.

Q: Two questions about Germany. Could you say a bit more about your model of possible reunification of the two Germanys? You predict a united or confederated Germany in ten years' time. What about special security arrangements if the West or East is threatened by such developments?

A: I am not even sure whether the word "unification" is the best word to describe what may be taking place, and what may have to take place, in the course of the next decade and a half if constructive change continues in Central Europe and in the Soviet Union. I am tempted sometimes to use the word "reassociation" of Germany to emphasize that the prospect in the long run may not necessarily be a united homogeneous state of the kind that existed from Bismarck to Hitler, and to stress that perhaps some more complex confederated arrangement may be a better way of giving Germans the self-determination to which they are entitled while also giving to Germany's neighbors the security to which they are entitled. In such a confederated Germany I could see for an indefinite number of years a special arrangement, for example, the presence, by treaty with a terminal date to it, of representative elements of military forces from the two alliances, which in the meantime will have developed a joint structure of security for Europe. I think some arrangement of this sort could go a long way toward meeting what are legitimate aspirations of the Germans without undermining the security of Germany's neighbors and certainly without reopening territorial issues in the heart of Europe.

This is still very sketchy, and I think what is important at this stage is not to present a blueprint that is very specific but to begin a serious and responsible discussion on an East-West basis of what the future holds for Germany. Because one thing is certain: the existing division of Germany is transitional and artificial. If there is going to be a European home, the division will have to be changed in some fashion, and we need to start discussing how we can change it.

Q: What is your vision of the current situation in Afghanistan. Will the US administration change its Afghan policy in view of the failure of the Afghan rebels to defeat the government in Kabul? When? How do you understand the US commitments under the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan.

A: First of all, the current situation in Afghanistan remains very fluid. While the existing government retains control over several main cities of Afghanistan, it no longer controls the countryside. Let me also remind you that when American forces left Vietnam, it took two more years before South Vietnam fell. In other words, the fall of the South Vietnamese government was not coincidental with the departure of the American forces from South Vietnam and the cutoff of American aid. It was only two years later that the South Vietnamese government fell.

It has so far been six months since the departure of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. During these six months, about 80 percent of the territory of Afghanistan outside of the cities and off the main roads has passed into the hands of the Mujahedin. I hope there is a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. But if there is a peaceful settlement on the basis of Afghan self-determination, I think it is very clear that Mr. Najibullah will not be a part of it, for the Afghan people did not resist for the last eight years to have Mr. Najibullah still in Kabul at the end of their resistance. It is, I think, important to realize that Mr. Najibullah is a successor to Mr. Babrak Karmal, who was imposed on Afghanistan after the assassination of the president of Afghanistan that coincided with the arrival of Soviet forces in Kabul. It is, therefore, a

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continuation of the regime imposed by force from the outside. The peaceful resolution of the Afghan problem will become possible once Mr. Najibullah and his associates are no longer part of that process. Then, I think, a national council representing the different forces of Afghanistan, including some of the left-wing progressive forces in the cities, can be constructed—perhaps with the king temporarily restored as a transitional figure to provide for central government—but with Afghanistan decentralized and ruled by tribal councils based largely on the rebel commanders who now control most of the countryside. I think we will move in that direction at some point in the future when it becomes clear that the maintenance of the present situation, with cities really being fortresses, is not a solution to the problem.

Q: What is your attitude toward possible changes in COCOM restrictions? Can they facilitate substantially USSR trade with Western states, and first of all, with West European countries?

A: I think some COCOM restrictions should be liberalized, that some of them are out of date. Opening up the opportunities for greater access by the Soviet Union to Western technology is now timely, especially since such technology in many sectors does not necessarily contribute to military capabilities and could make it easier for you to try to renovate, decentralize, and redynamize your economy. So I don't object to some relaxation of COCOM restrictions.

At the same time, no one should have any illusions that the lifting of COCOM restrictions will greatly increase Soviet trade with the West. COCOM is not the problem in that trade. The problem is that your economy over the last 40 years has become increasingly a Third World economy. Therefore, you do not have much to offer to the West in the area of advanced industrial technological products. You can only sell natural resources, and that is what your trade with the West is mostly about. You sell oil, you sell timber, you sell gold, and the profile of your foreign trade with the advanced countries of the world is typical of a Third World country. Singapore exports more machinery to the West than the Soviet Union. This is a very serious problem. That is what limits the expansion of your trade with the West. Beyond certain limits inherent in the West's desire to buy your natural resources, there isn't too much room for expansion—until you modernize your economy, until you unleash your productive forces, until you really join the modern world in technology, in advanced industrial development. And this requires successful *perestroyka*.

So I think it is really an illusion to say that the lifting of COCOM restrictions would greatly increase the possibility for more effective trade between us. The limits to it are really objective. They are not very political except in some highly specialized technological areas.

Q: What is your comment on Gorbachev's proposal regarding northern Europe in the recent speech in Finland?

A: I have not read the speech, so it is very hard for me to comment. I understand that one of the elements in it is a nuclear-free zone for the Baltic. That is perfectly fine with me, because we don't have any nuclear forces in the Baltic. So I think it is perfectly acceptable and desirable. Beyond that, you know our position on nuclear-free zones. It is that denuclearization, by itself, without significant reduction in conventional forces, is destabilizing. I subscribe to that position. I think that the East-West balance has been stable on the basis of a comprehensive structure of deterrence, ranging from the conventional to the nuclear. Simply eliminating the nuclear without changing the conventional, would create instability militarily. But I don't think that is the major problem in the Baltic, because the only nuclear ships and submarines in the Baltic have been yours. So if you decide to terminate that presence, that is perfectly all right.

Q: If you were the primary adviser of Mr. Gorbachev, what would you advise him to do, first, second, third, to achieve the goals of perestroyka?

A: That is a difficult and a very serious question. I know what I would advise him in general, but my advice, to some extent, would be based upon ignorance of the internal political situation. I just am not in a position to make a judgment regarding the political risks of certain choices that he, in my judgment, ought to make. So please bear in mind that my answer is based in large measure on ignorance of the internal political situation, and therefore I am not in a position to calculate the political risk of what I would advocate. I would advocate an acceleration of institutional, political, and economic change. I think the problem you face is that *perestroyka*, while courageous, even heroic, and ambitious, is undergoing increasing dissipation of dynamism at the margin. The demonstrable absence of economic progress leaves every foreigner who comes to the Soviet Union with the impression that there is no economic progress in the Soviet Union, either on the macro or mi-

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cro level. I suspect that is the case. At the same time, politically there is the danger that the progress so far could produce increasing fermentation because of the surfacing of irreconcilable group conflicts.

In that context, I would probably advise acceleration of institutional changes economically and politically, the articulation of a much more explicit vision of what the new economic and political system will be like, and the acceptance of institutional diversity, economic and political—that is to say, the transformation of the word "democracy" from a slogan into an institutional reality. I think only by accelerating can this very difficult historical wave be ridden. It is a dangerous process. It is inherently unstable, but only by moving forward can momentum and balance be maintained. It is a little bit like a man or woman on a bicycle. If you don't pedal hard enough and fast enough, you begin to weave and then you can fall. I think that is fundamentally the danger that *perestroyka* faces, although I could be wrong. Therefore, even though there could be even more transitional difficulties initially, I think an acceleration of the process of economic reform, of political reform, is the best way to prove my book is completely wrong in its prognosis.

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Estonia's Road to Independence

Rein Taagepera

If the political trends that emerged and strengthened themselves in the Soviet Union in 1987–89 continue, the Soviet occupation of Estonia (and Latvia and Lithuania) will end sometime in the early 1990's. Even as late as 1987, such a statement would have sounded preposterous. What has happened? First, that the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians could even think about restoring their independence illustrates the extent to which the old limits on political discourse and political action have been breached, not only in the Baltic republics, but also in Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union as a whole. Second, even two years ago, the very term "occupation" would have sounded propagandistic. An occupation is a temporary phenomenon, and until recently, the Soviet presence in the Baltic republics was seen as a permanent fixture. As Romuald J. Misiunas and I wrote in 1984:

By 1953, the Soviet rule had come to be considered more than a momentary and superficial occupation. . . . The habit of mentally challenging every Soviet rule slowly shifted into the less strainful habit of submission. A significant change of attitude seems to have taken place—from struggle against a foreign "occupation" to working for one's own interest within a framework of foreign "rule."[1]

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But in contrast to such popular attitudes in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, Estonia has again taken on the psychology of an occupied country (as have Latvia and Lithuania). Young people whose parents were born after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 discuss it as if it were a recent injustice they themselves had witnessed; Russian immigrants are openly regarded as colonists; and Estonians are vigorously and persistently reasserting their national culture and reclaiming their national history.

Such attitudes, of course, were present in the 1940's, but they could not preserve Estonia's independence in the face of Moscow's might. What has changed since that time?

A number of long-term trends underlie the recent cultural and political (but not yet economic revival) in Estonia. Indices of industrialization, urbanization, and education have all risen over the past 50 years, as they have throughout all of Europe, East and West. However, the fruits of expanded production capabilities were marred by their shoddy quality. The negative byproducts of modernization also have been especially prevalent in Estonia. For example, by 1970, abortions equalled or surpassed live births, and Estonia's divorce rate surpassed even that of the Soviet Union as a whole (3.8 versus 3.5 per 1,000 population, in 1978).[2]

Other factors motivating Estonia's movement for change include the recent decline in living standards and the increasing salience of environmental problems in the republic. Beginning in 1975, food and consumer-

[1] Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940–1980*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1983, p. 124.

[2] Ibid., pp. 214, 285–86, 290–91, 294; for education, see also *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1985 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1985), Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 1986, pp. 29, 509. As a basis for comparison, in 1978, the marriage rate in Estonia was 8.5 per 1,000 population.

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Demonstrators in Tallinn mark the 70th anniversary of Estonian independence on February 24, 1989. The banner reads: "Independence Is Not Separation But Responsibility."

—F. Hibon/SYGMA.

goods shortages tended to become more pronounced. Uncontrolled air pollution became life-threatening in the Kohtla-Järve oil shale mining area, near the Kunda cement factory, and at the Maardu phosphate mine (located 15 kilometers from downtown Tallinn). Hair losses among children were detected throughout the oil shale mining area, but especially in the uranium-processing enclave of Sillamäe.[3]

Finally, compared to earlier periods of Soviet rule in Estonia, what has changed in the late 1980's is the decline in the general health of the *all-Union* economy and society. Compared to the West, increases in the levels of education and industrialization have brought less improvement in living standards and more negative side effects, thus forcing Soviet leaders to look for new and different solutions to the various problems facing their society. The Estonians (as well as the Lithuanians and Latvians) have made full use of the opportunities provided to them by Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost'* and *perestroyka*.

The colonial rule of the European powers often produced its own antidote by encouraging the emergence of modern, educated, and urbanized local elites that then assumed the leadership of the colonies' struggles for independence. By contrast, in Estonia, native elites capable of articulating the nation's demands and organizing movements for change were beginning to emerge as early as 1900, and they had full authority over the country's economy and society in the interwar period. Thus, forces capable of devising programs to address the problems discussed here and organizing Estonia's struggle for independence have long existed in the country, and any kind of Gorbachev-style reform in the 1950's, 1960's, or 1970's would have led to an Estonian resurgence similar to the one now taking place.

The best guideline for predicting the immediate future is the recent past, and that past provides reasons for an optimistic assessment of Estonia's chances for genuine autonomy and perhaps independence. From the vantage point of 1986, the developments that took place in Eastern Europe (including the USSR) in 1987 would have looked improbable, those of 1988 implausible, and those of 1989 impossible. If this trend continues at anything close to the same pace, the Soviet army will withdraw from the Baltic republics in the early 1990's.

But what if these recent trends do not continue? Can the popular forces for change base their expectations on three heady years rather than the preceding 30 years of post-Stalinist immobilism? The brief answer is that those long, outwardly uneventful years actually saw the deep, irreversible social changes alluded to above, combined with a deterioration in the economic and environmental circumstances of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Moscow-centered empire became an anachronism in a world where the British, the French, and finally even the Portuguese empires had declined and ultimately disintegrated. (Those who might object that Moscow's multinational holdings are contiguous and therefore not comparable to these overseas empires should take note of Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey.)

Thus, from the perspective of the movement for

[3]Mare Taagepera, "Ecological Problems in Estonia," *Journal of Baltic Studies* (Mahwah/Hackettstown, NJ), Vol. 14, 1983, pp. 307–14; *Homeland* (Tallinn), July 19, 1989. For those who do not read Estonian, *Homeland*, an English-language supplement to the Soviet Estonian weekly *Kodumaa*, has become indispensable for following Estonian events. Whenever possible, this article will refer to *Homeland* rather than an equally valid Estonian-language source.

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change in Estonia, the last three years have witnessed the Estonian people's attempts to correct the failed policies of the preceding 45 years. A reactionary coup in Moscow certainly could slow down this return to normalcy, but it would not eliminate the socio-economic and environmental crises. General Wojciech Jaruzelski attempted a similar "solution" in Poland, and the Polish crisis did not abate but rather intensified.

Perhaps Moscow has reached the psychological watershed that Britain reached in the late 1940's and France reached with the advent of Charles de Gaulle in 1958—the shift from the "self-evident" need to cling to the empire to the urge to let go. The Soviet military pull-out from Afghanistan and the "ideological" pull-out from Eastern Europe, which starkly contrast with the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956, of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and of Afghanistan in 1979, cannot be explained otherwise.

However, limits yet remain on change in the Baltic republics. Although Moscow appears to accept eventual independence for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, excessive haste toward that goal is unacceptable to the Kremlin. Leaders and masses require time for psychological adjustment to the decline of empire. Nevertheless, we can indeed observe some movement on this issue in Moscow. Not only is the subject of Baltic independence no longer unmentionable; neither are demands for independence met with a categorical "no." Rather, this summer Moscow greeted Baltic demands with a negative answer supported by one-sided arguments. The next stage will likely be a reasoned discussion of the pros and cons of the issue.

Some reformers in Moscow hope for a commonwealth-type solution whereby the various Soviet republics achieve independence without formally leaving the Union.[4] In a Soviet economy beset by problems, where chances for improvement are dim at best, the Baltic republics stand the best chance of successfully carrying out reforms leading to autonomy and marketization. To encourage the work of the Baltic leaven on the Soviet dough, a reformist government in Moscow would have a particular interest in pressing for economic changes in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and in maintaining some sort of tie with them. In turn, the implementation of plans for economic autonomy and a market economy will strengthen the momentum toward reestablishing political independence in the Baltic republics. Ironically, lacking a ready market elsewhere for their goods, the newly independent Baltic states might turn to the huge Soviet market, so political independence might actually reinforce economic ties with the Soviet Union. Moscow would release restive provinces and gain friendly neighbors in return, thus in some ways paralleling the Soviet experience with Finland.

If events in the Baltic republics in general and in Estonia in particular were not moving so fast, one would describe the past in order to "explain" how the present situation came about. In that case, the preceding comments about the future would be better suited to a conclusion. But the status quo of 1985 is irretrievably gone, and the present is in flux. Consequently, we need two anchors in time: a stable past and a presumably more stable future. We must examine not only how the present stage came about but also how it prepares the way for the future. Otherwise this article risks being dated by the time it reaches the reader. Although the future is, of course, contingent, the need for an anchor in the future requires that we make assumptions about how events will likely unfold. Pretending to avoid making assumptions about the future would merely mask a hidden assumption that the status quo would continue with few changes, and this assumption would be the most problematic. Having established our anchor in the future by positing the existence of independent Baltic states by the early 1990's, let us now establish our anchor in the past by starting from the beginning.

Background

Estonians and their Balto-Finnic ancestors have lived at their present location for at least 5,000 years, and the linguistic borders have changed very little since the 14th century. Estonian is a member of the Finno-Ugric language family, which also includes Finnish, Hungarian, and Komi. Russian is closer to English than it is to Estonian.

Estonia was ruled by Germans from the 12th century to the 16th century, by Sweden from 1561 to 1721, and thereafter by tsarist Russia until gaining its independence in 1918. Multicandidate elections were held throughout the 1920's and again in 1938. Interwar Estonia's cultural autonomy for national minorities still stands as a model for non-territorial federalism.[5] An economic model suitable for a small Nordic country gradually evolved, and in the late 1930's, Estonia's economy was quite successful.

According to the secret protocols of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Estonia fell within the Soviet

[4]Rein Taagepera, "How Empires End: Is The Soviet Union to Become A Commonwealth?" *Homeland*, July 12–26, 1989.

[5]Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1984, p. 84.

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sphere of influence.[6] Under threat of armed invasion, on September 28, 1939, Estonia agreed to allow Soviet military bases on its territory. Soviet troops invaded the country on June 17, 1940, while world attention was focused on Hitler's conquest of France. After rigged elections on July 14, the Estonian People's Assembly—with Soviet troops present—proclaimed a socialist republic and applied for admission into the USSR on July 21. On August 6, the USSR Supreme Soviet formally admitted Estonia into the Soviet Union. The United States, among other countries, did not recognize the annexation, and consulates of independent Estonia continue to function in New York and Los Angeles.

By the time the Germans completely occupied Estonia in September 1941, the Soviet regime had murdered or sent to slow death in labor camps at least 50,000 out of a population of 1.1 million. The horrors of this period have again come alive now that people in Estonia have dared to speak up and reveal the truth about this period. These horrors also made the German occupation look relatively benign by comparison. More than 60,000 people fled to Sweden and Germany prior to the second Soviet occupation (September 1944), after which the murders and deportations resumed. Moreover, Moscow detached about 5 percent of the territory of the Republic of Estonia and joined it to the Russian republic.

Estonia lost between one-quarter and one-third of its original population between 1940 and 1955. In place of these people came a large Soviet military garrison (presently about 150,000 troops) and a continuous influx of Russian-speaking colonists, many of whom thought and acted like a "civilian garrison," refusing to learn Estonian and insisting that the native population use the immigrants' language in any interactions. To be sure, many immigrants stayed only for a short time; but their place was taken by other colonists. It is estimated that since 1945, 7.5 million people have come to Estonia but 7 million have left again. Presently the population consists of 1 million Estonians, about 100,000 Russians who were citizens of the prewar Republic of Estonia, and 500,000 post-World War II colonists.[7]

Although outright terror subsided after Stalin's death, relentless discrimination proceeded against Estonians, their language, and their culture throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. At times, job openings in Estonia were advertised in Russian-speaking areas of the Soviet Union but not locally. Job discrimination was especially marked in railroads, aviation, the merchant navy, and in the militia, where Estonians have been gradually eliminated. At the other end of the spectrum, the flux of immigrant labor, with lower standards for living and work conditions, squeezed Estonians out of blue-collar jobs. Newly-built housing went to colonists fresh off the train rather than to local inhabitants who had sometimes been on the waiting list for decades. Housing discrimination contributed heavily to the low birth rate of Estonians. Immigrant physicians, who could not understand the complaints of Estonian children, all too often berated the parents for not raising their children in the language of the empire. In altercations with Estonians, the Russians frequently claimed special privileges because "they had liberated Estonia from the fascists" and in the same breath called Estonians fascists themselves. At times, language discrimination reached the point where Russian salespersons snarled "Speak a human language" to their Estonian-speaking customers.

Within the Soviet Union, Estonians enjoyed the highest standard of living, but they would gladly have exchanged it for the lowest in Western Europe. Almost on a par with Finland toward the end of the 1930's, Estonians watched themselves slip back in relative terms and, since 1975, in absolute terms as well. The gradually increasing contacts with Finland and reception of Finnish television in Estonia only rubbed in the difference.

From 1950 to the mid-1980's, all top administrative posts in the republic were occupied by Russified descendants of Estonians who had emigrated to Russia during the tsarist period. These people had little or no command of Estonian, lacked an understanding of Estonian culture, and were happy to oblige Moscow by promoting colonization and the ecologically reckless exploitation of Estonia's resources. In 1978, a native Estonian, Vaino Väljas, emerged as a likely candidate for the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia (CPE).[8] Väljas's pro-Moscow stance made him look "more royalist than the king." However, the position went to Siberian-born Karl Vaino, whose chief distinction was his inability to learn his ancestral Estonian during a 40-year residence in the country.

[6]For details of the history of the Baltic republics from 1940 to 1980, see Misiunas and Taagepera, op. cit. The best comprehensive work on the entire history of Estonia is Toivo Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987.

[7]According to the 1989 census (in *Rahva Hääl* [Tallinn], Sept. 19, 1989), the population of the Estonian SSR was 61.5 percent Estonian, 30.3 percent Russian, 3.1 percent Ukrainian, 1.8 percent Belorussian, and 3.3 percent various others. It is unclear to what extent Soviet military personnel and their dependents were counted in these figures and to what extent Estonian draftees were excluded.

[8]The customary form used in English, "Estonian Communist Party" could be interpreted as a territorial or an ethnic designation. The actual Estonian name, *Eestimaa Kommunistlik Partei* (Communist Party of Estonia), explicitly stresses its nature as a territorial and not an ethnic subdivision.

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The ongoing environmental campaign in Estonia—a Narva rally in June 1989 displays the banner "Stop Damaging Land and Fields!"

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

A small organized dissident movement emerged in the late 1960's, but only after the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975—which obligated the signatories to guarantee civil and political rights in their countries—did dissent in Estonia reach more significant proportions. Such groups as the Association of Concerned Estonians, the Estonian Democratic Movement, and the 40 prominent members of the intelligentsia who signed an open letter to *Pravda* in October 1980 protested Moscow's failure to observe the Helsinki Accords, expressed concern over the fate of the nation, and objected to the Russification of the republic. The regime responded indecisively. However, after the prison death of chemistry lecturer (and party member) Jüri Kukk in 1981, the regime managed to arrest nearly all open dissidents by 1983. Thereafter, protests became even more muted.[9]

The Phosphate Spring

Leonid Brezhnev's death and the eventual accession to power by Gorbachev brought few visible changes in Estonia. However, after Brezhnev's death and in departure from past practice, a native Estonian, Arnold Rüütel, became the head of state in 1983, and another, Bruno Saul, became Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1984. Moreover, Estonian and central press coverage of Estonia's economic and social problems increased markedly in 1986; even the forcible dispatch of thousands of Estonians to Chernobyl' was mentioned.[10] But by and large, Tallinn trailed Moscow in political activity. It also trailed Riga, where major protests erupted over the state of the environment in November 1986. It was only in the spring of 1987 that environmental demonstrations were organized in Tallinn.

These demonstrations were prompted by the deci-

[9]Misiunas and Taagepera, op. cit., pp. 253–58; Rein Taagepera, *Softening Without Liberalization in the Soviet Union: The Case of Jüri Kukk*, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1984. See also, Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent*, Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1985, Ch. 3.

[10]Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, "The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1980–1986," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 20, 1989, pp. 65–88.

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sion of the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production to initiate ecologically disastrous phosphate mining in northeast Estonia, and Gorbachev's visit to Estonia in February 1987 offered an opportunity to raise the issue directly with him, bypassing the republic's top administrators. Estonian youth organized numerous small protest demonstrations over this issue, and public discussion of it took place in the media. Although most protesters had expected few tangible results, the demonstrations did succeed in forcing the regime to shelve its mining plans.[11]

This success prepared the ground for further protest actions because it bolstered the confidence of the protesters and showed those who had remained quiescent that a significant number of people were no longer afraid to speak out. The attitude that "They'll never permit us to do that" changed into "We'll do it anyway." Valuable organizing experience also had been obtained, and the regime's grip on the mass media was broken. History had begun to move.

On August 23, 1987—the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—Lagle Parek and other dissidents recently released from prison obtained grudging official permission to hold a demonstration at Tallinn's Hirvepark. The gathering protested the Pact and called for the publication of its secret protocols. About 2,000 people attended this demonstration, a smaller number than at a simultaneous meeting in Riga, but more than in a similar commemoration in Vilnius. Following this meeting, the Estonian Group for Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (*Molotov-Ribbentropi Pakti Avalikustamise Eesti Grupp*—MRP-AEG) was formed.

At this point, closet reformers within the establishment, who had been cautiously testing the water, realized that they were losing initiative to forces that could provoke the very Stalinist backlash they wanted to avoid by going slowly. Therefore, the Hirvepark demonstration may also have speeded the drawing up of a plan for Estonia's economic autonomy embodied in the "Four-Man Proposal" published on September 26, 1987. This proposal called for such extensive economic changes in Estonia as granting the republic jurisdiction over its own economy, the introduction of complete self-financing throughout the republic, the establishment of a convertible Estonian ruble as the basis for all economic transactions, and complete enterprise autonomy in trade relations with other countries.[12]

The "Four-Man Proposal" was signed by Siim Kallas, a journalist; Edgar Savisaar, a former planning committee official; Tiit Made, a television commentator; and Mikk Titma, vice-president of the Soviet Sociology Association. (One year later Titma was to become the CPE secretary for ideology. The other three were elected to the all-Union Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, and Savisaar was also to become Estonia's vice-premier in charge of implementing the plan for economic autonomy.) Throughout late 1987, these four were subject to official criticism, but ironically, hoping to demonstrate that republic economic autonomy was impossible, those who attacked the "Four-Man Proposal" fell into the trap of documenting in great and often petty detail the extent to which Estonia's economy was run from Moscow. Savisaar managed to turn this argument on its head, using it as proof that overcentralization had reached absurd proportions.[13]

In the late fall of 1987, *glasnost'* began to take root in Estonia, and a number of changes were initiated in the cultural sphere. In November 1987, an article by historian Evald Laasi opened the public discussion of Stalin's crimes. It again became acceptable to celebrate Christmas. On December 12, a number of local organizations that had cooperated for more than a year to clear overgrown churchyards and to prepare for more extensive actions in the cultural sphere combined to form the Estonian Heritage Society (EHS). In January 1988, Stalinist CPE Ideology Secretary Rein Ristlaan was replaced by Indrek Toome, who established a dialogue with the reformists.

Regime hard-liners responded to these changes with force, thus catalyzing divisions within the opposition and, paradoxically, further liberalization. On February 2, 1988, a demonstration in Tartu, held in commemoration of the Estonian-Soviet peace treaty of 1920, was brutally attacked by the police. In retrospect, this police action was to be the last such act in Estonia, but at the time it brought a sharp disagreement over tactics between MRP-AEG, which planned more confrontational measures, including major demonstrations on Estonia's Independence Day (February 24), and the reformers, who, fearing a backlash, advocated more measured approaches.

To defuse discontent over the police action of February 2, the authorities allowed publication of an objective history of the events surrounding Estonia's independence in 1918 (official Soviet views had previously represented the newly independent Estonian government

[11]Mare Taagepera, "Ecological and Political Implications of Phosphorite Mining in Estonia," ibid., pp. 261–70.

[12]Toomas Ilves, "Conformist Communists Propose Turning Estonia into Closed Economic Zone," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Baltic Situation Report, No. 7, Oct. 28, 1987.

[13]Toivo Miljan, "The Proposal to Establish Economic Autonomy in Estonia," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 20, 1989, pp. 245–60.

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as a "bourgeois dictatorship"). From then on, open praise of Estonia's period of independence was sanctioned. Moreover, in Tallinn alone, about 10,000 people were able to participate in the February 24 demonstrations, without police interference.[14]

The Spring of the Flag

The public display of the prohibited national colors by the EHS (in Tartu on April 14–17) may not have been the most important event during the spring of 1988, but most Estonians will remember it anyway as the "Spring of the Blue-Black-White"—the spring when the displaying of the still-prohibited flag spread throughout the land, when tens of thousands of Estonians spent entire nights singing and waving flags. As a result of the "singing revolution," which continued into September, the Presidium of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) Supreme Soviet, on June 23, 1988, legalized the flag, and elderly Estonians declared that they could now die in peace.

Meanwhile, other major developments were taking place that represented a multifaceted breakthrough. At an April 1–2 meeting of the leaders of the creative unions (writers, artists, journalists, etc.), the mood was extremely defiant. For the first time, a member of the establishment—Rein Veidemann, editor of the monthly *Vikerkaar* (*Raduga* in the Russian-language edition)—mentioned publicly the possibility of Estonia leaving the Soviet Union: "If self-management cannot be implemented within the framework of the existing legislation of the federal state, then the constitutional right of self-determination must be exerted so as to shift to self-management through this means." The official press reported Veidemann's statement, along with radical proposals by representatives of the creative unions to the upcoming 19th Conference of the CPSU and a letter

[14]For more details and documentation, see Rein Taagepera, "Estonia in September 1988: Stalinists, Centrists, and Restorationists," ibid., pp. 271–86.

An October 1, 1988, meeting, left to right, of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia Vaino Väljas, party Secretary for Ideology Indrek Toome, and Edgar Savisaar, a leader of the Popular Front of Estonia.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

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expressing lack of confidence in the republic's top administrators.[15]

Then, on April 13, Edgar Savisaar proposed the creation of a "Popular Front for the Support of *Perestroyka*" (hereafter—Popular Front), and an initiative group to promote the new organization was quickly formed. A few days later, the EHS brought out the national flag. On April 28, a decision was made to create an Estonian Green Movement, the actual founding of which took place on May 23.

Increasingly out of touch with the burgeoning popular movement for reform, CPE First Secretary Vaino decided to appoint the Estonian delegation to the upcoming 19th Party Conference in Moscow without holding the multicandidate elections called for by the CPSU's central leadership. When the Popular Front called for a mass meeting on June 17 to meet with these delegates, Vaino asked Moscow for military support. But CPE Ideology Secretary Toome intervened and, on June 16, the Kremlin agreed to dismiss Vaino. The next day, 150,000 people came out to celebrate. The native Estonian over whom Vaino had been chosen in 1978, Vaino Väljas, now replaced him. At the Party Conference, Väljas defended the Popular Front's platform, which called for extensive republic economic autonomy.

By September, the CPE leadership had fully embraced the goal of Estonia's economic autonomy. Meanwhile, however, popular demands for change had outrun the party's willingness to push for incremental reforms. For example, the Popular Front had itself embraced a program calling for political changes, including a "transformation of the Soviet Union from a federal state into a confederation of states," with juridical guarantees and the establishment of a political mechanism for leaving the union.[16]

Many taboos on the discussion of blank spots in Estonia's recent history also disappeared. Thus, the Soviet takeover was called an occupation, and the republic's main daily, *Rahva Hääl*, published the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on August 11 and 12, 1988. The MRP-AEG, which thereby had achieved its short-term goal, folded, and reemerged on August 20 as the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP). The Popular Front demonstrated its strength by calling a meeting on September 11 in which 250,000 people participated, and this organization was formally constituted on October 2.

But the forces of reaction were also mobilizing. Many Russian and Russified settlers in Estonia thought of themselves as representatives of the imperial power in the republic and hence feared the upsurge of national feeling associated with the popular forces for reform. On July 12, these Russian conservatives formed their own popular movement—the Internationalist Front (later, Intermovement)—to resist the Estonian groups whose platforms embodied liberal nationalism.

When Prime Minister Saul resigned on November 16, 1988, the top leadership of the ESSR passed completely into the hands of the reformists, who included CPE First Secretary Väljas, head of state Arnold Rüütel (who has come to play a very active role in support of reform), Indrek Toome as the new prime minister, and Mikk Titma as the new ideology secretary. As of early December 1989, these officials were still in place.

The Winter of Sovereignty

The next major step on the road of reform did not come as a result of an Estonian initiative but was imposed by Moscow. Either by design or through insensitive wording, the changes in the Soviet Constitution that Gorbachev wanted to ram through the Supreme Soviet in November 1988 appeared to limit the rights of the union republics. Estonians raised a number of objections to the proposed changes. The alteration appeared to abolish the union republics' rights to leave the Union (although Article 72, which grants this right to republics, was not abolished) by granting to the new Congress of People's Deputies the power to "take decisions on questions of the composition of the USSR," which would include acting on demands for secession. Estonians also claimed that the proposed changes further centralized power in Moscow and that in the new Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet the representation of the union republics would fall in relation to that of the Russian republic.

The popular mood in Estonia favored invoking Article 72 while the right to secede was still unambiguous. On November 16, Väljas guided the ESSR Supreme Soviet through a tense meeting, which adopted a "Declaration About Sovereignty" ("about," not "of"!). This declaration stopped short of demanding Estonia's secession from the Soviet Union, yet interpreted the Soviet Constitution in the manner most favorable to gaining Estonia's sovereignty.[17]

[15]Veidemann was quoted in *Sirp ja Vasar* (Tallinn), Apr. 15, 1988. A full translation of proposals to Moscow can be found in *Homeland*, Apr. 20, 1988.

[16]*Sirp ja Vasar*, Aug. 5, 1988. *Sirp ja Vasar* (Hammer and Sickle) was renamed *Reede* (Friday) in July 1989.

[17]For the declaration to have legal validity by the time the USSR Supreme Soviet met, it had to have been published 10 days earlier. This deadline was met by printing a unique joint issue of *Rahva Hääl* and *Sovetskaya Estoniya* (Tallinn) on Nov. 18, 1989, with one page in Estonian and one in Russian. See the English text in *Homeland*, Nov. 23, 1989.

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As a consequence of their actions, the Estonian leaders (and Rüütel in particular) had to withstand a series of coarse verbal assaults from Gorbachev, other leaders in Moscow, and the central press. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet declared the Estonian sovereignty legislation unconstitutional, but nevertheless on December 7, the ESSR Supreme Soviet affirmed its stance. The Estonian line was that the Soviet Constitution was itself contradictory, especially after the latest changes. A stalemate resulted, and a prolonged stalemate between a pawn and a queen works in the former's favor.

Other changes proceeded apace, and these moves attempted to draw a balance between the interests of the Estonian and Russian speakers of the republic's population. A language law passed by the ESSR Supreme Soviet on January 18, 1989, declared Estonian to be the state language. But the law also gave even stronger guarantees for the use of Russian, and consequently some Estonians protested its ratification. At the same time, a number of Russian colonists protested the requirement that within four years all officials and salespeople be able to give service both in Estonian and Russian. Previously, Russian was required while Estonian was optional, and the extremists among the colonists considered the new parity "discriminatory."

This disagreement reflected fundamental, perhaps irreconcilable, differences between the Estonians and the colonists. The basic premise of Estonians was that Estonia was a distinct country, although occupied. The colonialist premise was that Estonia was just another Russian province, in which the colonists still graciously allowed other languages to coexist with Russian. Arguments based on such divergent premises were hard to settle, and indicated the extent to which politics in the republic had become polarized along national lines.[18]

But as events occurred with such rapidity and the government acceded to some of the demands of the reform movement, Estonians themselves, although agreeing on objectives, found themselves in disagreement over the pace of change. Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies on March 26, 1989 (with some runoffs or repeats on April 9 and May 14), caused a dispute between the Popular Front, which chose to participate, and the ENIP and the EHS, which argued that it was absurd to send Estonian delegates "to the parliament of a neighboring country." At the same time, relations between the Popular Front and the CPE were becoming more tense, and the Popular Front was not officially registered until February 2. The CPE itself was badly split along national lines. As a reflection of the polarization between the colonists and native Estonians, Intermovement, which was formally constituted on March 6, called for the resignation of the native Estonian leaders of the CPE. Ironically, this demand helped make the leaders of the Estonian party more popular with the Estonian people than the CPE as a whole.

About 95 percent of Estonians and 75 percent of non-Estonians voted in the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies. Nominations and vote-counting were basically fair. The candidates supported by the Popular Front (who included Väljas, Rüütel, and Toome) won 27 out of 36 seats. Intermovement and its allies won five seats. The second secretary of the CPE and the ESSR KGB chief—both non-Estonians—were shunned by both sides and lost badly. Of the 36 seats, 29 went to Estonians. Voting generally followed nationality lines; however, Leningrad-born economist Mikhail Bronshtein, who was endorsed by the Popular Front, won handily in a heavily Estonian district. Estonian nationals also received 11 of the 12 seats allocated to the ESSR through various all-Union organizations.[19]

Although the CPE and Popular Front leaders received a major boost from elections, they also faced a new challenge in the form of Citizens' Committees, organized by the EHS, ENIP, and the small Estonian Christian Union (ECU) to register citizens of the prewar Republic of Estonia and their offspring, as well as later immigrants wishing to be considered for citizenship in a newly independent republic. The underlying motives for this registration require some explanation.

In principle, Estonia's independence could be reestablished in two ways. One approach rests on the existence of the Estonian SSR and aims to work through the ESSR's present political institutions toward the republic's gradual emancipation. The outcome of this approach would be genuine autonomy within the USSR (the stated goal of the CPE up to the spring of 1989), a treaty of confederation between Estonia and the USSR (as proposed by the Popular Front in August 1988), or independent statehood outside the USSR, similar to Hungary or Finland (a goal increasingly voiced by the Popular Front since the spring of 1989).

A second approach presumes the continued legal existence of the interwar Republic of Estonia and, as outlined by EHS leader Trivimi Velliste on February 24, 1989, would be based on the Citizens' Committees. Once these committees succeeded in registering more

[18]For a perceptive description of the atmosphere and personalities in January 1989, see David K. Shipler, "A Reporter At Large: Symbols of Sovereignty," *The New Yorker* (New York), Sept. 18, 1989, pp. 52–99.

[19]For details of events associated with the elections, see Rein Taagepera, "Elections in Estonia, March 1989," unpublished manuscript.

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Table 1: Political Preferences of Inhabitants of Estonia, April 13–16, 1989

Organizations	Estonians	Others	Total
Intermovement	0.0	10.9	4.0
Joint Council of Work Collectives	0.9	17.8	7.0
Communist Party of Estonia	7.2	32.2	16.2
Union of Work Collectives	0.2	5.9	2.3
Rural Union	7.5	4.1	6.3
No preference	3.4	6.8	4.7
Popular Front of Estonia	50.3	8.9	35.2
Estonian Green Movement	12.6	11.5	12.2
Estonian Heritage Society	6.0	0.3	3.9
Estonian Christian Union	2.4	0.6	1.7
Estonian National Independence Party	9.6	0.9	6.4

SOURCES: *Iltasanomat* (Helsinki), May 2, 1989; also *Homeland* (Tallinn), May 17, 1989; and *Vaba Maa* (Tallinn), No. 6, May 1989, p. 3.

than 550,000 people (a majority of the population of the Republic of Estonia), an Estonian Congress could be called. That Congress would appoint delegates to enter into talks with Moscow regarding troop withdrawals. The Congress would have no legislative powers, but it would constitute an independent forum to discuss the future of Estonia. Its popular basis and independence from the established regime would lend it a great deal of legitimacy. Despite opposition by the leaders of the CPE and the Popular Front, local Citizens' Committees quickly emerged and began to collect signatures.[20]

Some evidence of the relative popularity of these two approaches, as well as of the conservative and reactionary groups on the Estonian political scene, was ascertained for the first time in a survey commissioned by the Finnish newspaper *Iltasanomat* and carried out by Mainor, a commercial enterprise associated with the Popular Front.[21] Table 1 shows the first preferences of Estonians and non-Estonians. Political groups are listed according to their approximate location on a scale moving from the most reactionary at the top to the most reform-minded at the bottom.

As the table shows, Intermovement and the allied Joint Council of Work Collectives had only 29 percent support even among the non-Estonians, a plurality of whom placed their trust in the CPE. The CPE, however, ranked a poor fifth among the Estonians, surpassed not only by the Popular Front but also by the Greens, the ENIP, and even the newly-formed Rural Union (an organization that is largely the creation of state and collective farm managers). The Popular Front won the support of an absolute majority of Estonians and even managed to make significant inroads among non-Estonians. The groups promoting the Citizens' Committees (EHS, ENIP, ECU) were the first preference of only 18 percent of Estonians.

The Summer of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

The debates in the Congress of People's Deputies (and later in the Supreme Soviet) in late spring and summer 1989 produced two major outcomes for the Baltic republics: Moscow's acceptance in principle of economic autonomy for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, on July 27; and the formation of a Supreme Soviet commission to investigate the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the 50th anniversary of which was imminent. Although the crucial enabling laws for implementation of autonomy remained to be haggled out in the fall, Savisaar became ESSR vice-premier in charge of economic reform and began preparations for the implementation of autonomy and the movement to a market economy, without waiting for approval from Moscow.[22] But whatever the long-range impact of the autonomy decision, it was overshadowed in the short run by the commemoration of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

The formation of the commission to investigate the Pact occurred against the backdrop of further moves on the part of the CPE and the Popular Front toward independence. Thus, the CPE came out in support of the Popular Front's demand for a treaty of confederation between Estonia and the Soviet Union. Even CPE Ideology Secretary Titma publicly acknowledged that Soviet Estonia "was born as a result of a Stalin-Hitler deal."[23]

[20]At first glance, the Citizens' Committees' approach looks utopian: why would Moscow wish to deal with representatives of a "Republic of Estonia" rather than those of the Estonian SSR? However, Moscow may have good reasons to raise the issue of Estonia's independence with the Citizens' Committees when the republic's departure from the Soviet Union becomes a subject for discussion in Moscow. If the Estonian SSR were to use Article 72 of the Soviet Constitution to leave the Soviet Union, this action would establish a precedent for all the other union republics. By contrast, a Soviet troop-withdrawal from a Republic of Estonia unjustly occupied by Stalin would be analogous to the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and would create no legal precedent for the union republics that were part of the Soviet Union before 1940.

[21]*Iltasanomat* (Helsinki), May 2, 1989; also *Homeland*, May 17, 1989; and *Vaba Maa* (Tallinn), No. 6, May 1989, p. 2. *Vaba Maa* is published by the Popular Front. The Union of Work Collectives, whose popularity was gauged in the survey, is a centrist counterweight to the reactionary Joint Council of Work Collectives, which is dominated by Russians.

[22]On November 27, 1989, the USSR Supreme Soviet granted the Baltic republics economic autonomy, beginning on January 1, 1989. The new legislation grants these republics control over their local financial systems, banking, factories, and other state-run enterprises. Moscow will retain control over oil and gas lines, and other facilities that the legislation deems of all-Union importance. See *The Washington Post*, Nov. 28, 1989.

[23]*Homeland*, July 5, 19, and 26, 1989.

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During a break in the proceedings at the USSR Supreme Soviet in July 1989, Estonian Prime Minister Indrek Toome (right) and Communist Party of Lithuania First Secretary Algirdas Brazauskas (left) examine a draft law aimed at giving their republics greater financial independence from the Kremlin.

—Dominique Dudouble/REUTERS/BETTMANN NEWSPHOTOS.

At the same time, the Popular Front was moving further toward independence by asking that the ESSR Supreme Soviet declare Estonia's incorporation into the Soviet Union illegal and invalid.

The Supreme Soviet commission on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact contained both Russians and other non-Balts, many of whom wanted to minimize its historical significance, and Balts, who continued to discover further documentation on how the Pact had led to the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. As the anniversary date of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact approached, the members of the Supreme Soviet commission investigating the Pact split, and on July 20, 14 of its 26 members signed an assessment to the effect that a secret protocol to the Pact had infringed on the rights of third countries, including the Baltic states. The 14 members of the commission recommended that the USSR Supreme Soviet condemn these protocols and declare them invalid. The Balts were disappointed and angry when Aleksandr Yakovlev, chairman of the commission, did not sign the assessment and maintained that the Pact had no connection with the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR.[24]

Emotionally, the highlight of the summer was the Baltic Chain, organized by the three popular fronts in the Baltic republics on August 23. Throughout Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, 1–2 million people participated, peacefully joining hands and shouting "We demand freedom! Freedom! Freedom!"[25] "The Baltic Way," a joint statement of the three popular fronts, condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the resulting occupation of the Baltic states, and called for restoration of Baltic statehood, but refrained from using the buzzword "independence":

We remind all nations that under international law treaties of this kind are criminal and unlawful from the very moment of signing. This knowledge, which the apologists of imperialism and red fascists have preferred to overlook, has supported and kept us alive despite the decades-long public terror and systematic genocide.

Stability on the shores of the Baltic must be built on a system of treaties such as was in force before the deal of 1939, and which stems from the peace treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and the Baltic states in 1920.

The BALTIC WAY is a parliamentary way for the peaceful restoration of our statehood.

The BALTIC WAY will guarantee social security, civil rights, and economic progress to all peoples in the Baltic republics regardless of their nationality.[26]

The suspicions of Moscow and the non-Estonians within the republic had also been aroused by a law on local elections passed by the ESSR Supreme Soviet on August 8. This legislation stipulated that only citizens who had lived not less than the past two years on the territory of the district in which they were voting or for a total of five years in the Estonian SSR had the right to vote.[27] The goal of this part of the law was to prevent Soviet troops from being transported to cast a pre-marked

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[24]Text of assessment in *Homeland*, Aug. 23, 1989. By late September 1989, 21 out of the 26 members had signed the assessment, but Yakovlev had not. See *Homeland*, Oct. 4, 1989.

[25]I was one of them. As the crucial moment approached, some Popular Front leaders and I joined the chain, whose "links" were joined densely side by side in a pine forest. The chain, standing on the western side of the road and facing east, repeated the slogan mentioned in the text. Properly spaced radios transmitted the incantation. We proceeded to a culminating meeting at the Latvian border. Upon departure, we got an idea of the size of the crowd when our car failed to move more than 10 feet in 90 minutes.

[26]The full English text of "The Baltic Way" can be found in *Homeland*, Aug. 23, 1989.

[27]Saulius Girnius, "Estonian Supreme Soviet Suspends Residency Requirements for Local Elections," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), October 20, 1989, p. 19. See also, Vasil Bykov, "The Intolerance Syndrome," *Moscow News*, Sept. 17–24, 1989, p. 8.

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Estonian demonstrators in traditional dress wave the Estonian flag as they take part in a human chain of protest from Tallinn to Vilnius through the three Baltic republics on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, under which the Soviet Union annexed their countries.

—Dominique Dudouble/REUTERS/BETTMANN NEWSPHOTOS.

ballot in crucial districts.[28] A second clause in the legislation stated that the electoral law should conform to a law on citizenship that would be adopted later.

Intermovement then went on the offensive, with management-ordered work stoppages, staged ostensibly to protest the new electoral law. The strikers also demanded the removal of the CPE and government leaders. Up to 30,000 industrial and transportation workers—4 percent of the total workforce—stopped work (voluntarily or through managerial lockout) for up to six days, from August 11 to 16. By stopping all railroad transportation, the strike could have delivered a knockout blow to the republic's economy, but its effects were minimized by the Estonian authorities. They built a backup transport system using rural buses and trucks.

The demonstration on August 23 and the new election law in Estonia prepared the ground for a CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the Situation in the Republics of the Soviet Baltic." The resolution condemned "the separatist line that certain forces in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have conducted with growing obstinacy and aggressiveness over the course of recent months." The resolution maintained that "here and there organizations recalling the political formations of the bourgeois period and the times of fascist occupation have appeared." With Estonia's recent election law and Lithuania's declaration of sovereignty in mind, the resolution castigated "anticonstitutional acts that contradict the federal principles of the state, that discriminate against the non-indigenous part of the population of these republics." The Central Committee statement then appeared to threaten military action:

Things have gone far. A serious danger threatens the fate of the Baltic nations. People must know toward what kind of abyss nationalist leaders are pushing them. If they succeed in achieving their goals, the consequences could be catastrophic for

[28]This had happened in Tallinn in March 1989. See *Vaba Maa*, No. 4, April 1989, p. 3.

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their peoples. Their very viability could be called into question.[29]

The three Baltic popular fronts quickly used this threat to ask the United Nations to send a human rights commission to the Baltic republics and to debate the Baltic question at a UN General Assembly meeting.[30] On October 14, the three popular fronts criticized the response to Moscow by the Baltic communist parties, which, they said, indicated those parties' "inability or unwillingness to express and defend the interests of their people."[31]

Under pressure from Moscow, on October 5, the ESSR Supreme Soviet suspended the voter residence requirements for the coming elections, to be held on December 10. The suspension did not affect the election law's five-year residence requirement for candidates.

Pressure from Moscow also temporarily affected the Supreme Soviet's position on Estonia's annexation by the Soviet Union. Following Lithuania's lead, on September 25, a commission of the ESSR Supreme Soviet declared the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union illegal, but although the Supreme Soviet accepted the report, it failed to endorse its conclusions. On November 11, however, the Estonian Supreme Soviet reversed its position on the issue. By a vote of 188 to 1, the legislature declared that Estonia's annexation by the Soviet Union amounted to a "military occupation." (CPE chief Väljas did manage to introduce a clause into this legislation stipulating that this resolution did not denote Estonia's secession from the USSR.)[32]

[29]*Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 27, 1989. See also *Homeland*, Sept. 6, 1989.
[30]Letter to United Nations' Secretary General Xavier Perez de Cuellar by the Baltic Council of the three popular fronts. Riga, Aug. 31, 1989.
[31]*Noorte Hääl*, Oct. 16, 1989.
[32]*The Washington Post*, Nov. 14, 1989.

Platform of the Popular Front

By September, the Citizens' Committees had registered 300,000 people (one-tenth of them postwar immigrants applying for Republic of Estonia citizenship). It looked as if their goal of organizing an Estonian Congress might be within reach. Faced with this competition, plus the need to devise a program for the upcoming local elections (and the elections to the ESSR Supreme Soviet in early 1990), the Popular Front of Estonia came out with an electoral platform that unambiguously set independence as the final goal. The intermediate stages were to involve the following:

- instituting democratic elections;
- specifying the present status of Estonia as an occupied territory;
- renaming the ESSR Supreme Soviet a "Constituent Assembly," and thus formally abolishing the entity called "ESSR";
- convoking an Estonian Congress of all pro-inde-

Strikers at the entrance to the Baltic ship-repair yard in Tallinn in the summer of 1989. The placard reads: "We Are on Strike for Equality of Nations—Without Priority."

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

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Table 2: Some Major Milestones in National Self-Assertion of the Baltic Republics, 1986–89

	Estonia	Lithuania	Latvia
LATVIAN PHASE			
First major ecology protest	March 1987	June 1986	October 1986
First major history-oriented protest	August 1987	August 1987	June 1987
ESTONIAN PHASE			
First public discussion of economic autonomy	September 1987	May 1988	October 1988
Latest repression of a demonstration	February 1988	September 1988	March 1989
Birth of republic popular front	April 1988	May 1988	June 1988
Removal of old guard party chief	June 1988	October 1988	October 1988
Legalization of national flag	June 1988	October 1988	October 1988
National language declared state language	June 1988	November 1988	October 1988
Birth of local colonialist organization	July 1988	November 1988	October 1988
Founding congress of the popular front	October 1988	October 1988	October 1988
Formal declaration of republic sovereignty	November 1988	May 1989	July 1989
State language legislation adopted	January 1989	January 1989	May 1989
Legal registration of popular front	February 1989	March 1989	N.a.
LITHUANIAN PHASE			
Communist youth group becomes autonomous	N.a.	June 1989	N.a.
Republic Supreme Soviet commission declares annexation by USSR illegal	September 1989	August 1989	N.a.
Republic Supreme Soviet itself declares annexation by USSR illegal	November 1989	September 1989	N.a.
Average lag of other republics behind Estonia (September 1987 to February 1989) in months	N.a.	3.5	5

SOURCES: V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuanian National Politics," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1989, pp. 53–76; Juris Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," ibid., pp. 77–94; "National Renaissance of 1988," *Baltic Forum* (New York), Fall 1988, pp. 1–21; "On the Road to Sovereignty," ibid., Spring 1989, pp. 38–51; Baltic Appeal to the United Nations, "Chronology of Events in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania," New York, 1989; and Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR*, (Munich), Sept. 15, 1989.

pendence forces;

- obtaining Moscow's approval for a referendum on independence and a treaty of confederation;
- calling an internationally supervised referendum on independence, with only citizens of the prewar Republic of Estonia, their descendants, and other Estonians taking part;
- concluding a temporary treaty of confederation with the Soviet Union that would fix a date for independence;
- establishing a separate Estonian citizenship (presumably to include many postwar settlers who wish to become citizens);
- developing economic autonomy and a balanced economic approach toward East and West;
- gradually demilitarizing Estonia;
- calling a referendum to approve the Constitution of independent Estonia;
- declaring an independent Republic of Estonia.[33]

This program stole most of the thunder of the Citizens' Committees (including their desire to convoke an "Estonian Congress"). Nevertheless, the Citizens' Committees continued to deny the need for a referendum on independence, resting their case on a presumption of the continued legal existence of the prewar Republic of Estonia. On November 11, they elected a nation-wide 50-member General Committee to implement their program.

The Popular Front platform also intimated that the Popular Front would soon declare itself a Social Democratic Party on the model of those in the Scandinavian countries: "With the publication of the [Popular Front] electoral platform, the politics of the [Popular Front of Estonia] enters a new phase where the social democratic ideology of the Popular Front is given a firmer

[33]*Noorte Hääl*, Oct. 17, 1989. For an overview of the Popular Front's program, see *Homeland*, Oct. 25, 1989.

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framework, while at the same time leaving room, within the Popular Front, to Eurocommunist as well as liberal and centrist tendencies."[34] Thus, although in theory a one-party system remains in Estonia, in fact a multiparty system is about to emerge in the republic.

Inter-Baltic Comparisons

In his recent article on "Lithuanian National Politics," V. Stanley Vardys repeatedly mentions "the Estonian model." Juris Dreifelds in "Latvian National Rebirth" specifies that broadly speaking, among the Baltic republics Latvia led on the road to reform in 1987, Estonia in 1988, and Lithuania in 1989.[35] Table 2 confirms this pattern, but also makes it more precise. Estonia pulled decisively ahead of Latvia as early as September 1987, with the "Four-Man Proposal" for economic autonomy, and remained the reform leader until May 1989, when Lithuania's Supreme Soviet passed a resolution declaring the republic's sovereignty. Lithuania then pulled ahead of Estonia in the summer of 1989, when its Communist Youth League formally distanced itself from the all-Union Komsomol and a commission of its Supreme Soviet declared the Soviet annexation of Lithuania illegal. (The only earlier Lithuanian "first" occurred in November 1988, when Lithuania's Supreme Soviet made the national colors the republic's official flag. This move occurred as part of the Communist Party of Lithuania's efforts to stem criticism of the Supreme Soviet's refusal at the time to declare Lithuanian law sovereign in the republic.)[36]

As shown by Table 2, from late 1987 to early 1989, the events in Lithuania lagged, on the average, 3.5 months behind comparable events in Estonia. In the case of Latvia this lag was about five months.

What caused the successive periods of Latvian, Estonian, and now Lithuanian leadership? It probably results from numerous factors, but the most important apparently being the indigenous nation's share of the population of its titular national republic. These figures are given in Table 3.

The national factor affects the Baltic republics, but in different ways. Because Lithuanians make up a much larger share of their republic's population than the titular nationalities of the other two Baltic republics, the Lithuanians can afford to be more cautious, because they are not subject to the threat of minority status within their own republic, much less to the threat of demographic extinction.

By contrast, the need to resist is greatest in Latvia, because of the acute threat of national extinction through colonization by other Soviet nationalities, mainly Russians. In the early phase of national resurgence, when activities in Latvia centered around concern for the environment, despair over the fate of their nation compelled Latvians to act, because they believed they had nothing to lose. But as activities became more politicized, the Latvians' boldness diminished when confronted with threats of counteraction by non-Latvians and the center in Moscow.

Estonians saw their share in the country's population rapidly decreasing but they acted while they still had sufficient numbers to push for reform. With increasing autonomy, Estonians now have more to lose in case of a backlash, and this autonomy perhaps encourages caution (although the latest platform of the Popular Front is quite bold).

Table 3: Titular Nationality as Percent of Total Population in the Baltic Republics

	1979	1989	Change
Latvians in Latvia	53.7	52.0	-1.7
Estonians in Estonia	64.7	61.5	-3.2
Lithuanians in Lithuania	80.0	79.0 ?	-1.0 ?

SOURCES: Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, "The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1980–1986," *Journal of Baltic Studies* (Mahwah/Hackettstown, NJ), Vol. 20, 1989, p. 71; *Rahva Hääl* (Tallinn), Sept. 19, 1989; and *Cīņa* (Riga), Oct. 12, 1989.

Prospects

The spectrum of political groupings in Estonia was rather stable from June 1988 to November 1989, but the range of political forces may change appreciably in 1990. The CPE faces profound factional strife because its membership is evenly divided between Estonians and non-Estonians. Many Estonians remain in the CPE only in order to prevent its takeover by the colonists. Imitating the recent transformation by the communist party in Hungary, the CPE may declare itself not only independent of the CPSU but also become the "Estonian Socialist Party," thus ridding itself of those colonists who could not accept such a label. Once the CPE is safely in Estonian hands, many Estonian members may leave it—especially when the Popular Front becomes a distinct party. The organizations promoting the Citi-

[34] *Noorte Hääl*, Oct. 17, 1989.

[35] V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuanian National Politics," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1989, pp. 53–76; Juris Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," ibid., pp. 77–94. For some comparisons between the situations in Latvia and Lithuania, and the situation in Belorussia, see Jan Zaprudnik, "Belorussian Reawakening," ibid., pp. 36–52.

[36] See Vardys, loc. cit., pp. 67–68.

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zens' Committees would then feel some pressure to unite into a single party in order to combine their forces in the local and republic elections.

The local elections will be training grounds for the elections of the ESSR Supreme Soviet. Pro-independence forces are certain to win a majority in each case, but because the Russian population is strong in the northeast, Intermovement could win there and try to force the area to secede from Estonia.

The potential for economic reform will be endangered by the central ministries in Moscow, which could sabotage the republic's quest for autonomy and the building of a market economy. This potential threat will only reinforce the desire for political independence.

Next summer will mark the 50th anniversary of the Soviet occupation and annexation of the Baltic states. Certainly this anniversary will be the focus of concerted Baltic action. Faced with a deteriorating economy and various other problems, the Kremlin could well decide to reduce its overall burden by denouncing Stalin's annexations and announcing the withdrawal of Soviet garrisons from the Baltic republics within the next few years.[37] Intervention by the empire is also possible, of course, especially if opponents of *perestroyka* assume power in Moscow.[38] In that event, the Balts might be held responsible for forcing the conservatives' hand.

The most likely scenario is continued progress toward independence. Granting formal independence to the Baltic republics would improve the Soviet image abroad, while existing all-Union economic links would ensure continued close Baltic cooperation with the Soviet Union. As important, Soviet security might well be enhanced if an extensive demilitarized zone—which would include the Baltic states—could be established in Northern Europe.

[37]A potential scenario is given in Rein Taagepera's article in *Homeland*, May 31–June 21, 1989.

[38]If Moscow chooses violent repression, it might appoint Jaak Allik, party secretary of the Viljandi district, to pick up the pieces the way János Kádár did in Hungary in 1956. Allik has positioned himself for that role with vocal support for radical reform, coupled with fanatical insistence that the communist party must retain its leading role. He ran against Popular Front leader Savisaar (who won with 73 percent of the vote) in the March 1989 elections, and he reacted submissively (in *Rahva Hääl*, Sept. 3, 1989) to the CPSU Central Committee's threat of a crackdown in the Baltic republics.

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New Cooperatives in the USSR

Anthony Jones and William Moskoff

One of the cornerstones of the policy of *perestroyka* in the Soviet Union is the development of avenues for the functioning of private economic activity. As General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev told the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), "the top priority of the party and of the entire people is to decisively conquer the unfavorable tendencies in the development of the economy, to impart the proper dynamism to it, and to open scope for the initiative and creativity of the masses and for genuine revolutionary transformations."[1] The process is now sufficiently developed to allow us to make a preliminary evaluation of how well the policy of privatization of the Soviet economy is working in one potentially important sector—the new cooperatives. The evidence to date suggests a mixture of success and failure. There is concern in some quarters in the Soviet Union that the new cooperative movement is in danger of dying. At the very least, it is not certain that cooperatives will survive either in their current form or in the form desired by their most optimistic supporters.

Although the recent development of cooperatives—like the experiments in leasing state property to private individuals and establishing family production contracts in agriculture—is radical compared to the predominant central planning model, it reflects a long-term trend toward more diverse official and unofficial forms of Soviet economic activity. As Anders Åslund has recently reminded us, "the non-state economy has been both larger and more complex than official Soviet publications have suggested."[2] Numerous unregistered groups of migrant workers (*shabashniki*) have performed various production and construction tasks, individuals have provided a variety of services, and peasants have raised significant quantities of meat and produce on their private plots.

Prior to *perestroyka*, "the relatively large cooperative sectors in agriculture, trade, and housing," Åslund argues, had increasingly "lost all independence and become almost as petrified as state enterprises . . . ."[3] The official cooperatives were a legal fiction under which property nominally was owned corporately, unlike state enterprises, which were allegedly the property of society as a whole. As typified by the collective farms (*kolkhozy*) and state farms (*sovkhozy*) respectively, the two forms did not differ that dramatically—neither the cooperative nor state organizational forms offered avenues for individual initiative or profit. By contrast, the new cooperatives are literally the property of those who create them, making them much more like private enterprises in the capitalist sense.

Nevertheless, in the constricting system, where the old cooperatives did not offer avenues for individual initiative or profit, private enterprise did manage to emerge, but it lay outside the system, virtually unsupported by the state. The spontaneous growth of the underground economy since the 1960's was itself a kind of de facto privatization. In many cases, the new laws on cooperatives legalize activities that were formerly illegal or unsanctioned.

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[1]From the text of Gorbachev's speech, as printed in *Pravda* (Moscow) and *Izvestiya* (Moscow) on Feb. 26, 1986, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter, *CDSP*), Mar. 26, 1986, p. 12.

[2]Anders Åslund, *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 150.

[3]Ibid.

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New Legal Framework

The current form of the new cooperatives has evolved gradually over the last three years. A variety of administrative decrees in 1985 tried to open up the range of non-state economic endeavors, but these measures were vague and little more than suggestions to officials to support and encourage cooperative activity.[4] On November 19, 1986, a Law on Individual Labor Activity (*individual'naya trudovaya deyatel'nost'*) was adopted, providing the first firm foundation for new forms of cooperative activity by allowing family members who resided together to form a business. Yet, the law, which became operative on May 1, 1987, was full of restrictions on private enterprise. While Article 1 encouraged citizens "to unite in cooperatives, voluntary societies, and associations, in accordance with legislatively established procedures," the law contained no clear legal provision for a new form of cooperative activity. The law rejected in advance enterprises that would embody undesirable features of capitalism: "Individual enterprise that involves hired labor, is aimed at deriving unearned income, or is detrimental to other interests of society is not permitted." Only pensioners, students, the disabled, housewives, and others not employed in the state economy were allowed to enter the private sector full-time; those employed in the state sector who wished to participate could do so, but only "in time they have free from their basic work."[5]

On the "Riviera"—patrons at a new private restaurant on a boat on the Moscow River.

—F. Hibon/SYGMA.

The 1986 law provided a fairly detailed list of permitted and forbidden business activities. This perceived need to define a standard of socially acceptable activities—what can be produced, who can be hired, and how much they can earn—has continued to plague the cooperatives right up to the present time. The restrictions imposed in 1986 reflected the leadership's reluctance to grant permanent status to private enterprise. Indeed, at that juncture, the maximum length of time for which a business could be registered was five years.[6] It seems clear that in the first years of *perestroyka,* the new forms of "individual labor activity" were seen as a way of temporarily meeting some of the needs left unmet by the state economy, and certainly not as a potential competitor for state resources—human or other.

In practice, the activities of cooperatives soon began to expand beyond the limits set out in the 1986 law. For example, the narrow restrictions on who could work in a cooperative were soon inoperative. By the end of 1987, 65 percent of those working in the cooperatives held a second job in existing state or cooperative enterprises, i.e., were not the pensioners, housewives, students, and pupils that the 1986 law had hoped to draw into the labor market.[7] As we shall see, Soviet legislation gradually adapted to these changing realities.

Many of the first new cooperatives were successful, and the concept continued to blossom in the second half of 1987 and early 1988, with the encouragement of the party leadership. In November 1987, a resolution of the CPSU Central Committee noted that by October 1, 1987, some 8,000 cooperatives, employing more than 88,000 persons, had already been formed, and that these new entities had produced consumer goods and provided services to the public valued at 134 million rubles. The party resolution bemoaned the slow and uneven development of cooperatives, and the failure of state and party organs to cooperate in the establishment and operation of these new entities, which were

[4]See, for example, *Izvestiya,* July 18, 1985; and *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), Apr. 14, 1985.

[5]See "The Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Individual Labor Activity," *Pravda,* and *Izvestiya,* Nov. 21, 1986, trans. in *CDSP,* Dec. 17, 1986, p. 6.

[6]Ibid., p. 7.

[7]See L. Belopetravicius and V. Sukhachevskiy, " 'Nyanyushka' and Others—The Difficult Beginning of the Cooperative Movement," *Pravda,* Dec. 1, 1987, trans. in *CDSP,* Dec. 30, 1987, p. 10.

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expected to help meet theneeds of the public.[8]

At the same time, the party resolution noted the nonfulfillment of the "requirements that cooperatives be created mainly from among citizens not employed in social production, and also that cooperatives produce commodities and provide services by enlisting *additional* local production and material resources . . . ."[9] Indeed, this period saw the remarkable conversion of unprofitable state and consumer cooperative enterprises into new cooperative establishments, an unwelcome phenomenon reportedly not envisaged by the law on individual economic activity. In the words of one commentary, what was taking place was "not an expansion of the existing network but a change of signboards, which often infringes on the interests of the population."[10]

The high point in the formal recognition of the new cooperatives came on May 26, 1988, with the adoption of the Law on Cooperation in the USSR.[11] This law in a sense marked the emancipation of private enterprise in the USSR. It defined the two primary purposes of the cooperatives as producing goods and services for the population and improving the standard of living of cooperative members. In a remarkable departure from the past, the law specifically guaranteed that cooperatives could own private productive property. Moreover, it instructed government authorities not to interfere with the cooperatives and explicitly stated that local authorities had no power to "approve" (i.e., prohibit) registration of a cooperative. The law conspicuously placed no restrictions on the number of workers a cooperative might employ or the amount of its assets; and it granted cooperatives the right to pursue production in virtually every area of the economy, to issue shares to members in proportion to their contribution and grant members income in proportion to both their financial investment and the amount of their work, and to employ part-time workers on a contractual basis (a major departure from the strictures imposed by the Marxist abhorrence of "exploitation").

[8]"In the CPSU Central Committee—On Experience in the Creation and Operation of Cooperatives in the Sphere of Public Catering and Consumer Services, the Production of Consumer Goods, and the Procurement and Processing of Secondary Raw Materials," *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Nov. 25, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 30, 1987, pp. 9–10.

[9]Ibid., emphasis added.

[10]Belopetravicius and Sukhachevskiy, loc. cit. In the RSFSR (the Russian Federation), a reported 80 percent of the new cooperatives have been formed this way; in Kazakhstan, 72 percent; and in Moldavia, 83 percent.

[11]The text of the law was published in *Pravda*, June 8, 1988. For discussion of the law, see John Tedstrom, "The New Law on Cooperatives," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 246/88, June 10, 1988; and Philip Hanson, "The Draft Law on Cooperatives: An Assessment," ibid., RL 111/88, Mar. 15, 1988.

Table 1: Growth in Number of Soviet Cooperatives

Date	Number of operating cooperatives	Total employed in cooperatives
October 1, 1987	8,000	88,000
January 1, 1988	14,100	N.a.
January 1, 1989	77,500	1,392,000
April 1, 1989	99,300	1,951,000
July 1, 1989	133,000	2,900,000

SOURCES: *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Nov. 25, 1987; *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 18, 1989; *Izvestiya*, June 30, 1989; *Moscow News*, No. 28, 1989; *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 37, September 1989, p. 15.

The law also imposed restrictions on cooperatives. All cooperative members actually had to work in the business. Bonds could be sold only to cooperative members, to employees, to state enterprises, or to other cooperatives.

Growth of the New Cooperatives

Spurred by the new legislation and surmounting many difficulties, Soviet entrepreneurs have wrought a phenomenal growth in the number of cooperatives. From 8,000 in autumn 1987, the number of operating cooperatives soared to 133,000 in July 1989 (see Table 1); another 100,000 had been registered as of the latter date but were not yet operating.[12] The value of goods and services produced by the cooperatives has risen just as dramatically. Output, estimated at 350 million rubles for 1987, rose to more than 6 billion rubles in 1988, and in 1989 registered 4.3 billion rubles in the first quarter alone and a staggering 12.9 billion rubles by the end of June.[13] The 1987 figure represented 0.1 percent of Soviet national product, while the mid-1989 estimate put cooperative production at 2–3 percent of all goods and services.[14] What is striking here is that this increasing level of output is produced by only 1.5 percent of the 130 million people in the Soviet labor force.

Cooperatives engage in a wide range of activities, but most are in the service industry or produce consumer goods. Table 2, showing the types of businesses operating in the RSFSR at the end of June 1988, dem-

[12]*Moscow News*, No. 28, 1989.

[13]*Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 18, 1989; *Sovetskaya Torgovlya* (Moscow), July 22, 1989; and *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 37, September 1989, p. 15. There is little doubt that a part of the increase in the ruble value of cooperative sales is due to higher prices, reflecting, among other things, higher taxes imposed on cooperative earnings (see below).

[14]*Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 18, 1989; and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), May 4, 1989.

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Table 2: Types of Cooperatives in the Russian Republic (RSFSR), Fall 1988

Type of cooperative	Number of cooperatives
Everyday repairs and other services	6,700
Production of consumer goods	3,400
Restaurant food service	2,400
Trade and purchasing	700
Scrap & waste purchasing and processing	700
Retail trade	200
Other	2,200

SOURCE: *FAKT Bulletin* (Moscow), circa October 1988, p. 2.

onstrates the concentration of cooperatives in small-scale activities. Some 30 percent provided services, another 20 percent produced consumer goods, and about 10 percent were in public catering.

Cooperatives are not spread evenly throughout the republics of the Soviet Union. Relatively speaking, the movement is much more active in the Baltic republics than in any other part of the country. As of October 1988, the number of people in cooperatives per 10,000 population was 94 in Estonia and 62 in Latvia. In striking contrast, in Tajikistan the figure was 16, in Azerbaijan it was 15, and in Turkmenistan it was a mere 10.[15] Per capita output of cooperatives, which came to 21 rubles for the country as a whole, was 71 rubles in Latvia, 64 rubles in Estonia, 64 rubles in Armenia, 38 rubles in Georgia, but only 7 rubles in Tajikistan and 6 rubles in Turkmenistan.[16]

Difficulties Facing Cooperatives

Soviet cooperatives face a number of serious obstacles. To begin with, they do not receive sufficient financing from the state banking system. Cooperatives complain that loans are usually for small amounts and granted only for short terms, thereby making it difficult for cooperatives to buy needed equipment or to engage in remodeling.[17] The State Bank (*Gosbank*) has been accused of being inconsistent in deciding who qualifies for loans,[18] and one highly sarcastic article has accused the state of falsely pleading poverty.[19] This credit crunch discourages entrepreneurs from entering more productive lines of enterprise, limits the scale of enterprises opened, and contributes to the phenomenon noted above of large numbers of registered cooperatives that have not begun operations.

Cooperatives have also found it extremely difficult to obtain reliable access to supplies. Restaurants and cafes complain about the absence of meat in the markets. This difficulty is aggravated by a dual pricing system, which often forces cooperatives to pay much higher prices than do state enterprises purchasing the same goods. The supply problem is not limited to consumer goods: for example, a KamAZ truck that usually sells for 17,000 rubles to state enterprises can cost a cooperative 70,000 rubles.[20] (Such costs tend to be passed along to the consumer, contributing to the high prices about which so many complain.) Moreover, many state enterprises refuse to sell or even lease their superfluous equipment to cooperatives.[21]

Acquiring physical premises on which to operate is also a problem. Many cooperatives (especially cafes and restaurants) are in fact operating on premises taken over from failed state operations,[22] and although state enterprises are increasingly renting space and equipment to cooperatives, the number of cooperatives that can gain access to these premises is obviously limited.[23] Other cooperatives must rent space in unsuitable buildings and then bear the cost of converting and equipping them. An innovation that may ease the problem a little surfaced in late 1988 in Moscow, when 85 state stores were "auctioned" to those willing to bid on them.[24]

The cooperative movement encountered official obstructionism almost from its inception. The press is full of horror stories documenting the many ways bureaucrats have prevented cooperatives from being formed and operating effectively. A cooperative can come into existence in two ways: either individuals propose to form a cooperative, or the local government (soviet) decides that it needs a certain kind of cooperative. In the latter case, the soviet's executive committee simply registers the cooperative, and it becomes a legal entity. But in the former case, individuals have to deal with

[15] "The Cooperative Boom: Roses and Thorns," *Politicheskoye Obrazovaniye* (Moscow), June 1989, pp. 103–06.

[16] *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 18, 1989.

[17] See, for example, the article by a cooperative chairman, V. Yurchenko, "Notes of a Cooperative Member: Our First Difficulties," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 29, July 15, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Nov. 11, 1987, p. 5.

[18] *Moscow News*, No. 43, 1988.

[19] *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, July 8, 1989.

[20] *Moscow News*, No. 22, 1988.

[21] Ibid., No. 47, 1987.

[22] Ibid.

[23] The cooperatives that are formally attached to a guarantor enterprise tend to be much better off than independent cooperatives because they can obtain cheap supplies and hence tend to have very high profits. See John Tedstrom, "The Status of Soviet Cooperatives," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Aug. 25, 1989, p. 12.

[24] *Moscow News*, No. 45, 1988. The reporter noted that none of the staff members of these stores showed up at the auction, clearly having no interest in moving to the private sector. "The most important thing that the first auction has ensured," he said, "is that 85 shops will now be staffed by people who welcome customers instead of hating them like sworn enemies."

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many layers of bureaucracy and fill out many forms before they even apply to the soviet for registration.[25] Recalcitrant officials may refuse to allow cooperatives to start either because they cannot find an analogue in the existing economy, or on the basis of sheer whim.[26]

There have also been many instances of officials arbitrarily closing cooperatives. For example, in late 1988 in Yevpatoria in the Crimea, two cooperatives making large profits were closed down because the authorities said they were illegal. According to a press report, except for some minor technicalities, their operations were perfectly legal.[27] In Odessa, a cooperative installing natural gas service was closed by a purely arbitrary administrative decision, in spite of the fact that it could accomplish in a year what it took the state organization nine years to do! The director of the closed cooperative observed:

One gets the impression that not all skies are sunny on the cooperative horizon: Authorization today, prohibition tomorrow; an opening today, a shutdown tomorrow. . . . And there is particular eagerness to "take measures" against cooperatives in places where their enterprising spirit sheds a bright light on the sluggishness and the just plain poor performance of state enterprises.[28]

In a study of 800 readers of *Izvestiya* conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion under the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociological Research, one-third of the those questioned who were members of cooperatives said that "distrust and excessive tutelage on the part of local authorities are the chief obstacles to the development of cooperatives." Thirty-seven percent of all those surveyed said that "the main reason for the reluctance of millions of people to legalize their individual or group enterprise is that they do

[25]See Viktor Yasmann, "Obstacles in the Way of the Cooperative Movement," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 343/87, Aug. 28, 1987, p. 2

[26]See the account of difficulties encountered in creating cooperatives to employ former staffers of the abolished Ukraine republic Ministry of the Coal Industry, *Izvestiya*, Jan. 28, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 24, 1988, pp. 6–7; also *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 4, 1989.

[27]See "Other People's Money," *Izvestiya*, Dec. 12, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Jan. 20, 1988, p. 9.

[28]"Life as It Is: Poor People," *Pravda*, Mar. 24, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 19, 1989, pp. 27–28.

An exercise room in the "Harmony" fitness center, a cooperatively-owned facility in the Kalinin District of Moscow.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

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Table 3: Meat Prices in Collective Farm Markets and Public Catering Establishments

(in rubles and kopeks)

City	Price per 100 grams in collective farm markets		Approximate price per 100 grams entree meat dishes in:		
	Beef	Pork	Cooperative cafes	State cafes	State restaurants
Moscow	0.78	0.72	3.5–4.5	0.7–0.8	1.8–2.0
Riga	0.60	0.52	2.5–3.0	0.6–0.8	1.5–1.7
Tallinn	0.50	0.40	2.0–2.5	0.5–0.6	1.4–1.6
Tbilisi	0.70	0.70	2.0–3.0	0.6–0.7	1.6–1.8
Yerevan	0.59	0.59	2.0–3.0	0.6–0.7	1.5–1.7
Alma–Ata	0.42	0.38	2.0–2.5	0.5–0.6	1.3–1.5
Kishinev	0.60	0.70	2.5–3.0	0.6–0.7	1.4–1.6

SOURCE: *Izvestiya (Moscow)*, Oct. 7, 1988.

not count on any support from the local authorities."[29]

Relations between state enterprises and cooperative enterprises have been marked by a mixture of confusion, jealousy, and inherent limitations on respective actions. For example, in regard to financial operations, cooperatives have a considerable amount of freedom, but the state enterprises with which they are often connected are significantly constrained by their accountability to the state. As *Moscow News* put it, the "economically free cooperatives find themselves part of a fettered, state-run enterprise."[30] Even where state enterprises are well-intentioned and helpful, problems can occur, as in the case where the state obliged an enterprise under penalty of fines to hand over its scrap metal to the state rather than sell it to an efficient cooperative.[31]

Because of the problems involved in setting up a cooperative, these entitites can often find themselves subject to the controls of agencies working at cross purposes. For example, cooperatives unable to find a physical location in their own district in Moscow, often set up their businesses in another district in the city, thereby ending up accountable to two different government offices in addition to a guarantor enterprise.[32]

Cooperative competition with state enterprises has also generated considerable concern. In one recent case, a highly successful truck transport cooperative in Vitebsk was offered business by a major retail outlet in the city, which thereupon broke its contract with the less efficient state transport agency. The latter appealed to its superiors to intervene, and the store was ordered to resume using state transport facilities.[33] The fear of competition on the part of state clinics and hospitals also had much to do with the restrictions imposed on private clinics in December 1988, following which hundreds have reportedly gone out of business.[34]

Public Hostility Toward Cooperatives

Cooperatives have received a mixed reception from Soviet society. The rapidly increasing level of trade indicates that the goods and services that cooperatives provide are welcomed by many in an economy where state-produced goods are in short supply or are of poor quality. But cooperative activity has also engendered a great deal of hostility from two groups: the consuming public, which it is supposed to serve, and the bureaucracy, which it threatens.

A number of surveys have been conducted measuring popular attitudes toward the cooperatives. A poll of 5,500 citizens in Leningrad and Tallinn revealed striking differences in the attitudes of the two populations. In Leningrad, 53 percent of the people had "reservations about cooperatives and individual enterprises." By contrast, in Tallinn, only 31 percent had the same reservations. Overall, of those who had never used a cooperative, 77 percent were opposed to them, while 85 percent of those who had used a cooperative at least once were in favor of them. In the sample, 54 percent of the men as opposed to only 35 percent of the women supported the cooperatives. Since women do most of the shopping, this may reflect more direct experience and an associated antagonism toward the high prices

[29]"Response: Other People's Money," *Izvestiya*, Dec. 22, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Jan 20, 1988, pp. 10, 24.

[30]No. 28, 1989.

[31]*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, June 23, 1989.

[32]*Moscow News*, No. 19, 1988.

[33]*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, June 23, 1989. In a compromise, the store was later allowed to use both the state and coop transport facilities.

[34]*The New York Times*, Mar. 5, 1989.

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charged by cooperatives. There was also a correlation between people's age and their attitudes toward cooperatives. Three-fourths of students were for cooperatives, but only 25 percent of pensioners favored them.[35]

What are the sources of hostility toward cooperatives? Foremost, it is widely believed that cooperatives are gouging the general public. Prices in cooperatives are, indeed, higher than those in subsidized state stores. For example, Table 3 gives the prices for meat in the collective farm markets in July 1988 and then the price of meat dishes in three different types of eating establishments. The data show that prices in cooperative cafes are anywhere from 3.5 to more than 5 times the price of meat dishes in state cafes, and from 1.3 to 2.1 times the prices in state restaurants. With worsening shortages, cooperative prices have risen even more. In spite of these high prices, many people feel that the quality of what they receive from cooperatives is no better, and sometimes even worse, than what they receive from state establishments.[36] (Although Soviet consumers complain vociferously about the explicit monetary costs imposed by high cooperative prices, they fail to recognize that the substantial time costs imposed by state shortages are significantly reduced by cooperatives.)

High prices often translate into unusually high incomes for cooperative members, which arouses great resentment among the population. The differential between the incomes of state workers and those of cooperative workers is substantial and widening. In 1988, the average monthly wage in the state sector was 217 rubles, and only 14 percent of workers and employees had an income over 300 rubles. But in the fourth quarter of 1988, the average monthly earnings of a cooperative worker was 406 rubles before distribution of profits.[37]

This real disparity is intensified in the public mind by press accounts of cooperative members who earn 1,000 or even as much as 12,500 rubles a month.[38] Particular attention was focused on the cooperative Tekhnika, which allegedly made 250 million rubles in profits, in part by trading industrial raw materials with foreign countries for computer parts and then selling computers in the Soviet Union for 50,000 rubles or more. The two top people in the cooperative in December 1988 had paid themselves 690,000 and 510,000 rubles, respectively, and after the Central Committee passed a resolution that month restricting certain cooperative activities (see below), Tekhnika distributed 8 million rubles to its members, with the two top people getting 3 million rubles each and the others in the cooperative receiving 350,000 rubles each.[39]

The high profits of cooperatives are often painted as the result of very little or no effort on the part of manipulative middlemen. A May 28, 1989, article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* described a "parasitic division of labor among cooperatives," giving as an example the case of one cooperative that bought extremely scarce soap for 15 kopeks, cosmetically added scent or color, and resold it a different cooperative in another area of the country for 65 kopeks, with the latter then selling the soap for one ruble (100 kopeks).[40] Another story described how a Leningrad cooperative obtained children's socks in short supply and marketed them with a flower design attached for twice the price of the unadorned socks. The factory from which the cooperative was buying directly went along with this arrangement because the increased prices figured in the factory's gross value of output. In the words of a reporter, this process is one in which "a state bun and state sausage becomes a somewhat different thing—a cooperative sandwich."[41]

This case was one of many in which cooperatives have been perceived as diverting scarce goods from the general population. Public catering establishments are accused of buying much of their food in state stores at prices that are subsidized for all customers.[42] As a consequence, in several places restrictions have been placed on cooperatives, regarding which foods and in what amounts they can buy in state stores.[43] In Ukraine, the republic Council of Ministers shut down cooperatives breeding fur-bearing animals such as foxes and mink because the cooperatives were buying meat, fish, and dairy products from state stores to feed their animals.[44] Yet, most cooperatives have nowhere to go but state stores for needed supplies.

The psychological impact of such revelations can be explosive in a country where as much as 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.[45] USSR

[35] *Moscow News*, No. 13, 1988. An earlier survey had also found strong support among younger people and hostility among pensioners, with those in middle-aged groups not having clearly formed opinions one way or the other. See *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 24, 1987.

[36] *Moscow News*, No. 10, 1988.

[37] *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 18, 1989.

[38] *Trud* (Moscow), July 13, 1989; and *Izvestiya*, Jan. 7 and Feb. 27, 1988.

[39] See *Trud*, June 1 and 13, 1989; and "A Gold Mine where Aspiring Millionaires Seek Success," *Pravda*, Apr. 20, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, May 17, 1989, p. 23.

[40] On the country's soap shortage, see *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, May 18, 1989.

[41] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 19, 1989. See also, "A Gold Mine . . . ," loc. cit.

[42] See, for example, "A Few Years Later: No Competition," *Izvestiya*, Sept. 20, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 26, 1988, p. 13.

[43] "Problems and Opinions: Should Coop Operators Be Allowed into the Store?" *Izvestiya*, Nov. 19, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 14, 1988, p. 21.

[44] "In the Republic Governments: Furs, Tickets, and Gas Supply," *Izvestiya*, May 3, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, May 31, 1989, p. 27.

[45] *Sovetskaya Torgovlya*, Special Edition, June 1989, p. 4.

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In Sakhalin Oblast, Yelena Nazarova fashions coats and caps for women and children at the "Sivuch" cooperative, which makes useful consumer products out of rabbit skins rejected by a local animal-raising farm.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

Minister for Social Development Aleksandra Biryukova, a nonvoting member of the CPSU Politburo, made it clear in a news conference in January 1989 that she was in sympathy with those who resent the newly rich private entrepreneurs. This "unjustified income," she said, "is a social injustice."[46] One of the demands in the summer 1989 strike of Donbass coal miners was that the cooperatives be closed down.[47] In September 1989, at its founding congress, the United Front of Russian Workers expressed alarm at the introduction of private enterprise in Soviet society.[48]

The most extreme expression of anti-cooperative sentiment has been the "pogroms" (as the Soviet press has characterized them) carried out against cooperatives in several parts of the country. One of the earliest was in the spring of 1986 in Brest oblast where people smashed the greenhouses of persons raising tomatoes as a private endeavor.[49] Pogroms against cooperatives have also been reported in Lviv and in Tallinn, where taxi drivers employed by the state "physically threatened" drivers in a thriving taxi cooperative.[50] Most dramatically, in May 1989, cooperatives in the Turkmen city of Nebit-Dag were set on fire, and operators were beaten up by crowds. One local unemployed 21-year-old said:

I wasn't at the demonstration, but if I had known about it I would have gone. Why should the cooperators have everything, their pockets full of money, while I have nothing. Because of them, there is nothing to buy in the stores.[51]

The unfavorable image of the cooperatives in the public mind is also due to the fact that some cooperatives are involved in criminal activity. Unquestionably, the cooperative movement includes persons who were previously involved in the underground economy, and even may include some persons with criminal records.[52] A researcher at the USSR Ministry of the Interior claims that "according to random statistics, racketeers' incomes amount to 20–25 percent of cooperators' profits."[53]

The precarious position of the cooperatives in the Soviet economy makes them extremely vulnerable to crime. Given the difficulties in dealing with authorities and obtaining reliable sources of supplies, it is very difficult for cooperatives to avoid bending or breaking the law if they are to stay in business. Often, to get anything done, they must offer bribes.[54] Bribery makes them vulnerable to blackmail by criminals, and given both the public hostility toward the cooperatives and these organizations' uncertain legal status, many cooperative operators would rather pay than go to the police for

[46] *The New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1989.

[47] *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, July 28, 1989. On March 12, 1988, the same newspaper had carried a story of the cooperative Donbass in Donetsk whose members were making 5,000 rubles a month producing plastic junk jewelry.

[48] *The Financial Times* (London), Sept. 14, 1989.

[49] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 32, August 6, 1986, p. 10.

[50] *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, July 28, 1989; and Anton Gurevich, "Obstacles to Individual Labor," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 298/87, July 14, 1987, p. 3.

[51] *Sovetskaya Torgovlya*, Aug. 5, 1989.

[52] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 5, 1989.

[53] *New Times* (Moscow), No. 26, 1989, p. 23.

[54] *Moscow News*, No. 31, 1988.

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help. Sometimes, criminals offer to work with the cooperatives in a kind of "sweetheart" arrangement to "ensure" access to supplies. In other cases, cooperators are physically intimidated by so-called "wild racketeers" (usually youths) sent by criminals, and are then offered protection against further harassment in return for a cut of the profits.[55]

Lines of Defense

Cooperatives have taken various steps to lessen their vulnerability. They have made generous contributions to charitable activities in an attempt to offset bad feelings about the high prices and high profits of cooperatives. A single cooperative contributed 12,000 rubles of the 25,000 needed to begin the soup kitchen for poor pensioners that opened in the spring of 1988 in Leningrad.[56] The science and technology cooperative Sputnik in Moscow donated almost 300,000 rubles as New Year's gifts to children's homes and homes for senior citizens.[57] Gifts such as these have become routine for many cooperatives and, in fact, are recommended by consultants who help cooperatives set up their enterprises.[58]

Cooperatives have recognized that their interests would be served by having umbrella organizations to fulfill a number of crucial functions. For example, the members of the cooperative association Rossiya, which numbered 3,500 as of mid-1989, united because, in the words of its chairman, together they have more resources "to survive." The association has formed a bank that lends money to association members, and a member cooperative provides legal assistance to all the other cooperatives in the association.[59] Similarly, the association of cooperatives operating in Naberezhnyye Chelny in the Tatar Autonomous Republic "helps the [member] cooperatives with patent and licensing work; provides consultation; solves problems involved in the supply, storage, and marketing of goods; provides financial assistance; and represents their interests before local government bodies."[60] There is even a private detective/security cooperative operating in Leningrad and Moscow (employing 20 full-time and 50 part-time operatives in Moscow alone) which, among other things, protects other cooperatives from those in the protection racket.[61]

Cooperatives throughout the Soviet Union have also combined to form a united organization. The USSR Union of Cooperatives held a founding congress in January 1989 and a follow-up congress in June. At the June gathering, Chairman Vladimir Tikhonov stated that the new organization was not a trade union, but had been created to defend the social rights of cooperative workers and to protect the property of cooperatives from the bureaucracy, racketeers, and criminals.[62]

Recent New Restrictions

Despite such defensive actions, the cooperative movement sustained two formidable blows in the past year. The first was the December 29, 1988, resolution "On Regulating Certain Types of Activity of Cooperatives in the USSR," which significantly undercut the liberal provisions of the May 1988 Law on Cooperation. The December resolution had two main articles, the first of which established that cooperatives do not have the right to engage at all in certain activities. It makes sense, of course, to prohibit some of these activities, such as making weapons, munitions, and narcotics. But the same article banned a large number of medical activities that had become important in the cooperative sector, such as obstetric services or treatment of patients with infectious diseases or drug addiction, and it also prohibited the manufacture of wine and vodka and the right to publish. Hence, for the first time, the state defined what areas of the economy it wanted to monopolize. The second article defined a number of areas in which cooperatives could legally operate only if under contract with state organizations. These include the buying and processing of secondary materials, and the provision of certain kinds of medical services not otherwise banned.[63]

In attempting to justify this shift in policy, I. Prostyakov, vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' Bureau for Social Development, said that the coopera-

[55]See *New Times*, No. 26, 1989, pp. 22–25, where these problems are catalogued. In the same article, a department head of the Moscow criminal investigation service wrote that: "Recently, we arrested three racketeers who had pressed the chief of the Sokol cooperative to fork over [sic] 50,000 rubles. The bandits took their victim 'for a ride' out of town, tortured and abused him in every way. It was by some miracle that the man, more dead than alive, managed to make his getaway. Notably, two out of the three attackers were cooperative operators, too. Shots were fired on more than one occasion in Moscow of late. A recent gunfight near the Alst cooperative cafe, for instance, looked like part of a mob war."

[56]*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 7, 1989.

[57]*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, May 21, 1989.

[58]In May 1989, one of the authors saw a fast-food coop trailer on Gorky Street which advertised in large letters that 50 percent of its profits were being donated to the Veterans' Fund.

[59]*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, June 23, 1989.

[60]"Cooperative Members Join Forces," *Pravda*, July 7, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 21.

[61]See *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Aug. 31, 1989.

[62]*Sovetskaya Torgovlya*, May 16 and July 22, 1989.

[63]The new law with its two appendices specifying prohibited activities and activities permitted on the basis of contracts with enterprises, organizations, and institutions was published in *Izvestiya*, Dec. 31, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 1, 1989, p. 10.

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tives were increasing at such a rapid rate that their activities "were bound to be at variance with the interests of society." He observed that because the Law on Cooperation states that those activities not prohibited are permitted, what is permissible had to be spelled out.[64]

A second, and perhaps even more damaging, policy shift was the decision to increase the rate of taxation of cooperative income. Early attempts to set high tax rates for cooperatives had been staved off. In March 1988, it had been proposed to apply progressive tax rates, with a top marginal rate of 90 percent of monthly income.[65] But, on July 13 of the same year, after a heated debate, the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers rejected the draft for a system of taxation of the cooperative network and sent the matter back for redrafting to be done in consultation with specialists, scholars, and cooperative members.[66] Then on July 29, the Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers approved a very generous tax measure: during the first year of operation, a cooperative was to pay 2–3 percent of its income; during the second year, 3–5 percent; and in subsequent years, 10 percent, with the actual amounts to be determined by the local soviet executive committee responsible for initially registering a particular cooperative.[67]

The conflict over the proper level of tax rates pitted reform-minded economists, who want lenient rates to stimulate cooperative development, against those who think it is antisocial for cooperatives to keep the enormous monies they are earning.[68] However, given the widespread popular perception that cooperative incomes are excessively high, it was perhaps inevitable that higher tax rates would be imposed. On February 23, 1989, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a decree stipulating that cooperatives were to be taxed on their *income* (not profits) after deductions for costs of materials, transportation, depreciation, leasing charges for fixed capital, and interest payment on loans from Gosbank. Significantly, wages were not to be deducted prior to calculating taxable cooperative income. The actual tax rates were to be set by each republic, which could differentiate taxes by type of cooperative, using such criteria as how important the cooperative's product was in meeting consumer demand, whether the cooperative employed a large number of handicapped individuals, and whether it was using local and secondary raw materials.[69]

In implementating these regulations, republics have expanded exemptions in various directions. For example, in Azerbaijan, those cooperatives engaged in ecological work and certain jobs in regions of high unemployment enjoy tax exemptions. Lithuania is one of several republics granting deductions for goods designated for export and therefore for the earning of hard currency.[70] Tajikistan's regulations provide for a reduction in taxes when cooperatives sell at least half their output to the state.

The most glaring fact about the new tax rates is that they are considerably higher than many Soviet economists believe prudent if cooperatives are to prosper. The conventional wisdom among economists is that tax rates over 25 percent bring "financial disadvantages," yet the chairman of the Kosmos cooperative in Moscow says that the income of intermediaries will be taxed at up to 85 percent. The state, he said, will become the "executioner" of the coops.[71] A commentary in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* was sufficiently disturbed over the implications of the tax policy to raise the apocalyptic question: "Is this the end of cooperatives?" The article noted that since the taxes apply to cooperative *income* rather than to *profits*, it constitutes a system of double taxation, since individual income of cooperative workers is already taxed progressively, at rates ranging from 13 to 50 percent.[72]

A sampling of tax rates on cooperatives from the various republics indicates significant variation in priorities and in the areas of the economy in which republic authorities prefer cooperatives to operate.[73] In general, the lowest taxes are levied on agricultural cooperatives: e.g., in Azerbaijan, it is 3 percent on livestock products and 10 percent on crop production; in Belorussia, it is 5 percent on agricultural output. For nonagricultural cooperatives, the lowest tax rates are in the Baltic republics. In Estonia, taxes are only 10–20 percent, except for production for export, and then the tax

[64]See interview with Prostyakov published in *Izvestiya*, Jan. 2, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 1, 1989, pp. 10–11.

[65]See the interview with Yu. Zemskov, head of the General State Revenues and Taxes Department of the USSR Ministry of Finance, *Izvestiya*, Mar. 20, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 20, 1988, p. 29.

[66]"Look Before You Leap," *Izvestiya*, July 15, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 10, 1988, pp. 23–24. Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Ryzhkov observed during this session that questions of taxation accounted for a "substantial portion" of the more than 200,000 reactions received regarding the draft law on cooperatives.

[67]See "In the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers," *Izvestiya*, July 30, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 24, 1988, p. 26.

[68]For example, Nikolay Shmelev, one of the leading reform economists in the country, has argued against establishing a constrictive, income-based system of taxation that fails to exempt production expenses. See *Moscow News*, No. 21, 1989.

[69]For the decree, see *Izvestiya*, Feb. 23, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, Mar. 22, 1989, p. 11.

[70]In spite of the hard-currency shortage in the country, there is some concern that goods sent abroad by cooperatives simply means fewer goods at home, where consumer goods shortages have become severe.

[71]*Moscow News*, No. 28, 1989.

[72]See *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 25, June 21, 1989, p. 2.

[73]The data in this paragraph are drawn from *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, July 28, 1989.

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Yevgeniy Zolotov, left, and Aleksandr Novichkov are among the taxi drivers in the city of Ulyanovsk who have availed themselves of the opportunity of going into private business, renting taxis from the city.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

rate is only 5 percent. In Latvia, taxes are 10–15 percent. Moreover, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belorussia are the only republics that allow cooperatives to deduct investment funds from income to determine net taxable income. In the RSFSR, taxes on cooperative income are as follows: agricultural production, 10 percent; production of goods, 30–50 percent; scientific-technical cooperatives, 35–40 percent; public catering, 40-50 percent; and trade and purchasing, 60 percent. In Kirgizia, taxes on cooperatives range from 10 percent on the production of construction materials to 80 percent for trade and purchasing cooperatives. In addition, there is the possibility in that republic that the tax will be raised arbitrarily by 50 percent of the basic rate if "prices don't reflect socially necessary expenditures." The highest tax rates by and large are imposed on public catering, entertainment, and middleman cooperatives. This is especially true in Kazakhstan, Moldavia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and the RSFSR.

Why have tax rates been set so high? Clearly, "speculation" (*spekulatsiya*) remains a bogey man in Soviet thinking. In an interview with *Izvestiya*, V. G. Panskov, first deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Finance, essentially argued that the high rates were established in order to "create [more equitable] conditions for economic competition between cooperatives and state enterprises." His argument was that while 52–53 percent of all state industrial profits usually go into the central state budget, the state had collected only some 40 million rubles in taxes—about 1 percent of total cooperative income—since the Law on Cooperation had been approved.[74] This argument ignores the fact that if, like the cooperatives, state enterprises paid taxes based on their *income*, rather than their *profits*, their effective tax rate would be only 20 percent, not 50 percent.[75] Thus, the new tax law has actually placed cooperatives at a disadvantage relative to state enterprises. In words

[74] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 25, 1989, trans. in *CDSP*, Mar. 22, 1989, pp. 11–13.
[75] *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, May 25, 1989.

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reminiscent of another era in Soviet economic history, a *Moscow News* reporter said: "There can only be two explanations for this tax—either a complete lack of economic know-how or the conscious desire to liquidate those involved in cooperatives 'as a class'."[76]

More recently, in mid-October 1989, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a number of revisions to the Law on Cooperation. There were two main changes. The first gives much more authority to the bureaucracy to regulate prices of goods and services sold by cooperatives to both consumers and state enterprises. The second imposes very tight restrictions on middleman activities. State retail trade outlets are now forbidden to sell cooperatives goods that are intended for resale without changing the product. Cooperatives have been given until January 1, 1990, to stop such activity. Moreover, local authorities have been given much more power to decide what constitutes proper cooperative activities. The one bright spot is that the same resolution reconfirms the commitment to giving cooperatives equal rights with state enterprises, and requires state organs to strictly observe the legal rights of cooperatives.[77]

Local control of cooperatives may simply lead to an increase in interregional income disparities, because those areas already supporting cooperatives, like the Baltic republics, will continue to do so, and those opposing the cooperatives will take steps to throttle their activity. Hence, we disagree with Nikolay Shmelev, who argues that local control signals the beginning of the end of the cooperative movement.[78]

Conclusion

This is a time of great uncertainty about the future course of the cooperative movement. The growth in the number of operating units can only be termed astonishing, given all of the problems that they face. This growth suggests an implicit faith that cooperatives will endure for a long time, although it is probably also true that many enter private business because there is a great deal of money to be made in the short term regardless of the long-term fortunes of cooperatives. We can already see the early stage of development of a new social stratum of entrepreneurs, joining the traditional strata of workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. Moreover, under growing outside pressures, cooperatives are forming what may be described as proto-professional organizations that look as if they will develop mechanisms for self-regulation and the enforcement of business values and standards of conduct.

Unfortunately, would-be entrepreneurs only have incentives to enter areas of the economy that demand the least capital. Access to working capital is difficult, aspiring entrepreneurs are uncertain about the kinds of businesses that will be allowed to function in the future, and the current tax laws do not permit a deduction for expenditures made on capital equipment. Rather than expanding the horizons of potential Soviet entrepreneurs, current state policy thus serves to constrict the range of what it is profitable to do in the USSR.

High tax rates raise the cost of doing business for Soviet cooperatives and add an additional incentive to boost prices. In a situation of significant goods shortages, Soviet consumers will probably continue to pay these prices, but the hostility between producer and consumer will continue to flourish. To the extent that this continues, cooperatives will remain convenient scapegoats for more general economic problems. As *Moscow News* has said: "Thanks to concerted efforts, the enemy image of *perestroyka* is being shifted from the bureaucrat-apparatchik to cooperative members and scientist-economists."[79]

Cooperatives face the problems that are daily confronted by state enterprises, such as uncertainty of supply and bureaucratic interference, without being armed with the mechanisms available to state enterprises to make these difficulties less damaging to their performance. Moreover, as long as most of the state sector's output is tied to state contracts, very limited goods and materials will be available for purchase by cooperatives. Such shortages will likely be a major constraint on the growth of the cooperative movement.

From the very beginning, the leadership went to great pains to assure people that private enterprise was not being introduced in the Soviet Union—for example, references have all along been to "individual labor activity" or to "cooperative labor activity." However, the distinction between private enterprise and individual/cooperative activity has substantially eroded. The distinction hinges on whether others are employed for one's own profit, an idea that has been anathema in the Soviet Union, certainly since the end of the 1920's. The recent evolution of cooperatives has involved greater and greater reliance on labor that is not part of the cooperative ownership, and although "hired labor" in a cooperative often earns considerably more than it can earn in the state sector, it is clearly producing more value than it is receiving, a case of exploitation to Marxists.

[76] *Moscow News*, No. 28, 1989.
[77] *Trud*, Oct. 21, 1989.
[78] *Moscow News*, No. 41, 1989.
[79] Ibid., No. 12, 1989.

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What is the potential for the growth of the cooperative movement? Polls have indicated that nearly one-third of the labor force would like to earn a second income,[80] and a survey in December 1987 revealed that 20 percent of the respondents expressed an interest in participating in the new forms of individual labor.[81]

One can discern several stages (or waves) in the evolution of the cooperative movement. In the early period, many rushed into businesses as a way of getting rich quickly, and were unable to sustain a viable operation. Then, during a second wave, came those who got involved out of a vague and naïve wish to become "independent businessmen"—for a while, it seemed as if the dream of every Soviet citizen was to open a restaurant or cafe. It is only in the most recent period that we have seen a third wave, the entry of people who are taking a much more "businesslike" approach and are planning their operations in a much more pragmatic way. Such entrepreneurs will provide the backbone for the new local associations and national union.[82]

In the long run, the problems faced by the cooperative movement cannot be solved without two basic changes. The first is the emancipation of state enterprises from ministerial tutelage and a concomitant increase in the role of the market. As long as state enterprises remain tied to state contracts, the amount of production capacity available to the cooperative sector will remain limited. The second is a solution of the legal problems. Cooperatives are currently operating in a legal limbo—their rights and obligations, and the legal status of their property, are not yet settled issues.

Yet, one is led to a cautious optimism because of the enormous pool of latent energy and creativity tapped in the past three years. Although the forces of inertia and reaction still abide in the country, it may be that the momentum generated cannot be easily stopped.

[80]Gurevich, loc. cit., p. 3.

[81]Ye. G. Antosenkov et al, "Public Opinion on Cooperation," *Sotsiologicheskiye Issledovaniya* (Moscow), November-December 1988, p. 8.

[82]There are a number of versions of this notion that the new cooperatives have evolved through a series of waves or stages. See, for example, *Moscow News*, No. 22, 1988; and S. Shakhmayev, "Three Waves . . . Reflections on Cooperation," *Politicheskoye Obrazovaniye*, No. 5, 1989, pp. 63–69.

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Glasnost' and Soviet Culture

Josephine Woll

In the past two years, the nature of cultural politics in the Soviet Union has changed dramatically. The uncomfortable intimacy of politics and culture, bedfellows for so many decades, continues, but the relationship is not what it once was. New institutions are functioning, and unexpected material is available in print and on the air waves. Certain trends emerging two years ago have become more pronounced, while others have diminished.[1] This essay attempts to discern and analyze some of the processes and patterns of cultural politics in the last two years—a tumultuous and exciting kaleidoscope of complicated and often contradictory trends, reflecting an altered cultural universe.

Mikhail Gorbachev, for political reasons adumbrated by many observers both within the Soviet Union and abroad, chose Soviet cultural life as the first arena in which to implement his policy of *glasnost'*. It quickly became apparent that, whatever its limitations, the policy of *glasnost'* meant a substantial expansion of artistic opportunities available to creative artists and their audiences. Books are being published, movies are being screened in theaters and aired on television, and paintings are being exhibited that even five years ago would never have reached their intended audiences.

The excitement generated by these possibilities is enormous. But it is accompanied by uncertainty, by a fear prompted by the reality of Soviet history. Personnel can always be replaced. What, if anything, guarantees the permanence of the new policy? What institutional safeguards ensure the continuity of *glasnost'* if Gorbachev loses power—or if he should have a change of heart? Freedom by the fiat of an individual is tenuous at best; to be secure, it requires safeguards that would render the philosophy and intentions of any particular individual or group irrelevant.

People—both in the Soviet Union and watching from abroad—have been looking for signs that *glasnost'* is being institutionalized. One such sign is a draft law on the press. Approved by working groups of the parliamentary commission on *glasnost'*, legislation, and culture in the fall of 1989, it bans preliminary censorship and stipulates the right of public organizations to establish their own newspapers. According to the director of TASS, the law should go through the Supreme Soviet by the end of 1989. The creative unions, the organizations that oversee the arts, have become even more important now than they were in the past, because the traditional cultural authorities in the Soviet Union (such as the censorship offices, the Ministry of Culture, and the Culture Department of the CPSU Central Committee) have by and large withdrawn to the sidelines; direct and preemptive intervention in the cultural sphere is now reserved for matters having major political repercussions. Given the nature of the cultural establishment in the Soviet Union, the various creative unions exercise substantial influence and indeed control over artistic life in the country. Censorship does not depend on the unions in any direct way, but for the time being, only the unions possess the durable institutional structures that can force thoroughgoing changes in the ways and means by which artistic products are distributed to the audience they are meant to reach. Two of the unions—those of cinema workers and of theater workers—have changed radically; three others, those of artists, composers, and writers, have hardly altered

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[1]See John Dunlop, "Soviet Cultural Politics," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1987, pp. 34–56.

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in structure, although some personnel changes have taken place.[2] I shall concentrate on the two unions that have undergone restructuring and on the USSR Union of Writers, which has not.

The Creative Unions

What, then, has happened in the theater and cinema unions, from the start strong supporters of Gorbachev and *perestroyka*? After forcing the retirement of their conservative old-guard leaderships at the earliest opportunity (in April–May 1986), both unions implemented a series of roughly parallel decisions to increase decentralization and to encourage democratization of decision-making. Most of the country's film studios and a number of theaters have become essentially self-financing.

Theater. Eighty-three theaters all over the country are participating in an experimental agreement with the state by which they have gained much greater artistic autonomy (for instance, in the choice of repertory) as well as financial responsibility. A variety of new organizational forms were introduced to support existing theaters and to encourage the creation of new theaters. To give one example, under the sponsorship of the Moscow City Executive Committee, several "theater-studios"—that is, less well-established or more experimental groups—signed two-year collective contracts entitling them to a public space and making them fully commercial. Formerly such theater groups had to mount their productions wherever they could, on makeshift and borrowed temporary stages; publicity spread by word-of-mouth, and well-informed friends comprised the audience. Now they have a place to work; if they lose money, they will have to close.

The director of one of the most prominent of these groups, Mark Rozovskiy, has explained that he receives no state subsidy and pays 5 percent of his profits into the state budget. He has full control over 80 percent of the profits his theater earns, as well as full control over the works he stages.[3] The freedom he now enjoys compensates for a number of problems he did not have when his group was outside official control: maintaining, in his words, "ethical purity," because the absence of wage-leveling invites ambition and self-aggrandizement; tackling a mountain of daily bureaucratic paperwork, including restrictions on renovations within his theater; and having no right to set ticket prices, which obviously affects profits.[4]

A newly-created Agency of Amateur Theaters, sponsored by a variety of organizations (among them the USSR Cultural Fund), underwrites amateur troupes. Independent local theaters are funded by party committees, the Komsomol, and other groups and are fueled by the enthusiasm of theater fans. The All-Russian Association of Artistic Workshops, created in the fall of 1987 by the RSFSR Theater Union, acts like a Western producer, funding directors to stage plays and organize troupes.

The "democratization" of theater has had mixed results. Theaters like Rozovskiy's have obviously benefited. By contrast, Georgiy Tovstonogov, artistic director of the Leningrad Bol'shoy Drama Theater, pointed to one of the pitfalls: the incompatibility of "democracy" and talent:

I'm for [democratization of the theater] in the sense of freeing the arts from the pressure brought to bear on them by bureaucracy. I'm all for the open appraisals of our work, for the joint discussion of the future of the contemporary Soviet theater, for the foundation of a creative union of theatrical workers. . . . [But] the majority principle doesn't work in the arts. The majority vote cannot decide the value and profundity of an artist's ideas. A director must be a dictator in his theater, but his rule must be willingly accepted by the actors. It should be a rule based on artistic authority, but never on the fear that he might sack everyone he doesn't like.[5]

Nor has there been an explosion of significant new work. Except for Mikhail Shatrov's plays, particularly "Further . . . Further . . . Further," few plays have stimulated much excitement. (Shatrov's play, in which he charges Stalin with ordering Sergey Kirov's murder and Trotsky's execution, was extremely controversial, elicit-

[2]The Composers' Union, *glasnost'* notwithstanding, has continued to be led by the redoubtable and seemingly immortal Tikhon Khrennikov (aged 76), whose career began ignominiously more than 40 years ago. On September 29, however, Radio Moscow announced that a plenum of the Board of the Union had dissolved the union and created a federation of independent composers' organizations. In February 1988, the Congress of Soviet Artists chose as the chairman of its union an artist, Andrey Vasnetsov, whose paintings had not been exhibited since the notorious 1962 Manezh exhibition that so offended Nikita Khrushchev. One of his goals as chairman is to "show everything there is to show," and though his own work is far from modernist in style, he speaks with tolerance of other schools of painting. See Natalya Kraminova, "The Times of Andrei Vasnetsov," *Moscow News*, No. 6, 1989.

[3]Professional theaters in the USSR have always been heavily subsidized by the state, in part because of the traditional view of the theater as an educational and ideological institution. Whether that view will now be superseded by one that sees the theater as an enterprise—and hence as financially self-supporting—is moot. Given its importance for the future of Soviet theater, it is a subject hotly debated in the press.

[4]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Aug. 12, 1988.

[5]"Democracy and Proficiency," *Moscow News*, No. 3, 1988. Interview with Oleg Kuprin.

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ing attacks in *Pravda* and elsewhere. In May 1988, the monthly journal *Znamya,* which had published Shatrov's play in its January issue, printed 30 [out of some 300] letters, most of them defending Shatrov.[6])

Soviet critics continually lament the state of Russian theater, and Yale Drama School's Richard Gilman, after a month's stay recently as part of a cultural exchange program sponsored by the American-Soviet Theater Initiative, concurs: "I went," he writes, "with high expectations stemming from the reputed new energy and openness that *glasnost'* has brought about in the theater, as elsewhere. . . . Those expectations were only partly fulfilled. There is energy and openness on the Soviet stage these days, but with few exceptions I found little imaginative vigor."[7] Good politics, he was told by Soviets and saw for himself, but bad art.

Cinema. Like theaters, film studios now have virtual autonomy in all artistic matters—selection of scripts, casting, contractual hiring of directors and actors, freedom of expenditure, etc.—and are financially accountable. Those that fail to show a profit will, at least theoretically, have to shut down. The USSR Cinematographers' Union (which comprises all film workers, and not only cameramen) was the first to introduce these changes, beginning with its blackballing of the entire old-guard of the filmmaking industry at its May 1986 Congress. Elem Klimov, a director whose films released in the West include "Rasputin" and "Come and See," was chosen to lead the union in place of hard-liner Lev Kulidzhanov. In January 1988, Klimov resigned in order to work on a film and was replaced by Andrey Smirnov. (Klimov is slated to return as chair in January 1990.) Filip Yermash, the conservative head of Goskino (the official overseer of the film industry) was replaced in December 1986 by the more professional and open-minded Aleksandr Kamshalov.

To prevent the domination of purely commercial considerations—a sensitive issue vigorously debated at creative union conferences and in the press—the Cinematographers' Union has reserved 1 percent of all profits for films by beginners and for projects undertaken by established artists who wish to experiment with commercially risky films. Predictably, the ensuing competition for desirable contracts has been fierce. A commission of writers, directors, critics, and representatives of Goskino created in August 1986 by the union to handle disputes, and to investigate the fate of "repressed" movies, has succeeded in releasing some 80 of the more than 100 films held back from distribution over a period of 20 years for all kinds of political reasons. They include several films by Aleksey German ("Road-check" and "My Friend Ivan Lapshin"); Gleb Panfilov's 1979 "Theme," once unacceptable because of its allusion to Jewish emigration and its portrayal of a successful literary hack; and Aleksandr Askoldov's 1968 "Commissar," in which a pregnant Red Army commissar during the Civil War lives out her confinement and bears her child in the home of a poor Jewish family, leaving the baby with them when she goes back to fight.[8]

Bureaucratic roadblocks continue to exist: a proposed filmmakers' newspaper was vetoed, as was a new film magazine. Student demands for a more creative approach to teaching and the replacement of certain individuals at the All-Union Institute of Cinematography were rejected by the Moscow Party Committee. And within the union, some members feel that those now in powerful positions, who tend to obtain the money and resources for making new movies, have become as hard to budge as their predecessors were.

Nevertheless, in several respects, the filmmaking industry looks much healthier than it did several years ago. The critical disdain for theater plays is not manifested by film-goers or film critics, in part because of the release of previously shelved films and in part because of an explosion of documentary films, often broadcast on all-Union television to enormous audiences. In such feature films as "Little Vera" and Nikolay Gubenko's "Restricted Zone," and in such documentaries as "Is It Easy to be Young?," "Are You Going to the Ball?," and "Solovetskiy Power," contemporary social and ecological problems and legacies from the Stalinist past are depicted with an honesty that was not possible even a few years ago. "Solovetskiy Power" (its Russian title, "*Solovetskaya vlast',*" is a pun on "Soviet power," [*Sovetskaya vlast'*]), is a documentary on the history of the Solovki labor camps. It includes interviews with seven former inmates of the Gulag, the most prominent among them being Academician Dmitriy Likhachev, as well as an interview with a former Chekist, who was a guard at Solovki between 1923 and 1925.[10] Footage censored from earlier films has been restored, and in some instances reshot. And film distribution has

[6]For an illuminating discussion of Shatrov's work, see David Joravsky, "*Glasnost* Theater," *The New York Review of Books,* Nov. 10, 1988.

[7]*The New York Times,* June 4, 1989.

[8]See Anna Lawton, "Toward a New Openness," in Daniel J. Goulding, Ed., *Post New Wave Cinema in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1989, esp. pp. 36–46.

[9]See, for instance, Stanislav Govorukhin, "March of the Envious," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), June 13, 1989.

[10]See Vera Tolz, "Soviet Film Describes Birth of Gulag System," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Apr. 21, 1989, pp. 9–13.

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improved markedly: it now bears a reasonable correlation to viewer preferences as determined by, for instance, surveys and questionnaires. Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be a hunger even for "avant-garde" films: when Riga's self-financing Video Center and the Union of Latvian Cinema Workers organized a six-day film forum in the autumn of 1988, almost 70,000 people paid high prices to see supposedly "non-commercial" films made both within the Soviet Union (early Dovzhenko and Kuleshov, recent work by Paradzhanov, Peleshyan, the brilliant animator Yuriy Norshteyn) and abroad (from classics like "The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari" and "Un chien andalou" to recent Czech, Hungarian, and "underground" American films).[11]

Belles-lettres. The USSR Writers' Union, like the Composers' and Artists' Unions, presents a rather different picture. It remains largely unreconstructed, dominated by a coalition of *apparatchiks* and ideologues. The former comprise the majority of active members of the influential RSFSR branch of the Writers' Union. Many of them are relatively unknown provincial writers, and while their work rarely penetrates the pages of the large-circulation literary journals, it continues to appear in book form thanks to networks of patronage. These writers were badly frightened by the announcement, in late 1988, that publishing houses might introduce commercial criteria into their 1989 decisions—which might well signal the end of their careers. So, as one observer dryly explained, they took the high moral ground, rejecting such reforms as antithetical to "the sacred principle of 'social justice' and . . . to the true interests of culture."[12]

An enormous amount of power, and a formidable range of perquisites and privileges, are at stake.[13] Natal'ya Il'ina, a writer (primarily of satire) well-placed in and extremely knowledgeable about the literary bureaucracy, caused a furor in early 1988 with an article she published in the weekly *Ogonek*. She ascribed the death-grip these *apparatchiks* have on the unions, and on the Soviet literary establishment in general, to human nature rather than to politics. Greed, she claimed, is responsible for much of their resistance to any changes that might threaten their positions.[14] Indeed, the tangible rewards of power within the cultural establishment, which rarely correspond to talent or even genuine popularity, extend far beyond such relative—if desirable—trivia as rooms in exclusive sanatoria or vacation spots. Major financial benefits are involved. In book publishing, Il'ina explains, royalties are based not on the number of copies of a work sold, but on the number of copies of a work printed. Moreover, in the past at least, publishing houses were not responsible for their financial losses. Thus, the system steadily encouraged inflated lists having little to do with merit or the interest of the readers, in turn producing a large number of remaindered books while preventing those of real interest to readers from being printed.[15] All this was going on against the backdrop of a serious paper shortage.

Il'ina illustrates her argument with specific examples. In one case of egregious corruption, the director of the publishing house Sovetskiy pisatel' compiled a volume of prose. It was his first book: before being appointed to that post, he had published only a few short articles. The volume came out under the imprint of 11 different publishing houses, with a print-run in Moscow alone of more than 1 million. By way of quid pro quo, his house published the work of fellow-directors of other publishing houses. (To no one's surprise, both Il'ina and her editor, Vitaliy Korotich, were vehemently attacked by the two main publications of the Writers' Union, in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* [Moscow], No. 3, 1988, and in *Literaturnaya Rossiya,* No. 3, 1988.)

I do not mean to suggest that ideological differences play no role in the Writers' Union disputes. But the bureaucratic resistance to *glasnost',* and especially to translating *glasnost'* into structural and institutional change, is rooted as much in venality and vanity as in disagreement over matters of principle, and the power of such resistance should not be underestimated.

"Liberals" Versus "Conservatives"

What does it mean, in today's Soviet Union, to consider oneself or one's opponent "liberal" or "conservative"? What ideas and values does each rubric signify on the Soviet cultural scene? Do the terms correspond in any meaningful sense to the way they are used in the

[11]As reported by Andrei Vasiliev in *Moscow News,* No. 44, 1988.

[12]Julia Wishnevsky, "*Nash Sovremennik* Provides Focus for 'Opposition Party'," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* Jan. 20, 1989, p. 5.

[13]See Carol and John Garrard, *Inside the Soviet Writers' Union,* New York, Free Press, 1989.

[14]Natalya Il'ina, "Welcome, Young and Unknown Tribe . . . ," *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 2, 1988, pp. 23–26.

[15]Between 1976 and 1980, a reported 500 million out of 700 million new books received by Soviet libraries were removed from shelves *for lack of a single borrower.* See *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (Moscow—the weekly newspaper of the RSFSR Writers' Union), No. 19, 1986, p. 16. A comparable situation exists in the visual arts, according to one art historian. He claims that some 115,000 pieces of art, costing the state over 60 million rubles, are immured in closed depositories and have never been seen by the public. They are, he implied, artistically worthless, and were bought by the Artists' Union for reasons that had little if anything to do with aesthetic merit.

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West? These questions are critical to understanding Soviet cultural politics, and they require careful answers. While I will inevitably simplify the issues, and thereby do some injustice to the "sides" in this cultural civil war, I will attempt to characterize them here.

The terms themselves must be used with extreme caution. The British political vocabulary from which they are derived is hardly relevant, either in theory or in practice, to Soviet reality. In the Soviet Russian cultural (and political) world, "conservative" does suggest the disposition to maintain existing institutions. It almost always encompasses a regard—and sometimes nostalgia—for traditional culture, architecture, life-styles, religious values and artifacts, and a profound concern with ecological devastation and cultural damage. In its extreme manifestations, at the far end of the "conservative" spectrum, Russian nationalism fulminates as chauvinism, with decidedly xenophobic tendencies. Its broad appeal, however, derives from its ability to articulate a genuine sense of Russian national grievance, and from its attempts to restore and rebuild destroyed churches, implement legislation to protect the autonomy of the Russian Orthodox Church, and reverse the increase in pollution that has rendered well water undrinkable and rivers and lakes lethal. But "nationalism" is not a synonym for "conservatism," nor is "conservatism" a prerequisite for concern about issues like ecological destruction. Dunlop correctly identified a subgroup, which he called "liberal nationalists," who share Gorbachev's agenda generally but whose priorities differ from those of the "liberals" because of their emphasis on environmental issues and the recovery of the prerevolutionary past.[16] The medievalist Dmitriy Likhachev, an early and consistent supporter of Gorbachev's program who now heads the Cultural Fund, is the most prominent and most popular member of that group.

Similarly, not all economic "conservatives" who disagree with the tenets of *perestroyka* belong together with "nationalists" and "traditionalists." People genuinely disagree on the kind of economic reforms best suited to the Soviet Union, and how they should be implemented, although most people, whatever they think, feel obliged to offer at least token support to Gorbachev's reform package.[17] But the theoretical resistance to the reforms—as distinguished from the obfuscation and obstructionism thrown up by tenacious bureaucrats and *apparatchiks* fearful for their positions and power—tends to come from those economists and social commentators who align themselves, explicitly or by association, with the political conservatives.

"Liberals" form an equally complicated and more fractious bloc. The liberals can fairly be said to favor democratic reforms, although they are not necessarily in favor of abolishing privilege, at least if privilege is construed as earned reward for initiative in one's workplace, as an incentive toward privatization. In all the artistic organizations of Soviet society, the "liberals" have been in the vanguard of the support for *glasnost',* Gorbachev, and *perestroyka*. They have tended to seek a loosening of the existing strictures on freedom of expression.

"Liberals" and "conservatives" may productively be distinguished from each other on the basis of their respective approaches to issues that have dominated public discussion and the press in the last two or three years. Thus, for example, the legacy of Stalinism is a matter of interest and concern to both groups.[18] Liberals have generally wished to examine the entire Stalin period, while conservatives often try to exempt Stalin's war-time role, because of a reluctance to destroy people's memory, real or fictitious, of what was virtually the only unifying (rather than divisive) event in Soviet history. Liberals make no bones about blaming Stalin for the number of war casualties, especially in the first months after the Nazi invasion; conservatives prefer to emphasize his symbolic importance to the nation as *vozhd',* ruler, and standard-bearer. As part of their efforts to find alternatives to Stalin within Soviet history, liberals have eagerly reclaimed Old Bolsheviks purged by Stalin (most notably Nikolay Bukharin). By contrast, conservatives have been at pains to show the responsibility such Old Bolsheviks bear for Stalin's rise to power, and how their own efforts created the system that ultimately devoured them. (Few liberal historians deny this complicity, despite what conservative critics like Anatoliy Salutskiy and Vadim Kozhinov imply.)

Inclusiveness as opposed to selectivity distinguishes the two groups on other issues as well. Liberals tend to support the fullest possible disclosures about the past, and the widest rehabilitation of both artistic

[16]Dunlop, "Soviet Cultural Politics," loc. cit., p. 36.

[17]Not all, however. Anatoliy Salutskiy, who dubs himself and those of his political cast "radicals," explicitly rejects the reforms. In many articles, he mounts a head-long attack on the "architects of *perestroyka,*" especially Abel Aganbegyan and Tat'yana Zaslavskaya. His colleague Mikhail Antonov is equally outspoken, arguing for a "patriotic" rather than "efficient" economy. For an excellent analysis of this dispute, see Wishnevsky, "*Nash Sovremennik* . . . ," loc. cit.; and idem, "Architects of Perestroika Defended," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* Mar. 17, 1989, pp. 4–6.

[18]Indeed, the first characteristic of the "liberals" that Dunlop identifies is their unfinished agenda, left over from the Khrushchev thaw, "to continue the interrupted process of de-Stalinization—the uncovering and publicizing of Stalin's crimes—and the publication of works suppressed under Stalin or in subsequent periods of 're-Stalinization.' In confronting and attacking the specter of Stalin, the 'liberals' sought to ensure once and for all that a return to a Stalinist system would become impossible." See Dunlop, "Soviet Cultural Politics," loc. cit., p. 36.

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and historical figures; conservatives tend to urge a more "balanced," that is, less negative analysis of Soviet history. They want more attention paid to the Russian victims of the Stalinist purges and to the Russian peasants who perished during collectivization, and less attention given to the ethnic minorities (Crimean Tatars, Meskhetians, etc.) deported during the war, the political victims of the Great Terror, and the victims of the postwar anti-cosmopolitan campaign.[19]

One example of this disagreement occurred in connection with a letter signed by many well-known writers endorsing the construction of a monument to the victims of the Great Terror. The prominent conservative Vladimir Soloukhin refused to sign. He explained that he refused because the letter mentioned none of the earlier victims of Stalin.[20] A liberal opponent, Benedikt Sarnov, commented: "I, like Soloukhin, also consider that the lawlessness began not in 1937, and that it is no less important to memorialize all the innocents who perished long before the bloody debauch of Stalinism. But I must honestly say that I don't consider this a sufficient basis for not signing a letter asking to memorialize those who died in the 1930's. Particularly since those who perished in the '30's were by no means exclusively residents of the 'House on the Embankment' [an apartment complex mostly occupied by high-level party and government families, including many Old Bolsheviks]."[21]

The same inclusiveness characterizes the liberals' approach to Russian émigré culture.[22] They are willing to reclaim all of it—from post-revolutionary émigré writers like Georgiy Ivanov to recent exiles like Andrei Sinyavsky and Joseph Brodsky, from Marc Chagall to the contemporary painter Mikhail Shemyakin. The conservatives are more selective in their attitude toward émigré culture: Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn interests them far more than Sinyavsky, and Shemyakin interests them not at all.[23]

Sinyavsky is a particular *bête-noir* because of his *Progulki s Pushkinym* (Strolls with Pushkin), a brilliant but iconoclastic appreciation of Pushkin. It was published abroad in 1975, and a small excerpt appeared in *Oktyabr'* in April 1989. *Oktyabr's* editor, Anatoliy Anan'yev, was raked over the coals by the Secretariat of the Writers' Union and by *Literaturnaya Rossiya*. Nearly apoplectic with rage over Sinyavsky's "desecration" of Russia's beloved Pushkin, the editors of *Literaturnaya Rossiya* reprinted an indignant review by Roman Gul', editor of the émigré magazine *Novyy Zhurnal,* and appended a comment:

The dubious work of Sinyavsky's was judged by the literary community long ago, and the work of our former compatriot long ago sank into oblivion, like all the other spiteful pasquinades that followed the great Russian poet during his lifetime and after. That is why we were so surprised by the appearance of anti-Pushkin attacks on the pages of a Russian literary journal. . . . Though like the majority of White émigrés, [Gul's] political views are ambiguous, in his view of Pushkin as the genius of Russia he is decidedly nobler and on a higher level than Sinyavsky and his defenders.[24]

Indeed, because conservatives tend to idealize the Russian past at the expense of modernism and Western influences, they disapprove of virtually all manifestations of Western art and pop culture in Soviet life—abstract painting, the beauty contests introduced in Moscow last summer, the rock concerts now tolerated by the authorities, Soviet-style punk clothing. In his speech at the Congress of People's Deputies, the novelist Valentin Rasputin used some of the time allotted for his address to express his disdain for such manifestations of Western pop culture, and while his distaste for "beauty queens" competing with a minute of silence for the victims of the April 9, 1989, events in Georgia is understandable, his call for a law "to consolidate and protect morality," and to "ban the propaganda of evil, violence, and vice" is frighteningly normative.

The conservatives now dominate the Writers' Union. They did not always do so: at the eighth congress of the union, in July 1986, supporters of reform took the reins, and many of the liberal editors of journals were appointed in the aftermath of the congress. In the last two years, however, the more conservative writers have

[19]One peculiar contribution to the recent literature on collectivization (generally accepted by the conservatives as a national tragedy and trauma) came from the deputy chief editor of *Molodaya Gvardiya*, Vyacheslav Gorbachev. He wrote that collectivization had been "different in different parts of the country," and suggested that the dispossession and exile of kulaks was justified. See *Molodaya Gvardiya* (Moscow), No. 7, 1987, pp. 227–28. For *Molodaya Gvardiya*'s role in these polemics, see Julia Wishnevsky, "*Molodaya Gvardiya*: A Leading Voice of Opposition to Restructuring," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 1/88, Jan. 5, 1988.

[20]"Why I Did Not Sign That Letter," *Nash Sovremennik*, No. 12, 1988.

[21]"On 'The Silent Ones' and 'The First Pupils'," *Ogonek*, No. 16, 1989, p. 30.

[22]See Nancy Condee and Vladimir Padunov, "The Outposts of Official Art: Recharting Soviet Cultural History," *Framework* (London), No. 34, 1987, pp. 61–71, for an analysis of what they call the "recuperation of the émigré heritage."

[23]In 1987, for instance, *Molodaya Gvardiya* sharply condemned exhibits of work by Wassily Kandinsky and Marc Chagall. See Nos. 7 and 9.

[24]See Anatoliy Anan'yev, "Criticism or Accusation?" *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 35, Sept. 1, 1989; a response to the "Letter of the Secretariat of the Writers' Union of the RSFSR" (from Mikhail Antonov, V. Klykov, and Igor' Shafarevich), which had appeared in *Literaturnaya Rossiya* on Aug. 4, 1989; and the editors' reply to Anan'yev.

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steadily managed to concentrate more power in their hands. Despite occasional intervention by Gorbachev himself, this wing of the Writers' Union, seemingly undaunted, continues to issue imprecations and threats again its liberal colleagues. At the March 1987 meeting of the Secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, the floor was dominated by angry conservatives, as was the plenum the following month.[25] A year later, at the March 1988 plenum, the same pattern was repeated, with some of the speakers (Stanislav Kunyayev, Vladimir Krupin) defending *Pamyat'* against the (liberal) likes of poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, novelist Fazil Iskander, journalist Yelena Lesota, and economist Gavriil Popov. Yuriy Bondarev blamed the liberals, with their undifferentiated "mourning over" Russian history, for the loss of artistic direction in the country—and for sexual promiscuity among young people.[26]

Conservative wrath surfaced at the meeting of the secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, held in Ryazan' from September 28 to October 2, 1988, and at the plenum of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, held in Moscow in December 1988. The former gave the floor almost exclusively to contributors to *Nash Sovremennik,* who voiced their disapproval of changes in the political and cultural spheres using language deliberately reminiscent of Andrey Zhdanov's 1946 tirades. "Cosmopolitan enemies of Russia," they said, were corrupting its youth and would ultimately destroy the country's independence.[27] The December meeting, supposedly devoted to nonfiction writing on social and economic themes, turned into an all-out attack on the most prominent spokesmen and theoreticians of *perestroyka:* sociologist Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, economists Leonid Abalkin and Nikolay Shmelev, and journalist and deputy editor of *Kommunist* Otto Latsis. (*Kommunist* came in for a disproportionate share of abuse, probably because it had published an editorial in late November criticizing the Ryazan' speeches as anti-democratic, anti-Western, and, implicitly, anti-Semitic.[28]) Novelist Vasiliy Belov voiced his regret that the jamming of Western radio broadcasts had been stopped.[29]

The "mobilization" of the conservatives continued in March 1989, with a conference of the Union for the Spiritual Rebirth of the Fatherland and the establishment of the Foundation for Slavic Writing and Slavic Culture to foster greater historical and cultural knowledge about and cohesion among Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians.[30] Though theoretically a common initiative among representatives of all these peoples, it is compromised by the participation of a large number of the most extreme Russian nationalists. (The same people formed, in November 1988, an Association of Russian Artists in Moscow, in order to "awaken, illuminate, and strengthen the national self-awareness and spiritual powers of the Russian people."[31]) Their goals include encouraging Russian folksongs and folklore (rather than rock), preserving Russian library and archival materials, restoring Russian historical and cultural monuments, and improving "the education of the people in the spirit of respect for Russian history and the traditions of military duty." They sponsored a series of rallies under the rubric "The Voices and Colors of Russia," some of which took on a decidedly anti-Semitic tinge.[32]

Political Debate in the Journals

The liberals' inability to wrest even a measure of control over the Writers' Union from the conservatives, the organization's relative stagnation, and its deeply-rooted resistance to reform of either itself or the publishing industry, has shifted the battleground of this aspect of the cultural war to the media, in particular to the journals.[33] Editors have traditionally had great power over Soviet literature, acting as first-line censors and in some instances slipping manuscripts into print through briefly-opened windows of opportunity. Now that prior censorship, especially of *belle-lettres,* has virtually ceased, editors have even more power than before. Conservatives continue to control three main journals,

[25]For details of these two meetings, see Dunlop, "Soviet Cultural Politics," loc. cit., pp. 46–50; also Walter Laqueur, *The Long Road to Freedom,* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, pp 78–90 and passim. Laqueur devotes a separate chapter of his book to the reemergent Russian Right.

[26]The proceedings of the plenum were published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* No. 10, 1988, pp. 2–10.

[27]*Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 43, 1988, pp. 2–9.

[28]See *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, 1988, pp 22–26.

[29]Julia Wishnevsky properly notes that the non-Russian writers present at the plenum strongly objected to the prevailing Russian nationalist tone. Also, a few days after the plenum, the Moscow Writers' Organization asked the USSR Writers' Union to grant it republican status, which would end its subordination to the RSFSR Writers' Union. See Wishnevsky, "*Nash Sovremennik* . . . " loc. cit., pp. 5–6.

[30]"A Noble and Beneficial Task." *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Mar. 17, 1989, pp. 4–5. See Douglas Smith, "Formation of New Russian Nationalist Group Announced," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* July 7, 1989, pp. 5–8; idem, Moscow's 'Otechestvo': A Link between Russian Nationalism and Conservative Opposition to Reform," ibid., July 28, 1989, pp. 6–9.

[31]*Moskovskiy Literator* (Moscow), Nos. 49–50, Dec. 16, 1988, p. 3. See John Dunlop's analysis of these two organizations in "Two Noteworthy Russian Nationalist Initiatives," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* May 26, 1989, pp. 1–4; Julia Wishnevsky offers another view in "Ligachev, 'Pamyat',' and Conservative Writers," ibid., Mar. 10, 1989, p. 14.

[32]For one version of these rallies, see *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Jan. 17, 1989, and *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Nos. 2–4, 1989. For another, see *Moscow News*, No. 6, 1989, p. 15, and *Ogonek*, No. 7, 1989, p. 11.

[33]For a recent summary of changes in Soviet television, see Viktor Yasmann, "Zigzags of *Glasnost'* and Soviet Television," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* Mar. 31, 1989, pp. 12–17.

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Nash Sovremennik, Molodaya Gvardiya, and *Moskva,* as well as the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (where the infamous Nina Andreyeva letter appeared on March 13, 1988) and the in-house paper of the Moscow chapter of the USSR Writers' Union, *Moskovskiy Literator.* Liberals run the flagship publications of *perestroyka* and *glasnost',* the weeklies *Ogonek* and *Moscow News,* the monthlies *Novyy Mir, Druzhba Narodov, Znamya, Oktyabr',* and *Neva.* (At the First Congress of People's Deputies, in June 1989, Vasiliy Belov, whose recent novel *Vse vperedi* [Everything Lies Ahead] is markedly anti-Semitic, spoke of the concentration of real power in the hands "of those who control the media," who reflect the interests of "certain groups" from the capital.[34] This allegation is often repeated at meetings of extreme nationalists.)

Accusations of "elitism," regularly leveled against the editors of liberal journals who supposedly do not publish what "most people" want to read, are belied by the circulation figures: *Novyy Mir's* print-run for 1988 exceeded 1 million, more than twice that for 1987; *Ogonek's* print-run shot up past 3 million; *Druzhba Narodov* more than quintupled, from 150,000 in 1987 to 800,000 in 1988. *Znamya* and *Neva* both doubled their print-runs for 1988. These are hardly "elitist" magazines, particularly when one considers that (conservatively) three or four readers read every printed copy. This figure is certainly higher for the most popular issues of these journals, like those of *Druzhba Narodov* containing Anatoliy Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat. Molodaya Gvardiya's* circulation went up as well, although by a much smaller percentage (1987: 640,000; 1988: 700,000); so, marginally, did the figures for *Moskva* and *Nash Sovremennik.*

What has developed in the last two years is a process at once reassuring and distressing. Polarization has intensified. Attacks in the conservatives' periodicals on certain individuals identified with *glasnost'* and *perestroyka,* and on artistic works that symbolize them, have increased in frequency and venom. Tat'yana Zaslavskaya is a favorite target, especially of *Nash Sovremennik* economics writer Anatoliy Salutskiy. In a number of articles, Salutskiy distorts and on occasion blatantly falsifies Zaslavskaya's stated views; when challenged, he temporarily backs off but then resumes his disinformation campaign.[35] *Ogonek* and its editor Vitaliy Korotich are constant targets. An egregious example of an attack on Korotich was a letter of denunciation to *Pravda* published on January 18, 1989, and signed by seven prominent conservatives (Mikhail Alekseyev, editor of *Moskva;* Petr Proskurin, chairman of the RSFSR Cultural Foundation; Sergey Vikulov, editor of *Nash Sovremennik;* novelists Viktor Astaf'yev, Vasiliy Belov, and Valentin Rasputin; and film director Sergey Bondarchuk). The signators object to *Ogonek's* criticism of the Ryazan' meeting referred to above, and to its publication of readers' letters criticizing Rasputin, Belov, and the others; such letters, they charged, besmirched "our spiritual values." Korotich is regularly accused of being an unscrupulous careerist who was ready to praise Leonid Brezhnev when that was useful and now supports Gorbachev out of expedience as well. Vasiliy Grossman's novel *Life and Fate* is often lambasted for its "Russophobia" (Vikulov's indictment at the December 1988 plenum); his *Forever Flowing,* published in *Oktyabr'* last spring, is deemed even worse;[36] Anatoliy Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat* supposedly slanders Siberians as "wild, stupid, and promiscuous" (Rasputin, in print and on prime-time television[37]), and falsifies history (A. Baygushev[38]).

One reader of the monthly journal *Literaturnoye Obozreniye* described the journal war last summer:

It turns out that to come out for democracy means to come out against something. Perestroyka *has no open opponents, but it seems that it has supporters with whose help democracy can be turned into its very opposite. Nowadays they prefer to obstruct from a position of reactionary romanticism, advocating a patriarchal stance and isolation from the world at the end of the 20th century. Revealingly, some of the "neoslavophile" slogans—the struggle with the forces of foreigners and intellectuals—are close to the positions of the neo-Stalinists. The approach espoused today by* Nash Sovremennik *and* Molodaya Gvardiya *is a form of neo-slavophilism, nationalist utopianism behind which arrant bureaucratic conservatism finds it easy to hide.*[39]

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[34]*Pravda* (Moscow), June 3, 1989.

[35]For a review of Salutskiy's recently-published works, see Aleksandr Volkov, "At the Forefront of *Perestroyka,*" *Literaturnoye Obozreniye* (Moscow), No. 8, 1988, pp. 72–75.

[36]For the "conservatives," the publication of *Forever Flowing* was Anan'yev's chief transgression, worse than Sinyavsky and Alexander Yanov. See the exchange referred to in fn. 24. As of early December 1989, Anan'yev has reportedly been removed from his post as editor of *Oktyabr'* and has been replaced by a staunch nationalist.

[37]*Knizhnoye Obozreniye* (Moscow), No. 22, 1988, p. 4. His TV remarks were part of an hour-long program featuring 14 *Nash Sovremennik* editors and regular contributors. See Julia Wishnevsky, "*Nash Sovremennik* Talks to Soviet TV Viewers," *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 346/88, July 28, 1988.

[38]Baygushev's piece appeared in *Moskva* (Moscow), No. 12, 1988. Rybakov's defenders include the critic Alla Latynina (*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Dec. 14, 1988), and he himself replied in a letter to the editor of *Ogonek,* No. 5, 1989.

[39]Gennadiy Kuznetsov, "From the Viewpoint of a 'Neophyte'," *Literaturnoye Obozreniye,* No. 8, 1988, p. 93.

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At the same time, what is reassuring is the fact that discussion, if at times on a primitive and personally offensive level, is open, public, and continuous. Statements do not go unanswered; prejudices are not allowed to stand unchallenged. Nothing is swept under the rug. Let Salutskiy defame Zaslavskaya in *Nash Sovremennik;* she is quickly defended in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*. Let Baygushev attack Anatoliy Rybakov in *Moskva;* Alla Latynina refutes him in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. A vibrant intellectual pluralism holds sway, and although the extreme conservatives, far from hospitable to the very notion of pluralism, would probably wish to curtail it, their moderate colleagues and their liberal opponents fully appreciate its value.[40] Again to quote the wise *Literaturnoye Obozreniye* reader, "As for journals of another [more conservative] cast . . . probably we can't do without them. If there are people who think that way, then let them express themselves." And he points out that when *Novyy Mir* prints, as it has done in the last two years, the work of "conservatives" such as Belov, Astaf'yev and Feliks Kuznetsov, it signals its tolerance of a variety of views—so long as its aesthetic criteria are maintained—and not a sudden conversion to the position of *Nash Sovremennik*.[41]

In this same spirit of pluralism, on November 22, 1988, Soviet television broadcast a documentary about the slander suit brought against the writer Ales' Adamovich and the newspaper *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* by Ivan Shekhovtsov. Shekhovtsov, an investigator in the Ukrainian republic prosecutor's office in the early 1950's, accused Adamovich and the paper of slandering post-1930 Soviet history, and "blackening and spurning" what patriotic Soviets hold dear. In response, Adamovich and other witnesses spoke of Stalin's genocidal policies as having cost more lives than Hitler's invasion. A documentary called "The Purification," like an earlier documentary called "The Trial," counterposed critics and defenders of Stalin; each justification of or apologia for Stalin was challenged, often by survivors of the purges. In "The Trial," Vladimir Tikhonov, a member of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and a critic of collectivization, traced the tyranny of Stalinism to the prior ban on dissenting opinion and on the formation of factions.[42]

Moreover, no longer can any decision in the cultural sphere be construed as irrevocable. The vicissitudes of publishing Solzhenitsyn are instructive in this regard.[43] In 1988, the debate was intense. Most editors, journalists, and readers clamored for publication; official spokesmen and a few liberal voices argued against Solzhenitsyn's "anti-Leninist" stance. In June 1988, *Moscow News* ran a piece on *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and its significance for Russian literature and Soviet society; two months later, in *Knizhnoye Obozreniye,* Yelena Chukovskaya urged the full rehabilitation of Solzhenitsyn, restoration of his citizenship, and publication of his books. However, the October issue of *Novvy Mir,* whose back cover promised the publication of Solzhenitsyn in 1989, was held back. When the magazine finally appeared, its future contents page made no such commitments. (It also was to have contained Sergey Kaledin's *Construction Brigade*. According to Vyacheslav Kondrat'yev, writing in *Komsomol'skaya Pravda,* the military censors banned Kaledin's novella, which only came out in the April issue of *Novvy Mir.*) The opponents appeared to have the upper hand, especially when Ideology Secretary Vadim Medvedev explicitly rejected the possibility of publishing Solzhenitsyn, because of his views on Lenin and the October Revolution. Yet only a few days later, on December 11 and 12, Solzhenitsyn's 70th birthday was celebrated by large crowds. The festivities occurred in places like the House of Medical Workers and the House of Architects: in other words, they must have had official sanction, however tacit. At the House of Cinema more than 1,400 people applauded Vladimir Lakshin's call for Solzhenitsyn's return and his praise of Solzhenitsyn as the original trailblazer; the critic Yuriy Koryakin remarked, "Let him be an anti-Communist. So was Dostoevsky. Is he an enemy?"[44]

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[40]Valentin Rasputin, at the Congress of People's Deputies: "Pluralism is possible as a variety and multiplicity of public and political opinion. You have imposed on the country a pluralism of morality. That is more dangerous than any bomb." *Izvestiya,* June 6, 1989.

[41]Natalya Ivanova, poetry editor of *Druzhba Narodov* and a significant force in the liberal camp, said much the same thing in "Journals in the Focus of Opinion," *Literaturnoye Obozreniye,* No. 4, 1988, p. 98. See also two "dialogues" between Alla Latynina and Sergey Chuprin, "Key to What?" *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Apr. 12, 1989, and "Left, Right: Which Side?" ibid., Apr. 19, 1989. Other references can be found in John Dunlop, "Alla Latynina: A Self-Proclaimed Centrist Calls for Political Realignment," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* June 23, 1989, pp. 8–10.

[42]On "The Trial" (*Protsess*), see Julia Wishnevsky, "Soviet Television Discusses Stalin's Legacy," *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 205/88 , May 17, 1988. On "The Cleansing" (*Ochishcheniye*), see idem, "A Stalinist's Lawsuit," ibid., RL 524/88, Nov. 23, 1988. The actual hearing took place on September 20, 1988.

[43]For a full description, see John B. Dunlop, "Solzhenitsyn Begins to Emerge from the Political Void," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* Sept. 8, 1989, pp. 1–6. In the same issue, see also Douglas Smith, "Reappraisal of Solzhenitsyn in the USSR," pp. 6–9.

[44]*The New York Times,* Dec. 13, 1988. Lakshin's comments were particularly significant for several reasons. First, he was Aleksandr Tvardovskiy's assistant editor in *Novyy Mir* when the latter won publication approval from Khrushchev for *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* in 1963. Second, he sharply disputed Solzhenitsyn's portrait of Tvardovskiy (in *The Calf and the Oak*) in his own *samizdat* essay, "Tvardovskiy, Solzhenitsyn, and *Novyy Mir.*" Third, he is one of the leading liberals today, in his own writing and as assistant editor of *Znamya,* and as such disagrees with (and is disliked by) virtually all of the conservative critics who claim Solzhenitsyn as their own.

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In 1989, the "Solzhenitsyn case" was happily resolved. After several "deep discussions" with Gorbachev himself,[45] Sergey Zalygin, *Novyy Mir's* editor, made good on his promise of the previous year. In the July issue he published Solzhenitsyn's "Nobel Lecture," and in issues 8, 9, and 10 substantial portions of *The Gulag Archipelago. The First Circle* and *Cancer Ward* will run (in *Novyy Mir*) in 1990, as will *March 1917* (in the Leningrad journal *Neva*), *August 1914* (in *Zvezda*), and *October 1916* (in *Nash Sovremennik*). The publishing house Sovetskiy pisatel' has announced a forthcoming seven-volume collection of Solzhenitsyn's works in a substantial print-run of 300,000.[46] Back in July, the chief Soviet censor told Bill Keller: "Regarding Solzhenitsyn, all debates are over";[47] the past few months have shown the truth of his words.

In his short prefatory note to the first installment of *Gulag,* Zalygin wrote: "Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, with his unyielding obduracy, is absolutely necessary to us now—we must know and listen to him, we have neither the moral nor the intellctual right to fail to know and listen to him."[48] Three months later, Igor Vinogradov echoed Zalygin's emphasis on the "up-to-date and . . . burning significance" of *Gulag.* Describing it as "the most complete, the most fundamental, truly encyclopedic description of the history and geography, of the laws and customs, of the state structure and population of the prisons, annihilating labour, penal-servitude camps and exile regions of this fantastic country," Vinogradov insisted on its importance for understanding the present and "not los[ing] our way in the future. . . . [Solzhenitsyn] offers his diagnosis not only to your reason but also to your conscience, to your behavior today, to your moral responsibility."[49]

Products of *Glasnost'*

What have readers found in the "thick" journals of the last two years, apart from the always-engrossing letters to the editors? Broadly speaking, essays on social, historical, economic, and political issues; poetry and prose held back for years and sometimes for decades; new poetry and prose. I can only suggest the wide range of works, with no attempt at offering a comprehensive list. 1988 began with two major publications, Grossman's *Life and Fate*[50] (which was one of the books even optimistic observers believed, as recently as two years ago, would not be published) and Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago.*[51] *Druzhba Narodov* published a work widely accepted in the West as one of the masterpieces of Soviet literature, Andrey Platonov's *Chevengur,* in its third and fourth issues for 1988, and Boris Pilnyak's classic *Mahogany* in its second issue for 1989.

Pleasure in the reclamation of Russian literature is widespread but by no means universal. Dmitriy Urnov, the editor of the leading journal of literary scholarship *Voprosy Literatury,* finds books like *Doctor Zhivago,* Zamyatin's *We,* Platonov's *Chevengur,* and Grossman's *Life and Fate* overrated. "I had and still have the impression," he wrote in response to a *Literaturnoye Obozreniye* survey, "that nearly all these works are without exception weak from a literary point of view, and I think that if works like *We,* for example, were artistically stronger, they would have broken down the wall, overcome all obstacles in their way. . . . Precedent tells us that there is always some kind of internal obstacle in the 'unrecognized' work itself to prevent its reaching its readers."[52] Urnov neglects to explain how KGB confiscation qualifies as an "internal obstacle," or for that matter what the aesthetic weakness of *We* had do to with the 60-year ban on its publication in the Soviet Union.

Poetry by writers who could not publish until two or three years ago—Semen Lipkin,[53] Aleksandr Kushner,[54] Inna Lisnyanskaya,[55] Yevgeniy Reyn,[56] and Boris Chichibabin[57]—shares pages with once-taboo émigré poets of various eras, from the 1920's émigré Don Aminado[58] to émigrés of the 1970's like Naum

[45]Those were Zalygin's words in describing his meetings with Gorbachev. See *The Washington Post,* Apr. 21, 1989.

[46]V. Yakimenko in *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), July 13, 1989.

[47]*The New York Times,* July 18, 1989.

[48]*Novyy Mir,* No. 8, 1989, p. 7.

[49]Igor Vinogradov, "Do Not Trust, Do Not Be Afraid, Do Not Ask for Anything," *Moscow News,* No. 45, 1989, p. 12.

[50]*Oktyabr'* (Moscow). Nos. 1–4, 1988, with an exemplary afterword by the literary critic Anatoliy Bocharov explaining, among other things, the KGB's confiscation of the manuscript in 1961. The poet Semen Lipkin goes into much greater detail in "The Life and Fate of Vasiliy Grossman," *Literaturnoye Obozreniye,* No. 7, 1988, pp. 98–108.

[51]*Novyy Mir* (Moscow), Nos. 1–4, 1988, with a preface by Academician Dmitriy Likhachev. *Novyy Mir* followed up with another notable retrieval: Yuriy Dombrovskiy's *Fakul'tet nenuzhnykh veshchey* (The Faculty of the Superfluous), in Nos. 8–11, 1988.

[52]In "Lessons for Tomorrow," *Literaturnoye Obozreniye,* No. 1, 1989, p. 16. For more on Urnov, see Julia Wishnevsky, "Dmitrii Urnov: A Learned Stalinist?" Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* Mar. 17, 1989, pp 11–13.

[53]In, for instance. *Oktyabr',* No. 8, 1988, pp. 118–20.

[54]Ibid., No. 6, 1988, pp. 82–85.

[55]Ibid., No. 11, 1988, pp. 130–32; in *Novyy Mir,* No. 6, 1988, pp. 6–7; and *Druzhba Narodov* (Moscow), No. 2, 1989, pp. 108–13.

[56]In *Novyy Mir,* No. 2, 1988, pp. 93–95;

[57]In *Druzhba Narodov,* No. 4, 1988, pp. 197–219. Publication references for Chichibabin and the previously-mentioned poets are by no means exhaustive.

[58]In *Oktyabr'.* No. 9, 1988, pp. 143–46.

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Korzhavin[59] and Joseph Brodsky.[60] Readers' thirst for information and analysis of Soviet history is reflected in Dmitriy Volkogonov's biography of Stalin (serialized in *Oktyabr',* Nos. 10–12, 1988) and Fedor Burlatskiy's controversial recollections of the Khrushchev era (in *Novyy Mir,* No. 10, 1988); in the correspondence of Boris Pasternak and Ol'ga Freydenberg (in *Druzhba Narodov,* Nos. 7–10, 1988); and in memoirs by both émigrés (Nina Berberova, Aleksandra Tolstoy) and Soviets (Anatoliy Nayman on Anna Akhmatova in *Novyy Mir,* Nos. 1–3, 1989, and Konstantin Simonov on Stalin, in *Znamya,* Nos. 3–5, 1988). All the thick journals have been running articles by Andrey Nuikin, Nikolay Shmelev (whose short stories are also now printed), Igor' Klyamkin, Vasiliy Selyunin, and a raft of other economists, historians, and social commentators.

It is true that unknown, younger, previously-unpublished writers face stiff competition in getting their work into journals crowded—some say overcrowded—with names from the past. As the critic Aleksey Zverev commented, "It's by no means simple for today's writers to present themselves in such company. The impression made by their work is rather pallid. But this is hardly their fault: who indeed could survive comparisons—which are unavoidable—with the likes of Grossman, Pasternak, Zamyatin, and Nabokov! And that's who they are rubbing shoulders with in the journals!"[61] (Also with George Orwell, Arthur Koestler, and Ken Kesey.) Zverev's point is important: more than 70 years' worth of the best literature written in Russian is being crammed into journals in the span of two to three years—tough competition indeed for even the best contemporary writers. Nevertheless, some new names have emerged: Sergey Kaledin, Tamara Nabatnikova, Sergey Alekseyev. Most notable, perhaps, are Mikhail Kurayev, whose first two novellas *Captain Dikshteyn* and *Night-time Interrogation* (in *Novyy Mir,* No. 9, 1987, and No. 12, 1988, respectively) were warmly received, and Tat'yana Tolstaya, whose stories ran in several issues of *Novyy Mir* and are now available in English (*On the Golden Porch,* published in 1989).

In conclusion, Soviet writers, filmmakers, and intellectuals may occupy "two warring camps," their divisions more sharply etched than ever. At the same time, they maintain a dialogue with each other, sometimes civil, sometimes vicious, but ongoing. Those who profit most from that dialogue are Soviet readers, viewers, and listeners, who have themselves become participants in the dynamic process *glasnost'* signifies.

[59]Ibid., No. 8, 1988, pp. 143–50; *Druzhba Narodov,* No. 12, 1988, pp. 186–89.

[60]*Druzhba Narodov,* No. 8, 1988, pp. 226–36; *Novyy Mir,* No. 12, 1987; *Neva* (Leningrad), No. 3, 1988; *Raduga* (Tallinn), No. 2, 1988; *Literaturnoye Obozreniye,* No. 8, 1988.

[61]Zverev's comments are part of a survey of literary critics in "Lessons for Tomorrow," *Literaturnoye Obozreniye,* No 1, 1989, p. 7.

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Note

Electing the USSR Congress of People's Deputies

Max E. Mote

THE SPRING 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union, which astonished Soviet citizens and the Western media and publics alike, occasioned much writing about Mikhail Gorbachev's restructuring of the Soviet political system. However, the subject has hardly been exhausted. The elections not only introduced an awareness of a possibility for change that took their importance far beyond that of the truly startling reports of free-wheeling meetings and articles in the daily press, they also established a baseline from which to evaluate future political change.

In the following pages, I would like to address two important issues raised by these elections. First, has the exercise altered to any degree the nature of power in the USSR? And second, what has the educational impact of the campaign been on Western observers and on Soviet citizens themselves?

Elections and Power

The first question can be divided into two parts: the first concerns the structure of power, and the second concerns the personal power of General Secretary and now President Gorbachev.

Structure of power. The elections did not shift power away from the party and the existing administrative apparatus. Indeed, the elections hardly affected the structure of power in the Soviet Union at all. It should be noted that two types of elections took place. First of all, there were elections from all-Union public organizations (*obshchestvennyye organizatsii*). Out of a total of 750 seats in this category, 425 were reserved for candidates from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) itself; other major organizations—for example, women's, youth, and veterans' organizations, the trade unions, cooperatives (kolkhozes), scientific groups, and creative unions—were allotted 325 seats. "Elections" for these seats were carried out by the central bodies of the respective organizations, e.g., the CPSU Central Committee conducted elections for the party on March 16; the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, on March 18; and the Communist Youth League (Komsomol), on March 23. A second type of election was held for 1,500 deputies from territorial and national-territorial districts (*okrugy*) on March 26. These "district" elections, as they were termed in Soviet accounts, are the ones that received the most attention in the Western press. The seats were distributed on the following basis: 750 were assigned to territorial districts with 257,300 voters each, while 750 seats were divided between union republics (32 from each), autonomous republics (11 from each), autonomous oblasts (5 from each), and autonomous okrugs (1 from each).[1]

The continuity between these recent elections and previous elections is strong. An examination of the chronology of the campaign and the provisions set

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[1]Dawn Mann, Robert Monyak, and Elizabeth Teague, *The Supreme Soviet: A Biographical Directory*, Munich, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Washington, DC, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989.

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forth in the new Electoral Law,[2] confirms that in both cases electoral procedures were dominated by the party, the elections themselves were highly regulated, and the results were conservative. The salient events in the process were the following:

- October 23, 1988, *Pravda* published the draft law on elections; discussion and revisions followed.
- December 1, 1988, the new Electoral Law was promulgated.
- December 11, 1988, district election commissions were formed, three and one-half months before the election, for territorial districts and for public organizations.
- December 26, 1988, to January 24, 1989, election voting precincts (*uchastki*) were formed in accordance with Article (Art.) 15 of the Electoral Law, and candidates were nominated under the provisions of Arts. 37 and 39, which specified that the nomination process would begin three months prior to the elections and end two months before the election. Voting was to be conducted by either open or secret ballot as determined at each meeting. Note that nominations could only be made by organizations with all-Union status, and that a quorum of 500 persons was required at nomination meetings (Art. 37). These provisions ruled out any independent and spontaneous nominations. These developments ended the first stage of the selection process, which had already been limited by the stipulations discussed earlier.
- January 25 to February 23, 1989, the second stage of the selection process began with the registration of candidates nominated in electoral districts. In practice, election commissions exercised their right to reduce the number of nominees who would be registered as candidates, a right many voters regarded as a limitation on the right of choice. The Electoral Law required no minimum attendance at commission meetings. Once again, voting was either by open or by secret ballot, and the meeting itself had the right to decide which procedure it would utilize (Art. 38). If more than two persons were nominated, the nominees could, if they wished, appear at meetings and present their programs (Art. 38). Candidates had to be registered at the end of this period.
- January 29, 1989, candidates from public organizations were registered.
- February 8, 1989, polling precinct election commissions were formed (Art. 26).
- January 26, to March 23, 1989, meetings of candidates with electors were held in both the districts and in public organizations. Note that after February 23, district nominees who had not been approved for nomination were removed from the race. The last month was restricted to campaigning by candidates.
- March 10, 1989, lists of electors were submitted for public scrutiny.
- March 6–23, 1989, 750 deputies from public organizations were elected at congresses of their organizations, or in plenary meetings of their all-Union bodies (see above). Winners were required to get more than half of the votes (Art. 56). Art. 60 specified that if no one was elected because no candidate received more than 50 percent of the votes, repeat voting would be held within one day, and only a plurality of votes would be necessary to win. Eighteen seats in five public organizations were not filled.
- March 26, 1989 (Election Day). Art. 55 specified that a winner had to receive more than 50 percent of the vote in a district to win. Voting had to be secret (Art. 52). No winners emerged from the first ballot in 275 districts.[3] One-quarter of the districts (384) had only one candidate.
- By April 5, 1989, election results were published (Art. 58).
- April 2–9, 1989, runoff elections took place in 64 districts where more than two candidates ran and none received a majority; Art. 60 set a time limit of two weeks for these elections; the two leading candidates were selected for the run-off, and the winner had to have more than 50 percent of the vote.
- May 14, 1989, repeat elections were held in 119 districts; Art. 61 stipulated such elections had to be held within two months in districts where one or two candidates ran and no one received a majority, and the winner had to receive more than 50 percent of the vote; these run-off elections were held well before the limit expired. Note that even in some single-member districts, less than 50 percent of the eligible voters voted for the candidate; notable were the cases where local party leaders failed to win a majority and thus were not elected. The Central Election Commission called for repeat elections in these districts and in the public organizations where the required number of seats was not filled.
- May 25, 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies convened in Moscow; a new Supreme Soviet of 542 members was elected by the deputies of the Congress. Gorbachev was elected chairman ("president").

[2]"Law of the USSR on Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR," *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow), Dec. 7, 1988, Item 729, pp. 831–57—hereafter referred to as "Electoral Law." An election chronology appeared in *Moscow News*, Jan. 1, 1989.

[3]On the election returns, see Dawn Mann, "The Congress of People's Deputies: The Election Marathon Ends," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), June 2, 1989, pp. 3–5.

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As this list of events indicates, the provisions of the new election law regulated the election, limited public choice, and in effect helped to secure the position of the party. In particular, the provisions of the law certainly limited the possibility of local "mavericks" appearing on a ballot—something that Soviet electoral laws have always prohibited. The provisions also stipulated that the nominees go through a dual selection process, once when being chosen as a candidate, and again when being registered by district election commissions. And finally, the law made voting a two-stage process, as it was in the Imperial Duma before the revolution, and as it is now within the CPSU. Thus, on May 25, after the elections were over, the Congress convened and elected the smaller legislative body, the Supreme Soviet. In short, the law itself laid down three hurdles to be crossed before a deputy could take a seat in the legislature.

Members of the party (and other public organizations) were favored under the law in that they actually voted three times for delegates. Like everyone else, they voted for two candidates from electoral districts, but before March 26, they (or their leading bodies) also voted for representatives from their public organization. These formal arrangements guaranteed the party a major voice in the new legislature. The CPSU was, as we have seen, assured 425 seats in the Congress, while the trade unions and the Komsomol were assured another 175.

There were also attempts to manage and control the elections by extra-legal means. These will be discussed below, under the section on old and new aspects of the election.

The General Secretary's power. Gorbachev's position appears to have been enhanced by the new electoral process, although it is difficult to know for certain how secure his position is.

The election campaign was used to stir up people about a visible enemy (the bureaucracy), to whip up enthusiasm for the current reform campaign (*perestroyka*), and to remove opponents of *perestroyka* and of Gorbachev.[4] Such a campaign can strengthen a leader, and Gorbachev probably gained some support from the entire exercise. At any rate, in April 1989, he carried out a massive "purge" of the Central Committee, removing 110 members who were considered to be conservative elements capable of voting him out of the leadership should crisis conditions (analogous to Nikita Khrushchev's problems in 1957 and 1964) arise.[5] And, when a significant number of local party leaders failed to win their elections, Gorbachev intimated that local party organizations might remove these failed candidates, all of whom were presumably hostile to Gorbachev and opposed to *perestroyka*.

It should be noted that the election campaign, with such democratic features as a choice of candidates in some districts, the right to speak out on issues, and access to the media by some groups, was taken as a sign of progress by the intelligentsia, a sector of the population whose support is critical to Gorbachev and to his plans for renewing the system. This is not to say that the intelligentsia did not have reservations and objections, but Gorbachev's introduction of democratic practices into the electoral process clearly enhanced his standing among this influential group.

The elections also increased Gorbachev's standing abroad. They were widely hailed, at least in Europe and North America, as a great move toward democracy. Indeed, the Western media's response to the elections was enthusiastic, perhaps more so than that of the Soviet media.

In sum, then, the elections can be said to have done little to alter the formal structure of power. They did, however, increase the power of the leader.

Instructional Aspects of the Elections

The main reasons for holding the elections are related to various aspects of reform, to changes in the structure and operations of the bureaucratic apparatus, to power moves, and in general to political categories. The elections were, however, also an attempt on the part of the leadership to reassure the citizenry that a new social policy, which reflected care for the workers and concern about living standards—the things that worry citizens most—was being adopted.

However, another important objective of the elections was clearly to teach citizens new ways of conducting their political business. In short, the campaign was a massive educational program for the people. Its message was that the "mind of the nation" had been hypno-

[4]This point is developed by Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Power to the Soviets?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1989, esp. pp. 35, 44. Hahn expected significant change to come from the new nominating procedures (p. 35), whereas the present article points to a conscious process of nurturing new public attitudes in the course of the election campaign.

[5]See Dawn Mann, A. Rahr, and E. Teague, "Gorbachev Cleans Out Central Committee," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR*, May 5, 1989, pp. 8–10; Dawn Mann, "Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies Nearly Over," ibid., Apr. 14, 1989, p. 11. The list of those who lost their position is in "To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CPSU Central Inspection Commission," *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 26, 1989, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), May 24, 1989, pp. 5–6.

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tized by Stalinism and by Brezhnev's era of "stagnation," that the new thinking of *perestroyka* would unleash the great reserves of energy and talent that had been lying dormant in the USSR, and that these resources were the only means left to solve the crisis facing the country.

Critique of past electoral practices. In the process of politically re-educating the people, old ways had to be denigrated. The campaign of repudiating past elections provides a mass of instructional material, from an unimpeachable source, on how elections had been run in the past. This material confirms the view of outside observers that Soviet elections were totally corrupt and undemocratic—indeed, that they were so systematically and thoroughly rigged as to remove the voters from any influence on government.

Insider views of the electoral process in the Soviet Union first began to appear in print in the West in the 1970's as a result of the third wave of Soviet emigration. For example, Maksudov (a pseudonym) published a short piece discussing election data that is steeped in corrosive irony.[6]

In the 1989 election campaign, information from *Pravda* furnished a broad and candid picture of the old ways of running elections. A basic criticism of past elections is that the individual was debarred from a real exercise of power. This is clearly stated in the basic party document, the "Appeal" to the Soviet people, released at the beginning of the election campaign.[7] According to this document, the entire administrative system was built on the higher organs' mistrust of the next lower organs—from the "center," to the oblast, down to the individual brigade member on a farm.[8] It was taken for granted that the system of soviets would be managed by higher officials of the party; *obkom* (oblast party committee) officials selected the people to run in the soviet elections, and their approval was a signal that everyone followed, passively voting for the single candidate.[9] A *Pravda* article mentions "pressure from above" as standard practice.[10]

Another *Pravda* article made it clear that the soviets were also dominated by male party officials.[11] Workers were included as tokens in the soviets, but typically they could be heard only once a year delivering a pre-approved report to the party officials.[12] Today, the concept of perfect and complete unity (*polnoye yedinodushiye*), which so completely governed elections in the past, is widely criticized as both a fraudulent and a harmful feature of public meetings and pronouncements,[13] especially when it is accompanied by ritual behavior[14] on the part of all participants in the administrative game.

In more specific critiques of past election practices published in *Pravda*, the management by the bureaucracy of the soviets and of elections emerges as a major problem. The programs advanced by nominees in the recent elections frequently referred to the need for independence from the bureaucracy[15] and for self-reliant thinking about issues as well as a principled defense of one's own "vision" or program.[16] Yet another article roundly condemns the behavior of the old soviets. The author says that the new Supreme Soviet must not go back to the irresponsibility of former years, to the old forms:

Not long ago, to tell the truth, we were indifferent to it all. We were taught that the overwhelming majority of deputies vote "for" when and where it is necessary to vote "for." And do you mean to say it wasn't the same for the rest of us in our daily lives? The deputies were simply a reflection of the rest of us . . . . I don't think you can blame our deputies [for] . . . political illiteracy, lack of experience, which isn't surprising after the mindless "unanimity" [bezdumnoye "yedinoglasiye"] *of former years.*[17]

Similar details are given even more trenchantly in other publications, such as *Moscow News* and the major reformist weekly, *Ogonek*.

One of the more surprising aspects of this material is the extent and depth of both the awareness and the dissatisfaction about fraudulent politics among Soviet citizens.[18] The great secret was, after all, not a secret—everyone knew but no one would talk. A brief clip from Moscow TV speaks volumes on the subject: a woman in Krasnoyarsk, when asked in a street interview for her

[6]Maksudov (pseudonym), "We All Are 'For' [Soviet Election Statistics]," trans. by M. Mote and T. Yedlin, *Political Methodology* (Los Altos, CA), Vol. 10, No. 3, 1984, pp. 293–300.
[7]*Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 13, 1989.
[8]Ibid., Mar. 2, 1989.
[9]Ibid., Jan. 5, 1989.
[10]Ibid., Feb. 14, 1989.
[11]Ibid., Feb. 2, 1989.
[12]Ibid., Feb. 28, 1989.
[13]Ibid., Feb. 14, 1989.
[14]Ibid., Jan. 11, 1989.
[15]Ibid., Jan. 30, 1989.
[16]Gorbachev uses the term vision (*videniye*): see ibid., Jan. 11, 1989.
[17]Vladimir Lyubitskiy, in ibid., Jan. 12, 1989.
[18]This is one point on which one may disagree with the excellent study of Soviet elections by Rasma Karklins, "Soviet Elections Revisited: Voter Abstention in Noncompetitive Voting," *American Political Science Review* (Washington, DC), June 1986, pp. 449–69, esp. pp. 456 and 465; she argued that the dissent on political issues is largely confined to the Moscow and Leningrad intelligentsia, but it now appears to be more universal.

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opinion of the candidates in the election, replied that she did not know anything about the nominees nor did she care because nothing would change anyway.[19] Hers was not an isolated response; such attitudes were prevalent throughout the country.

Of course, despite the recent liberalization, the 1989 elections continued to manifest many of the negative features characteristic of the old system. Although in the many multicandidate districts, voters had to cross out the names of unwanted candidate(s), in the numerous districts where only a single candidate was listed on the ballot, one could vote as before by simply by dropping the ballot in the box without making a mark. Because of limitations on the right to nominate candidates, Soviet citizens still do not vote for their own nominees so much as they vote for or against a candidate put forth by all-Union organizations.

The Soviets do not expect the mistakes of the past to be overcome in three months, i.e., in only one election campaign. Time and again one hears that this election was a "school" for democracy, in which the people were students, not graduates.[20] This leads to the final topic under consideration, namely, an account of the schooling that has begun and the unexpected lessons that the students might be drawing from it.

Lessons for future behavior. One of the most interesting aspects of the entire election period was the obvious intention to teach the Soviet public new modes of behavior.[21]

Of course, as we have mentioned above, in many ways, the new elections continued to resemble the old—the party authorities set the "line" for the elections, insisting that the aims of *perestroyka* were the aims of the campaign and of the entire Soviet people; the language of the law tends to protect the hegemony of the party; the party controlled the nominations so as to prevent usurpatory forces from entering the lists; and it managed registration through the electoral commissions. Nevertheless, a new approach to the entire process was evident in the speeches of the reformist leaders and in the media. Given that the assumption of this analysis is that ideas—in the broadest definition of the term, and as expressed in words—determine action, this is enormously significant.[22] The view that ideas govern behavior is widely accepted among the Soviet intelligentsia.[23] Thus, one must pay close attention to what was being said and shown to the Soviet public during the campaign. The words, the new meanings, the ideas, were not empty symbols.

The teaching of the new meanings and behavior was undertaken in many ways. The excoriation of past practices described above was itself a "school" in the new way of doing things. Soviet TV also provided, in its daily programs, many hours of instruction on "how to do it," that is, how to be, think, and act democratically. Soviet television gave extensive coverage to the entire campaign, and in this coverage we see a model of the new behavior considered by the leadership to be desirable. In addition to frequent reports on the regular evening news programs, officials dedicated a special series, "Toward the Elections," to the election campaign. Commentators summarized events, drew the lessons, and drove the points home to large audiences of viewers. These programs acted out for the viewers the ways in which politics at the popular level was to be conducted, and sometimes how it was not to be carried out. The programs were more than reporting; they were clearly didactic, as is so often the case with the Soviet media—one of whose assigned functions has always been to educate as much as to inform.[24]

In program after program, Soviet media attempted to communicate to the citizens one or more of the following ideas:

- the people support change, new ways of doing things, the program of *perestroyka*; reform is the route to better living standards, to a more progressive social policy;
- the word "election" now means conflict, discussion, and choice among alternative candidates;
- voting should be secret;
- the bureaucracy's power to make and execute policy should be accountable to citizens and deputies;
- democracy is not mindless unity, but "pluralism of views";
- correct policy emerges from a discussion of alter-

[19]Moscow TV, "Toward the Elections," Feb. 6, 1989.

[20]The "school of democracy" idea was repeated frequently during the campaign, e.g., in Viktor Chebrikov's nomination speech in Kishinev; see *Pravda*, Feb. 11, 1989. Chebrikov, however, dwells on the negative things learned and used by demagogues.

[21]This is suggested in one of the election articles by Dawn Mann cited above, "Elections Are Nearly Over," p. 11.

[22]It would be tidy at this point to cite a definitive work on a theory of action that makes the desired point about the importance of language, but there appears to be no such thing available. The subject of action is discussed by Sherry B. Ortner, "Theory of Anthropology in the Sixties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (Cambridge), January 1984, pp. 126–66; on language and behavior, see Stephen Toulmin, "Concepts and the Explanation of Human Behavior," Theodore Mischel, Ed., *Human Action*, New York, Academic Press, 1969, pp. 71–104.

[23]See, for example, Vyacheslav Kostikov, "The Time of Thawed Words," *Ogonek*, No. 22, May 1989, pp. 4–7; commenting on Russia's long history of censorship, Kostikov makes a telling point when he says that "you cannot benumb the tongue without putting the whole organism to sleep."

[24]See, for example, Ellen Mickiewicz, *Split Signals*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 56; Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Soviet Public Opinon and Ideology*, New York, Praeger, 1986, pp. 27–71.

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natives, from the independent exercise of the mind by individuals (within the framework, of course, of the party program);

- individuals can find the correct way of conducting an election by studying the law; the written law is the guide, the solution, the source;
- individuals must have programs, policies, principles; they must defend their own vision of truth; the answers to problems cannot come from the "center";
- an individual must speak the truth, as he or she sees it, rather than mouth slogans and phrases. The TV screen showed dozens of images of honest faces, wrestling with the expression of their private convictions, questions, doubts, anger, and so on;
- when the party does not attend to the needs of the people, it loses authority—its members might even be voted out of power.

At times, the new doctrine of freedom got out of and, and the media stepped in to admonish people for inadmissible behavior. The negative lessons were also important warnings on how not to act:[25]

- democracy and freedom do not provide a license for "egoistic" behavior; one must not use the media and public meetings simply to advance a personal cause;
- national minorities and their leaders must not utilize the rights granted in the electoral law to promote demagoguery, national exclusiveness, national hatred, or lack of respect for others;
- meetings must be conducted on the basis of firm ethical standards; one must not shout down opponents, disrupt meetings with demonstrations, falsify petitions, use mud-slinging slander against opponents, or engage in other dishonest or disrespectful acts.[26]

It is my view that these instructions and admonishments constitute an attempt to redefine part of the political vocabulary in the USSR. Certain key words are acquiring new meaning, and these meanings may bring about different patterns of behavior. Some of the more obvious of the new meanings are:[27]

- elections mean choice;
- political power should be in the hands of the people, not the apparatus;
- participation means discussion and voting where policy is made;
- patriotism does not mean unquestioning acceptance of instructions from above; policies may be criticized and should in fact be developed from below;
- socialism means a social policy that considers first the needs of ordinary citizens;
- honesty means speaking one's real thoughts, not those of the public half of a split personality.

We may wonder about the long-range effects of this schooling. But some of the results are already obvious. In spite of the fact that almost 90 percent of the deputies in the new Congress of People's Deputies were party members, stormy discussions developed immediately after the new Congress convened on May 25. Gorbachev himself was often under pressure from obstreperous deputies. Deputies from the Baltic republics demanded independence. The government, party, army, and police were castigated for their treatment of peaceful demonstrators in Georgia. Leaders appeared outside the framework of the traditional apparatus; one could see a symbol in the fact that Boris Yel'tsin was given a long, prime-time TV interview in the foyer of the Palace of Soviets where the Congress met.[28] Andrey Sakharov was a moral leader; Yel'tsin was a popular leader. Each had his own constituency beyond the power structure, and drew strength from publics that supported criticism of the regime.

The fascinating question is how far will all this go. A sanguine expectation is that the "genie is out of the bottle" and cannot be put back. Such a view has been advanced by a respected dean of Soviet studies, Walter Laqueur.[29] But as much as we might wish his view to be accurate, Soviet history shows cases of the opposite: the freedom of the revolutionary period was stifled in the 1920's and certainly under Stalin, and the thaw of Khrushchev was reversed in the 1960's. The final verdict is not in.

The elections have introduced another puzzle into the study of Soviet behavior. As we wait for the final resolution, we must focus our continuing analysis on the issues outlined above.

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[25]From the report of a meeting in Stavropol', Moscow TV, "Vremya," Jan. 23, 1989.

[26]A long article on misbehavior appeared later in the campaign, after reports of riotous conduct began to circulate; see *Pravda*, Feb. 27, 1989.

[27]This study is in a sense an exploration; it might be worthwhile to apply more precise techniques such as discourse analysis to the material.

[28]Moscow TV, "Vremya," Mar. 29, 1989.

[29]See Walter Laqueur, *The Long Road to Freedom. Russia and Glasnost*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, p. xvii, where he cites Horace to the effect that "once a word has been allowed to escape it cannot be recalled." He does consider several possible scenarios for the USSR (see pp. 271–89; 307–10), but a move backwards appears to be one of the less likely.

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Books

Ideology Is Dead! Long Live Ideology?

Cynthia Roberts and Elizabeth Wishnick

ALLEN LYNCH. *The Soviet Study of International Relations.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

STEPHEN SHENFIELD. *The Nuclear Predicament.* New York, Methuen, 1987.

MARGOT LIGHT. *The Soviet Theory of International Relations.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988.

P. H. VIGOR. *The Soviet View of Disarmament.* Houndsmills, UK, MacMillan Press, 1986.

WHEN Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in 1987 that the Soviet leadership had "taken the steps necessary to rid our policy of ideological prejudice,"[1] he was referring to the selective modification of established doctrinal aspects of Marxist-Leninist ideology to facilitate *perestroyka* domestically and expanded cooperation between the Soviet Union and other states in the international system. Since then, the USSR has experienced not only an explosion of various kinds of political turmoil, a deepening economic crisis, and a dramatic erosion in the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), but also unprecedented challenges to ideological orthodoxy from both domestic and external sources. In Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's flexible, if not supportive, stance toward change has accelerated the unraveling of the old orthodoxy and has contributed to the rapid demise of the leading role of communist parties first in Poland and Hungary, and then in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

At home, in increasingly more radical criticisms of the political and ideological roots of the Soviet system, several prominent intellectuals have linked Lenin to the suppression of nascent democracy in the early 1920's, Marx to the descent into Stalinism, and the decline of the "leading role of the party" to that institution's unaccountability and its infliction of false ideological goals and principles on Soviet society.[2] Reflecting growing divisions *within* the CPSU, some members of the Inter-Regional Group—a quasi-opposition group made up of radical reformers elected to the Congress of People's Deputies—are even pressing for a parliamentary debate on repealing Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which establishes "the leading role" of the CPSU in the Soviet polity, and for legalizing independent political and social organizations.[3]

Meanwhile, two of Gorbachev's allies in the Politburo, Aleksandr Yakovlev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, have also challenged key tenets of Marxism-Leninism. According to Shevardnadze, "the struggle between the two opposing systems can no longer be considered a leading (*vedu-*

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[1]Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York, Harper and Row, 1987, p. 250.

[2]See, in particular, Igor' Klyamkin, "Why It Is Difficult to Speak the Truth," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 2, 1989, pp. 204–38; Vasiliy Selyunin, "Sources," ibid., No. 5, 1988, pp. 162–89; and Aleksandr Tsipko, "The Sources of Stalinism," *Nauka i Zhizn'* (Moscow), Nos. 11 and 12, 1988, and Nos. 1 and 2, 1989. See also Vera Tolz, "Soviet Author Critically Evaluates Role of CPSU," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Mar. 31, 1989, pp. 6–8.

[3]*The New York Times*, Sept. 24 and Nov. 26, 1989; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), July 28, 1989, pp. 77–79. Andrey Sakharov formally tabled the group's draft platform at the concluding session of the Congress, when he was grudgingly granted five minutes to make a rushed final statement. For the complete text, see Andrei Sakharov, "A Speech to the People's Congress," *New York Review of Books* (New York), Aug. 17, 1989, pp. 25–26.

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shchaya) tendency of the contemporary era."[4] In a July 1989 speech, Yakovlev took this argument one step further by deploring both the "revolutionary romanticism" that left the promises of the Bolshevik Revolution unfulfilled, and the idealization of violent means, however noble the ends. Undeterred by the fact that some of his more trenchant comments had previously been censored in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*,[5] Yakovlev reflected on the 1789 revolution in France and the 1917 revolution in Russia, asserting that "the idea of violence as the midwife of history has outlived itself, as has the idea of the power of dictatorship relying directly on violence."[6] As such challenges to communist orthodoxy build, one may well ask: Whither ideology in Soviet domestic and foreign policy?

The four books under review in this essay provide a useful context for evaluating the evolving relationship between ideology and Soviet approaches to foreign and security policy, relatively neglected issues in the contemporary scholarly literature on the Soviet Union. Allen Lynch's excellent study focuses on the diminishing difference between the conceptual frameworks of Soviet and Western academics on the nature of the international system and on the interaction among states within it. In a new introduction to the paperback edition of his book (hereafter cited as 2nd ed.), Lynch also examines the link between the Soviet academic debates and Gorbachev's foreign policy approach. Stephen Shenfield's thinner but more readable analysis of the causes and policy implications of doctrinal changes in Gorbachev's foreign policy insightfully highlights the continuing contradictions between Marxist-Leninist philosophical assumptions and the Soviet leader's interest in promoting cooperation. Finally, Margot Light places Soviet doctrinal concepts in a historical context, and P. H. Vigor explores the impact of doctrine and security interests on past Soviet disarmament proposals.

Apart from neglecting to develop systematic connections between Soviet domestic politics and changing foreign policy concepts, these studies define the roles of ideology and theory with varying degrees of success. The neglect of domestic factors is an important shortcoming, because the "de-ideologization of interstate relations," advocated by Gorbachev and others,[7] is virtually impossible to grasp without understanding Soviet ideological terms of reference. In fact, the term "de-ideologization" is largely a misnomer. Rather than referring to an effort to remove ideological considerations from foreign policy, Gorbachev's efforts indicate a modification of the functions performed by ideology, modifications that have been prompted by changes in the international environment and by a reassessment of domestic priorities.

ACCORDING to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ideology denotes "a doctrine of political power, which simultaneously defines the ends, outlines the methods for their fulfillment, and mobilizes support for them." In Brzezinski's view, three components make up Marxist-Leninist ideology: philosophical assumptions, doctrinal concepts, and an action program, which derives from doctrine and is based on the philosophical assumptions.[8] Assuming, as Richard Lowenthal has, that only some aspects of ideology are "operative" in the policy-making process,[9] it is evident that at least two of the three components have significantly been affected by "new political thinking."

The philosophical assumptions of Marxism-Leninism continue to legitimate the one-party system and act as the moral and spiritual guide to the ever more remote communist utopia. Yet the Gorbachev leadership is less inclined than past defenders of the faith to view the set of these assumptions as a monolithic and closed system of philosophical beliefs. Gone are the old pretensions to an exclusive monopoly on the truth and to possession of the only key to human progress. Thus, the original claims to infallibility and to the scientific nature of socialism are now being challenged.[10] At the

[4]E. A. Shevardnadze, "Lecture," *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR* (Moscow—hereafter, *Vestnik MID*), Aug. 15, 1988, p. 34.

[5]Julia Wishnevsky, "Aleksandr Yakovlev to Regain the Ideological Portfolio?" Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR*, July 28, 1989, pp. 9–12.

[6]*Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), July 15, 1989. See also *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), July 20, 1989.

[7]See, for example, Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations General Assembly, *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 7, 1989.

[8]Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, revised enlarged edition, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 489. Other scholars also regard ideology as consisting of different components, each performing a separate function. See, for example, Alfred G. Meyer, "The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1966, pp. 273–85; Adam B. Ulam, "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Eds., *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed., New York, Aldine, 1980, pp. 136–53; and "Introduction: Communist Ideology, Belief Systems, and Soviet Foreign Policy," ibid., pp. 93–94.

[9]Richard Lowenthal, "The Logic of One-Party Rule," in Hoffmann and Fleron, op. cit., pp. 118–19.

[10]See Gorbachev's statement to a visiting Yugoslav delegation about how no Communist Party has a monopoly on the truth (TASS Report, Dec. 10, 1986). See also Gorbachev's June 1989 statement to the Congress of People's Deputies in which he refuted the idea that "there was a single socialist model" (*Pravda*, June 10, 1989). A month earlier, during his visit to China, Gorbachev made the same point (*Pravda*, May 16, 1989). See also, Vadim Medvedev, "Toward a Knowledge of Socialism," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, 1988, pp. 3–18; Medvedev's speech in *Pravda*, Apr. 22, 1989; Yevgeniy Primakov's article in ibid., July 10, 1987; and Yakovlev's comments about using reason rather than quotations from Lenin to support policy, cited in Wishnevsky, loc. cit.

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same time, key doctrinal concepts derived from the enduring philosophical assumptions have been reshaped or discarded in an effort to devise a different action program more suitable to current Soviet domestic and foreign policy needs. Such developments have called into question the core assumptions of Marxism-Leninism and hence its function as a legitimating force.

By breaking down Soviet ideology into its functional components, it is possible to avoid mistaking a part for the whole, as Light does when she confuses such doctrinal concepts as proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence (which she discusses in rich historical detail), with what she terms "the Soviet theory of international relations."[11] Although some Soviet commentators and scholars have written sophisticated analyses that have simultaneously diverged from key aspects of Marxist-Leninist ideology and broadened the scope of research on international relations, as Lynch points out, their work does not constitute theory by any accepted measure. Effectively using the criticisms of several East European scholars to develop his argument, Lynch concludes that Lenin, although wrong, was a better theorist—given his "clear assumptions, explicit links between variables, and bold predictive sweep"—than were Soviet analysts writing during the eras of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev (p. 147). Whatever Lenin's actual skills as a theorist, the point about the inability or unwillingness of Soviet analysts to engage in theory-building is important, because it demonstrates a principal limitation of Soviet scholarship. Nonetheless, what was "lost in analytical rigor," Lynch convincingly maintains, was "often made up by a keener sense of the actual moving forces of international relations" (p. 147).

Changing global realities have not only prompted greater realism in Soviet academic analyses; since the Bolshevik Revolution, they also have repeatedly stimulated revisions of Soviet doctrine, albeit not always concurrently, as readers of both Lynch and Light will be reminded. But this process of adapting to shifting international imperatives and opportunities did not mean, even in the post-Stalin era, that the Soviets were abandoning traditional assumptions about class conflict and the historic confrontation between capitalism and socialism.

Nevertheless, Western scholars have been searching for signs of convergence in Soviet and Western approaches to international relations since the late Stalin period. First, the Varga debates,[12] and then, more significantly, the doctrinal changes announced by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, such as the belief in the noninevitability of war, the recognition of diversity within the socialist camp, the positive role played by developing countries, and the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism, led to preliminary attempts to study changes in Soviet ideology.

In the 1960's, Western authors began to detect both a "deradicalization"[13] and a "routinization"[14] of doctrinal concepts, and envisaged a diminution of the role played by ideology as a guide to action.[15] Subsequently, Franklyn Griffiths demonstrated the existence of divergent tendencies within the Soviet foreign policy elite, ranging from those that relied heavily on doctrinal concepts and Marxist-Leninist assumptions to inform their analysis of American politics, to those who favored a more empirical approach.[16] Lynch and, to a lesser extent, Shenfield share this approach and discuss the ferment in the Soviet academic community that led to the new political thinking.

THE works under review are timely in that they provide the reader with a framework that can be used to explore Gorbachev's efforts to delimit the "operative" sphere of ideology. The Soviet leader's innovations stem from his belief that much of the prevailing ideological orthodoxy is neither conducive to achieving interstate cooperation in an increasingly interdependent world nor commensurate with accomplishing political and economic reform at home, tasks that affect the USSR's

[11]Light uncritically follows some Soviet scholars in using the terms "ideology" and "doctrine" as synonymous with "theory." See Light, p. 8. Subsequently, she defines "a good theory" as "one that can be adapted or expanded to reflect new circumstances so that it explains the past, serves as a model of the present and has some predictive value for the future. . ." (p. 318), and ably shows that Soviet "theorists" have failed to meet this test. Shenfield's cursory discussion of definitions, although posing fewer problems than Light's, nevertheless neglects to make such important distinctions.

[12]In his *Changes in the Economies of Capitalism as a Result of World War II*, E. Varga argued that governments and political forces in capitalist societies could have considerable independence from the class structure of those societies, specifically from monopoly capital. In addition, Varga found that although governments in capitalist countries were ultimately answerable to monopoly capital, sometimes they defended the interests of the bourgeois class as a whole. Finally, in what was perhaps his most profound departure from the reigning views of his day, Varga suggested that mass influence on the state in capitalist societies could become so pronounced that the state could be used as a means to move peacefully from capitalism to socialism.

[13]Robert C. Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea*, New York, Norton, 1969, p. 179.

[14]Meyer, loc. cit., p. 284.

[15]William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 289.

[16]Franklyn Griffiths, "Images, Politics, and Learning in Soviet Behavior Toward the United States," Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 1972.

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ability to play a central role in world politics. Striving to rid Soviet foreign policy of the siege mentality fostered by Stalin, the present leadership is now selectively rejecting key doctrinal concepts and redefining many of the philosophical assumptions on which they are based.

Suggesting that the past may no longer be a guide to the future, Light's examination of the ways Gorbachev's predecessors rationalized contradictions in doctrine reveals their strong tendency to make doctrine more elastic rather than to reject critical axioms. Indeed, Soviet policy-makers and scholars have often resorted to tortuous explanations for why they were infusing outmoded concepts with new meaning, bringing to mind the attempt by the phony doctor in Molière's *Le Médecin malgré lui* to justify his mistake about the relative positions of the heart and liver by claiming, "It was once that way, but we changed all that."

For example, the doctrinal concept of peaceful coexistence has, since Lenin, been portrayed as calling for varying degrees of conflict and collaboration with the Soviet Union's capitalist rivals, depending upon the prevailing assessment of the Soviet national interest. As Light asserts, Khrushchev gave this concept added weight by portraying its only alternative as "the most destructive war in history" (p. 47). Yet, the Soviet interest in avoiding a catastrophic nuclear war did not mean that Moscow was abandoning the class struggle and preparing itself to embrace the global political and social status quo. Even under the Brezhnev leadership, which, as Shenfield observes, "raised the formal status of the cooperative aspect" of peaceful coexistence, the ideological struggle was expected to continue until socialism was victorious (Shenfield, p. 23; also Light, pp. 53–63).

In fact, as Lynch contends, Brezhnev's strategy of détente (the process by which the West was compelled to embrace peaceful coexistence) assumed that the systemic competition between capitalism and socialism would intensify while the principal states cooperated to prevent war and ensure the safe transition to a new socialist world order (2nd ed., p. xxxi). During the early 1970's, Soviet policy-makers and theorists had few incentives to reconcile this basic contradiction, especially given the prevailing view in Moscow that the global correlation of forces—embracing the strength of the socialist camp and the overall balance of political, military, and economic power—was shifting to the Soviet Union's advantage.

Although other available Western studies more systematically explore the policy implications of the Brezhnev leadership's zero-sum approach to international politics,[17] the books reviewed here lucidly explain the conceptual framework informing this approach and the dilemmas that emerged, as dogma came into increasing conflict with international realities. Of the four authors, Vigor attaches the greatest weight to the influence of zero-sum doctrinal assumptions, categorically asserting that the "Soviet concept of the 'correlation of forces' lies at the root of all their thinking on international affairs" (p. 11). However, readers should note that unlike the authors of the other books discussed here, Vigor does not set out to explore the parameters or development of Soviet thinking about world politics; his analysis of the historical evolution of Moscow's approach to disarmament is deduced almost entirely from Soviet negotiating proposals and official leadership statements.

After examining a wider range of Soviet views on international relations, Lynch, Light, and Shenfield are more circumspect than Vigor about the centrality of the correlation-of-forces concept, particularly in recent years. Their reservations reflect not only a difference in focus and assumptions about the degree of doctrinal uniformity imposed from above, but also a difference in the time frame during which these works were prepared: Vigor's analysis was evidently completed before Gorbachev assumed power in 1985 and his book was published in 1986, before the other three.

For both reasons, it is hardly surprising that Light, Lynch, and Shenfield find evidence of ideological confusion among Soviet elites and growing reservations about the ability of established doctrine to explain the complexities and dynamics of international politics. All three agree that Moscow continues to care about maximizing its relative power and position vis-à-vis the West and that traditionally the concept of the correlation of forces has served as the "basic criterion" for evaluating the international standing of the Soviet Union (Lynch, p. 129).

However, both Shenfield and Lynch point to the evolution of Soviet views on global interdependence as evidence that Soviet scholars were searching for a supplementary or alternative concept to the correlation of forces well before Gorbachev became general secretary. By the early 1980's, Soviet analysts had found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the ostensibly positive shift in the correlation of forces, which stemmed largely from

[17]See Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984; Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1987/88, pp. 93–131; and Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, Washington, DC, Brookings, 1987.

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the earlier attainment of strategic parity, with the collapse of détente and the sustained confrontational posture of the Reagan administration. As Shenfield contends, "ideology was . . . in a state of crisis" (p. 31), and this crisis accelerated the process of conceptual innovation.

How Soviet analysts could have been so seriously mistaken in their forecasting of trends, even to the point of believing in the early 1970's that détente would be irreversible, can partly be explained by Light's analysis of the correlation of forces. After reviewing its historical applications and constituent elements, she finds no evidence of any scientific method in Soviet assessments but rather a heavy dose of impressionistic and subjective description disguised as analysis (pp. 275–76).

If ideological biases and erroneous expectations distorted Soviet analyses, their impact on policy was even more profound and enduring. As Light acknowledges, even as a "loose metaphor of the changing international system," such doctrinal tenets as the correlation of forces "can still serve as a guide to action" (pp. 289–90). Lynch meticulously documents how Soviet intellectuals eventually pushed the boundaries of ideological orthodoxy to capture the essence of international realities. However, the Brezhnev leadership (and its immediate successors) continued to define Soviet interests not only according to strategic imperatives but also according to traditional Marxist-Leninist philosophical assumptions about the international system, in which conflict between states with different social systems was deemed inherent, and the aggressive nature of "imperialism" was accepted as a given.

In his study of Soviet disarmament proposals from Lenin to Brezhnev, Vigor persuasively argues that strategic imperatives and Marxist-Leninist philosophical assumptions led successive Soviet leaders to conclude that the militarist impulses engendered by imperialism could only be reliably deterred by Soviet forces at least as strong as those of all their adversaries together (p. 16). Paradoxically, the resulting positive tilt in the correlation of forces also opened the way to halting and possibly reversing the arms race. According to Vigor, the marked progress in disarmament negotiations from 1968 onward coincided with Soviet assessments that the correlation of forces was "indeed tipping firmly and irreversibly" in favor of the socialist camp (pp. 16–17).

However, because he does not integrate a discussion of the incremental changes in Soviet military doctrine into his analysis of this period, Vigor fails to see what even Shenfield's cursory treatment reveals: that the Soviet Union was gradually adjusting to the challenge of obtaining security in the nuclear age. In fact, Brezhnev's denial of the possibility of victory in a nuclear war, as well as his renunciation of the goal of superiority and of Soviet first use of nuclear weapons, signaled real changes in the Soviet approach to war. Such developments, in turn, improved the prospects for at least limited superpower cooperation in arms control, although, of course, they cannot be compared to the major transformation of Soviet political and security preferences that is evident today.[18]

Wedded to ideological orthodoxy, Brezhnev and his colleagues rationalized their preference for a foreign policy that stressed developing Soviet military power and extending Soviet influence in the Third World. Even in the late 1970's and early 1980's, when the Soviet Union was confronted by a series of foreign policy setbacks, including the steady deterioration of superpower relations, Soviet leaders responded by clinging to their original assumptions instead of reexamining them. As a consequence, they resisted pressures to choose between competition and cooperation and failed to recognize that a strategy based on the traditional interpretation of peaceful coexistence was ultimately self-defeating.

THE radical reorientation of Soviet policy initiated by Gorbachev was in large part a response to the failures of Brezhnev's strategy and to the systemic crisis created by several decades of dogmatic and centralized Communist rule. What most distinguishes Gorbachev's program from past attempts at reform is his leadership's effort to delegitimate Stalinist command institutions and the conceptual basis of Stalin's foreign policy, both of which continued to have a detrimental impact on the policies of Stalin's successors.[19] De-Stalinization has set in motion a broader process of redefining the content and role of ideology that, coupled with fundamental political and economic reform and the sweeping reappraisals of Soviet history, forms the core of Gorbachev's revolution.[20]

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[18]On these points, see Cynthia Roberts, "Limited Adversaries, Limited Arms Control: Changing Soviet Interests and Prospects for Enhanced Security Cooperation," in Michael Mandelbaum, Ed., *The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet Approach to Arms Control*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, forthcoming.

[19]Shevardnadze, "Lecture," loc. cit., p. 32; Medvedev, "Toward a Knowledge of Socialism," loc. cit., p. 9; V. Dashichev, "East-West: The Search for New Relations," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), May 18, 1988; N. Popov, "We Are All in the Same Boat," ibid., Mar. 1, 1989, p. 14; and I. Malashenko, "Non-Military Aspects of Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1989, pp. 40–51.

[20]In these areas, events are outpacing Western analysis. However, for thoughtful discussions, see Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, Eds., *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*, Boulder, CO,

(fn. continued on p. 62)

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In foreign policy, the leadership did not immediately move to reconcile contradictions in established doctrine, despite Gorbachev's early hints that he envisaged a different relationship with the West. As late as June 1986, Anatoliy Dobrynin, then head of the International Department of the Central Committee, still denied that the new political thinking implied "any abandonment of the class-oriented analysis of the problems of war and peace."[21]

However, as Gorbachev's own ideas developed, and as he forged a new coalition of political elites who were not bound either by shared generational experiences or intellectual predispositions to many past assumptions, important changes emerged in the definition of such important doctrinal concepts as peaceful coexistence.[22] No longer is this doctrine interpreted as a specific form of class struggle or a temporary condition; in the new "Leninist" formulation, priority is squarely placed on the promotion of universal human values, particularly on the preservation of peace, and efforts in this direction are viewed as a fundamental process of indefinite duration.[23]

Stephen Shenfield perceptively traces this shift to what he calls the "all-human approach" (p. 62), in which the importance of peace is elevated above progress toward socialism. Clearly, Gorbachev has departed from past principles by recognizing that security in the nuclear age must be mutual rather than driven by zero-sum calculations. However, rejection of the quest for absolute security also serves the Soviet Union's obvious domestic need for a respite from the intense military build-up that the goal of absolute security required.

Shenfield further charts Soviet reappraisals of Lenin's thesis about the inherently aggressive nature of capitalism, observing that a reinterpretation of this aspect of doctrine is necessary to demonstrate "that a secure peace is attainable in advance of a further substantial improvement in the correlation of forces" (p. 48). Since the publication of Shenfield's book in 1987, Gorbachev has suggested that capitalism can develop dynamically without becoming militaristic (Lynch, 2nd ed., p. xxvii), while those referring to the correlation of forces have become voices in the wilderness. Prominent Soviet political observers are even beginning to dismiss Lenin's study of imperialism as outdated, asserting that the very nature of imperialism has changed.[24]

Recent developments illustrate the interplay between the shifts in doctrine and innovations in policy. Thus, Lynch observes in the new introduction to his book that Gorbachev links the aspects of new political thinking mentioned above to his security policy agenda for nuclear and conventional arms reductions and to his proposals for strengthening the United Nations so that it will reflect "a balance of interests of all countries" (2nd ed., p. xxvi).

Given such radical departures from orthodoxy, it is important to emphasize that current Soviet leaders have not abandoned the goals of the Bolshevik Revolution or the principle of competition between socialism and capitalism. As Gorbachev told a gathering of intellectuals in January 1989: "We can see the depth of the differences between the two social systems, but that is not a reason for opposition by force and the confrontation of states."[25] What Soviet leaders envisage is an "active interrelationship" between the two systems in which global challenges are "tackled jointly," while socialism obtains an opportunity to borrow from other developmental experiences, thereby strengthening its position in the continuing competition between the two social systems and in the "reciprocal testing of values."[26]

According to this new interpretation, class interests continue to exist but, contrary to the previously-held fundamental assumptions of Marxism-Leninism, they are now strictly subordinated to larger national and universal interests. Not surprisingly, Soviet officials deny that they are radically revising the definition of the term class interest. As a senior

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Westview, 1988; Bialer, Ed., *Politics, Society, and Nationality. Inside Gorbachev's Russia*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989; and Thomas Sherlock, "Politics and History Under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-August 1988, pp. 16–42.

[21]A. Dobrynin, "For a Nonnuclear World, On the Approach of the 21st Century," *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1986, p. 31. Dobrynin did note that the contest between the two systems should take exclusively peaceful forms. See also the discussion in Shenfield, p. 43.

[22]That many of Gorbachev's key advisors had previously advanced ideas central to the "new political thinking" testifies to the importance of personnel changes discussed by both Shenfield and Lynch. In fact, articles published around 1984 by such specialists as Primakov and Georgiy Shakhnazarov—who are now members of Gorbachev's brain trust—contain passages that read like current Gorbachev speeches.

[23]See, in particular, Medvedev, "Toward a Knowledge of Socialism," loc. cit.; the interview with Ivan Frolov in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 8, 1989, pp. 79–80; and Shevardnadze's speech in *Pravda*, Oct. 24, 1989. See also, S. V. Pronin, "Ideology in an Interdependent World," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEiMO*), October 1988, pp. 5–15, and the discussions in Lynch, pp. xxx–xxxi, and Shenfield, Chs. 8 and 9.

[24]See the comments by Aleksandr Bovin, in "New Thinking in International Affairs," *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1989, p. 104.

[25]*Pravda*, Jan. 7, 1989. See also the commentary by G. Mirskiy in ibid., Jan. 25, 1989.

[26]Medvedev, "Toward a Knowledge of Socialism," loc. cit., and his speech in *Pravda*, Apr. 22, 1989. For an insightful discussion on the changing role of ideology, see "Openness in Politics," *International Affairs*, August 1989, pp. 118–32; also A. I. Volkov, "Who We Are, Where We Are Going," *Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 2, 1989, pp. 67–76.

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official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained: "Our classics never imparted to it an absolute value and always stressed that the interests of the proletariat should not go against those of the majority of the population but merge with them."[27]

Still, whether or not the current leaders will admit to rethinking some basic doctrinal concepts, their commitment to realism in solving complex policy problems and their willingness to adapt these concepts to new realities when the need arises cannot be mistaken. Such realism applies not only to the reappraisal of imperialism as a way of justifying revised threat assessments and unilateral concessions in arms reductions, but also to the reexamination of Soviet history as a means of improving the Soviet Union's image in the world and of coopting the support of divergent groups within Soviet society. A revealing illustration of the latter point is that although Vyacheslav Molotov used the principle of peaceful coexistence to justify the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 50 years later the Gorbachev leadership has both redefined peaceful coexistence and "unequivocally" condemned the 1939 agreement as departing from "Leninist principles of foreign policy."[28]

Remarkably, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has even argued that national interests must be linked to legal, moral, and ethical norms.[29] Departing from a key Leninist tenet, Shevardnadze implies that the end does not justify the means. Meanwhile, Soviet analysts suggest that a Soviet foreign policy driven by ideology has repeatedly led to contradictions between the national interest and universal legal and ethical values, as in the interwar period and in Eastern Europe after World War II, with deleterious consequences for the USSR.[30] Some scholars have even criticized Gorbachev's foreign policy for claiming to stress moral values while failing to take a principled stand on such recent events as the brutal crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in China.[31]

EQUALLY radical changes, albeit incomplete ones, have occurred in Soviet thinking on the Third World and socialist states, areas where ideology has loomed large in past Soviet analyses. Both Light and Lynch examine Soviet views of relations among socialist states and the key impact of events in the socialist community on Soviet thinking regarding international relations (the topic is conspicuously absent in Shenfield's analysis).

Among the works under review, only Light's book examines Soviet views of the Third World per se, and in this section the author's analysis is at its best. Light effectively shows the gradual change in attitudes from Stalin to Khrushchev regarding the revolutionary promise of the colonies. She maintains that the refutation of Varga's views on evolutionary change in colonial areas encouraged the elaboration of Soviet thinking on the Third World, and specifically resulted in the adoption of more radical positions, namely, rejection of moderate popular front alliances in favor of radical liberation movements (p. 100).

In her analysis of Soviet views of classes and economic development in Third World countries from the Khrushchev through the Brezhnev periods, Light calls attention to the limitations imposed by Marxist-Leninist ideology on understanding the complex processes of change in these countries. Although not approaching the depth and detail that Elizabeth Valkenier and Jerry Hough have brought to the subject,[32] particularly for the Khrushchev period, Light has helpfully pinpointed the main contradictions in Moscow's approach that more recently have led Soviet foreign policy specialists to reassess their thinking on the Third World.

In fact, debate has enveloped Soviet studies of the Third World since Khrushchev's time, and Soviet scholars have recognized that in many cases the experiences of developing countries have not followed the course outlined by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Nonetheless, in her analysis of Soviet perspectives on the developing world, Light finds the same uncritical approach to Marxist-Leninist theory and thus an inability to explain prevailing trends in the Third World as was evident in Soviet discussions of the correlation of forces and other doctrinal concepts.

Since the reevaluation of Soviet foreign policy launched at the 27th Congress of the CPSU in 1986, a lively debate has developed in several journals on the appropriate course for Soviet studies of the

[27]Anatoly Adamishin, "Doomed to Discord," *New Times* (Moscow), Mar. 28–Apr. 3, 1989, p. 9.

[28]For the reference to Molotov, see Light, p. 35. For the strongest official Soviet condemnation of the Pact to date, see the interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev in *Pravda*, Aug. 18, 1989.

[29]Ibid., Oct. 24, 1989.

[30]See the comments by Alexander Chubaryan, Vyacheslav Dashichev, Victor Sheinis, and Vladimir Stupishin in "Openness in Politics," loc. cit., pp. 125–31; and Yuriy Levada, "A Reactive Recoil: Rethinking the Prague Spring," *Moscow News*, Aug. 27–Sept. 3, 1989, p. 7.

[31]Aleksey Izyumov and Andrey Kortunov, "Diplomacy and Morality of the Times of *Perestroyka*," *Moskovskiye Novosti*, No. 32, 1989, p. 6.

[32]See, in particular, Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World*, Washington, DC, Brookings, 1986; Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Assessments," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1986, pp. 415–34; and idem, *The Soviet Union and the Third World*, New York, Praeger, 1983.

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Third World.[33] Significantly, this debate has led some scholars to reject the constraints placed on the field by the Procrustean bed of Marxist-Leninist concepts and to rethink the categories of analysis, particularly such terms as "socialist orientation."[34]

In 1988, Soviet academics and political figures began to address the contradictions between the requirements of Soviet policy toward Third World states and various national liberation movements (Light, p. 140). They explored this issue against the background of the relative importance of class interests and such "common human values" (*obshchechelovecheskiye tsennosti*) as the need to end regional conflicts and to resolve the problems of hunger and underdevelopment. Consequently, political figures have had to resort to verbal gymnastics (for example, Vadim Medvedev called class interests the highest form of common human values[35]) to assuage the fears of revolutionaries worldwide, who see signs of weakening verbal support and dwindling material aid for their struggles in Moscow's new emphasis on East-West cooperation.[36]

Some members of the foreign policy elite simply take a pragmatic approach to Third World development. For example, Andrey Kozyrev, the deputy director of the International Organizations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that many Third World countries were opting for the Western model of development and "suffering not so much from capitalism but from its shortage."[37]

This is not to say that the ultimate aim of attaining the socialist millennium has been discarded. What has changed are the means to achieve this end. With class struggle seen as incompatible with the need for cooperation in interstate relations, the task of promoting socialist development in the Third World is increasingly becoming a matter of domestic policy. Some observers have even begun to examine Soviet aid to developing countries from an economic perspective and have cautioned against writing blank checks to regimes whose commitment to Marxist-Leninist socialism is open to question. As Alexei Izyumov and Andrei Kortunov assert, "in the final count the outcome of the competition between the two systems is decided not in Nicaragua or Afghanistan but in the main centers of socialism and capitalism."[38]

FURTHERMORE, Soviet policy-makers today are loath to impose a model of socialism on the developing countries or even on fellow members of the socialist community, because the very concept of socialism is now being redefined.[39] In Lynch's view, the Sino-Soviet split and the emergence of China as a security threat to the USSR catalyzed the reexamination of such fundamental aspects of doctrine as the predominance of class over national interests and, consequently, the impossibility of war between socialist states (p. 141).[40] Undoubtedly the Sino-Soviet conflict had a major impact on Soviet thinking on the nature of socialism and on inter-socialist relations, but events in Eastern Europe in the past three decades, especially the Prague Spring in 1968 and the Polish crisis in 1980–81, played an equally significant role.

Above all, the need to provide a theoretical rationale for *perestroyka* has been a particularly important motivating factor in the Soviet effort to reassess the meaning of socialism. The prevailing consensus on "the modern concept of socialism" was recently elaborated in a series of articles that appeared in *Pravda* on July 14, 16, and 17, 1989. Prominent officials and academics stated that the purpose of *perestroyka* was to enable socialism "to acquire a truly human face," words that recalled the Prague Spring. They also asserted that "the concept of socialism as a social system presupposes" that different models or variants of socialism will be adopted by socialist countries simultaneously or at various times. Gorbachev sub-

[33]For an incisive early critique, see V. L. Sheynis, "The Developing Countries and New Political Thinking," *Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir*, No. 4, 1987, pp. 77–90.

[34]This term has been the subject of considerable discussion in the Soviet journal *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* (Moscow). See the articles on "socialist orientation" in issues Nos. 8 and 10 in 1987, and Nos. 5, 6, 8, and 9 in 1988; the editorial in No. 10, 1988; and the discussion in *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1988.

[35]Medvedev, "Toward a Knowledge of Socialism," loc. cit., p. 10.

[36]See the reply by Yevgeniy Primakov, Vladlen Martynov, and German Diligenskiy to a critical letter from a Japanese leftist, "Some Problems of New Thinking," *MEiMO*, June 1986, pp. 5–18.

[37]Andrei Kozyrev, "Confidence and the Balance of Interests," *International Affairs*, November 1988, p. 6. See also, Alexei Izyumov and Andrei Kortunov, "The Soviet Union and the Changing World," ibid., August 1988, p. 52; and Aleksandr Bovin and Vladimir Lukin, "Dialogue: The Restructuring of International Affairs—Paths and Approaches," *MEiMO*, January 1989, pp. 67–68.

[38]Izyumov and Kortunov, "The Soviet Union and the Changing World," loc. cit., p. 55. See also Shevardnadze's comments on limiting the costs of protecting foreign policy interests in "Lecture," loc. cit., p. 31.

[39]For an early example, see Fedor Burlatskiy, "What Kind of Socialism Do the People Need?" *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Apr. 20, 1988.

[40]Lynch highlights this point in *Gorbachev's International Outlook: Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences*, Occasional Paper No. 9, New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989, pp. 9 and 27–28; and in the introduction to the paperback edition of his book, p. xix. Although Light points out that balance has increasingly been achieved in the Soviet evaluation of the national and international interests of socialist states, she does not explain the reasons for this change (pp. 306–08).

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sequently reiterated both points in a lengthy article that appeared in *Pravda* on November 26, 1989.[41]

Unlike Khrushchev's commitment to different roads to socialism, which was fatally tested by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, current Soviet leaders have demonstrated (as of late 1989) that they will live up to their promise to tolerate diversity within the socialist community, whether this diversity means a noncommunist government in Poland, movement toward a multiparty democracy and capitalist market in Hungary, the prospect of liberal reforms and competitive elections in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, repressive policies in Romania, or the brutal suppression of the prodemocracy movement in China. Soviet equanimity in the face of the dramatic end to the Berlin Wall as the symbol of a divided Europe testifies to the seriousness of Gorbachev's recent statements that the Soviet Union has no moral or political right to interfere in the affairs of its East European neighbors.[42]

Just six months ago, in his speech to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Gorbachev had been quick to remind the international community that the process of reform occurring in socialist countries leads not to the overthrow of socialism but to its renewal. It is because states enjoy freedom of choice, he argued, that the differences between capitalist and socialist states cannot be eliminated.[43] However, Soviet recognition that each country is free to choose its own path has not deterred Moscow from lobbying East European leaders to follow the example of *perestroyka* or from admonishing the Hungarians, Poles, and East Germans that talk of leaving the Warsaw Pact is premature.

Soviet leaders evidently hope that the old orthodoxy binding the socialist community can be replaced by a loosely defined commitment to the reform of socialism. It is becoming increasingly apparent, however, that the reform of socialism in countries where it was imposed by force in the postwar period leads not to its renewal but to its withering away and transformation, in all likelihood, into a form of social democracy.

Reflecting the remarkable flexibility in current Soviet thinking about ideology, even this seemingly unfavorable trend has now been cast in a positive light. Soviet observers such as Yevgeniy Ambartsumov insist that even noncommunist regimes, such as the government led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki in Poland, do not cease to be socialist, because they are not rejecting "basic socialist ideas as fundamental values." As Ambartsumov notes, Shevardnadze has made basically the same point. Moreover, Ambartsumov contends that even when new East European regimes "disown socialism," what they really mean is the "Stalinist administrative model of socialism."[44] Yet, while embracing "principles of social justice" and "ideas of socialism," Prime Minister Mazowiecki has made it clear that Poland seeks "to create a market economy."[45]

The upheavals sweeping across Eastern Europe also threaten to erode the institutional ties that bind the Soviet Union to its unraveling East European empire. In particular, these dramatic changes raise important questions about the future of the Warsaw Pact, the reemergence of old national rivalries in Central Europe, and the potential place of reforming East European states in Europe's political and economic life. Although Moscow is on record as favoring the abolition of both alliance systems and the creation of a "common European home," the Soviet Union is presently attempting to transform the role and structure of the Warsaw Pact, partly as a means to deter destabilizing near-term defections. From Gorbachev's perspective, the more immediate challenge of alliance management has undoubtedly loomed larger since the extraordinary events in East Germany, where the prospect of a multiparty system calls into question the rationale for a separate East German state.

GROWING demands in several East European states for radical reforms, including the introduction of multiparty systems, also add a new dimension to the challenges facing Gorbachev at home, where reform has taken a more measured course. Suddenly, developments in Eastern Europe have begun to outpace *perestroyka* and exert a reverse demonstration effect, which may strengthen Soviet proponents of more radical and rapid reforms.

In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's own policies have already led to a decentralization of political power and a restructuring of the relationship between state and society. Originally, these policies were de-

[41] Although the contributors to the July series included such notable figures as Leonid Abalkin, Oleg Bogomolov, Aleksey Butenko, and Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, the articles reflected the group's compromise positions and failed to refer to the role of the CPSU in Soviet society. By comparison, Gorbachev's article emphasized the CPSU's role as "political vanguard" and the "advisability of keeping the one-party system."

[42] *The New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1989.

[43] Gorbachev's speech to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg, in *Pravda*, July 7, 1989; see also, Gorbachev's speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 2, 1989, p. 44; an interview with Eduard Shevardnadze in which the Foreign Minister expresses the continuing need to preserve "the gains of the socialist system," *New Times* (Moscow), July 11–17, 1989, p. 10; and an interview with Karen Brutents, deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 28, 1989, p. 5.

[44] Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, "Not Agony but Turn to Life. Reforms in East Europe and the Destiny of Socialism," *Moskovskiye Novosti*, No. 45, Nov. 5, 1989, p. 7.

[45] Interviews with Tadeusz Mazowiecki in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 1, 1989, pp. 20–21; and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Oct. 11, 1989.

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signed to unleash individual initiative and enlist the broad support of the people in the effort to circumvent bureaucratic opposition to economic reform. Increasingly, democratization has come to be seen as essential in its own right, although there are as many views on what form democratization should take as there are on how best to make the transition.[46]

Many Soviet intellectuals assert that the development of real civil society requires a government based on the rule of law and the de-ideologization or "secularization" of political and social life. In their view, progress toward democracy and secularization is impossible without the elimination of "all ideological and political myth- and legend-making."[47] Others maintain that creating a civil society must be preceded by building the material basis for freedom, including the development of a market and the decentralization of state property, although these objectives may take decades to accomplish.[48] Even some senior officials in the CPSU apparatus recognize that the clash of ideas and interests within society, the transfer of certain powers to the soviets, and the development of pluralism (at least in the press and within the party) are positive developments that enhance the prospects for *perestroyka*.[49]

For the leadership, democratization has become, as Yakovlev puts it, "the backbone of *perestroyka*." Although rejecting the wholesale application of Western models, Yakovlev maintains that democracy should include "the individual's participation in all affairs" and the establishment of "effective feedback in society" in order to solve social problems. Acknowledging that Soviet leaders "cannot inculcate convictions from above," he emphasizes that people need information or *glasnost'* in order to make choices, particularly about issues that affect their daily lives.[50] Gorbachev, who has also advocated such views, stated in his November 26, 1989, article in *Pravda* that "the party will promote the development of pluralism."

Of course, the Soviet Union is just beginning to establish genuine democratic norms, and has yet to institutionalize effective means for holding the party-state accountable to the popular will. But the Congress of People's Deputies and the reconstituted Supreme Soviet demonstrated in their 1989 sessions that candidates for ministerial appointments were not guaranteed confirmation, and that deputies intend to advance bold new legislation defining such basic principles as freedom of the press, democratic electoral procedures, and property rights.[51] The increasingly independent Soviet legislature has even voted to remove the constitutional provision that allocates one-third of the 2,250 deputies' seats in the People's Congress to official "public organizations," including the CPSU, and, defying Gorbachev's wishes, approved an amendment permitting republics to decide for themselves whether presidents of their soviets should be elected by direct popular vote.

Having assumed much of the power and authority of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet is struggling to balance competing societal interests, and is forcing Gorbachev to engage in coalition-building. Ironically, these and other developments, such as the actions of popular fronts in the Baltic republics and widespread strikes, threaten to outpace theoretical discussions on the nature of democracy in the new socialist order.

Forward-thinking political elites and intellectuals, however, have recognized that the development of a democratic social structure requires not "more socialism" but a qualitatively different kind of socialism—what Oleg Bogomolov calls "a changing of the model of socialism."[52] Despite a wide spectrum of

[46]In addition to the references below, compare the roundtable discussion, "The 20th Century: Alternative Developments," *Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir*, No. 1, 1989, pp. 60–71; "Conclusion," ibid., No. 2, 1989, pp. 77–96; the roundtable discussion, "Western Democracy and Problems of Contemporary Social Development," *MEiMO*, November 1988, pp. 5–18; "The Democratic Alternative: Problems of the Democratization of Contemporary Societies," ibid., May 1989, pp. 5–18; and "The Ideology of Revolutionary Thought and Action," *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1988, pp. 3–11.

[47]Elgiz Pozdnyakov, "The National and the International in Foreign Policy," *International Affairs*, June 1989, pp. 10–11; idem, "National, State, and Class Interests in International Relations," *MEiMO*, May 1988, pp. 3–17; Yuriy Levada, "The Dynamics of Social Change: Possibilities of Analysis," *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1989, pp. 34–45; A. A. Lebedev, "The Last Religion," *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), January 1989, p. 54; Igor Yanin, "Returning to Simple Truths," *International Affairs*, March 1989, pp. 113–16; and Chingiz Aitmatov in *Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1987. See also, S. Y. Andreyev, "The Structure of Power and The Tasks of Society," *Neva* (Leningrad), January 1989, pp. 144–73.

[48]See, for example, Andranik Migranyan, "Is It Easy to Become Europe?" *XX Century and Peace* (Moscow), December 1988, pp. 22–25; the interview with Igor' Klyamkin and Andranik Migranyan, "Is an 'Iron Hand' Necessary?" *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 16, 1989; V. Shubkin, "A Difficult Farewell," *Novyy Mir*, April 1989, pp. 165–84; and A. P. Butenko in *Pravda*, Aug. 8, 1989.

[49]Interview with Georgiy Pryakhin in *FBIS-SOV*, July 28, 1989, pp. 92–93; *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Aug. 5, 1989.

[50]Aleksandr Yakovlev interviewed by Seweryn Bialer, "Redefining Socialism at Home and Abroad," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), Spring 1989, pp. 334–36.

[51]Dawn Mann, "First Session of USSR Supreme Soviet Ends," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR*, Aug. 18, 1989, pp. 1–3; idem, "The Challenges Facing Gorbachev," ibid., Sept. 1, 1989, pp. 15–19. See also the interview with N. I. Ryzhkov in *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 33, 1989, pp. 1–3.

[52]Compare the references in fns. 26 and 46 with O. Bogomolov, "The Changing Face of Socialism," *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1989, pp. 33–42; Yevgeniy Ambartsumov's article in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Sept. 19, 1989; the interview with I. T. Frolov in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 24, 1989, pp. 90–91; interview with Frolov in ibid., Apr. 19, 1989, pp. 83–85; and A. S. Panarin, "The Dialectics of Humanism," *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1989, pp. 40–51.

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views on what socialism means today, a common point of departure among progressive reformers, Gorbachev included, is the need to dismantle much of the old economic and political structure that suppressed individual initiative and societal interests in favor of state control.[53] Such reformers are even willing to draw on elements of the West European social democratic experience for guidance in reconceptualizing socialism.[54] Mikhail Gorbachev's own vision of socialist renewal in the USSR still contains limits and contradictions, but this consideration is perhaps less significant than his steady adoption of progressive ideas and his remarkable skill in redefining what may be considered acceptable centrist positions.

To be sure, Gorbachev persistently maintains that "any weakening of the party or diminution of its progressive activity [such as providing ideological support for policy] . . . would deal an irreparable blow to socialism." As recently as the summer of 1989, he was also insisting that *perestroyka* is "not the capitalist regeneration of Soviet society" and that it embraces the idea of "socialist ownership" but not "private ownership" of the means of production.[55] By comparison, some of his more radical subordinates and influential supporters were already defining *perestroyka* not only as "the rehabilitation of the individual," but also as "the 'restoration' of the civilized achievements of capitalism" and as a "process of convergence."[56]

By November, Gorbachev had narrowed the gap, suggesting not only that the Soviet Union should adopt some of the "achievements" of capitalism, but also that he did not exclude the possibility that private property "will appear" in the future.[57] According to Yakovlev, "the ideology of the owner must be paramount" for when a person "has a stake in something, he will move mountains; if he does not, he will be indifferent."[58] Given the pragmatic stance of many officials, including the new Deputy Premier, Leonid Abalkin—who has stated that "an enterprise is socialist if it makes money"[59]—it is likely that Gorbachev's present position on such matters will continue to evolve. Evidently, the Soviet leader is prepared to risk the further alienation of hard-core conservatives who view moderate and radical reformers alike as apostates from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.[60]

Moreover, just as the diminishing role of ideology in international relations paves the way for all states to have greater freedom of choice in their foreign and domestic policies, so the changing nature and place of ideology in Soviet domestic politics opens up the possibility of an end to the monopoly of power by the CPSU and the creation of a multiparty system. In fact, some would argue that popular fronts and the opposition movement within the Congress of People's Deputies are the embryos of future parties.[61]

Although this observation continues to make some party stalwarts like Vadim Medvedev squirm with

[53]For an important discussion of the costs to society of "statism," see G. Arbatov and E. Batalov, "Political Reform and the Evolution of the Soviet State," *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1989, pp. 35–64.

[54]See, for example, the interview with Karen Brutents in *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 30, 1989, pp. 4–5; Vadim Medvedev's interview with Bernard Guetta in *FBIS-SOV*, June 2, 1989, p. 29; the report of the Socialist International Congress in *Pravda*, July 20, 1989; and the report of a meeting between Gorbachev and Willy Brandt in ibid., Oct. 18, 1989. See also, A. Galkin and Yu. Krasin, "Communists and Social Democrats in the Contemporary World," *MEiMO*, February 1989, pp. 87–92.

[55]See Gorbachev's speech to the Supreme Soviet in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 2, 1989, p. 43; and the account of his conversation with workers in Leningrad on July 11, 1989, in *Pravda*, Aug. 20, 1989.

[56]The first quotation is from the interview with Georgiy Pryakhin, loc. cit., p. 93; and the latter ones are from L. Karpinskiy, "The Common Sense of *Perestroyka*," *Vek XX i Mir*, January 1989, p. 16. Pryakhin further maintains that "ideology must not interfere in economic affairs," and that "pluralism must also be developed in the sphere of ownership." He claims that "we must recognize private ownership, cooperative ownership, and mixed ownership, along with state ownership" (p. 2). See also the discussion of Aleksandr Tsipko's 1989 article in *Politicheskoye Obrazovaniye* by Elizabeth Teague in "Soviet Theoreticians Debate 'The Human Factor'," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR*, Aug. 25, 1989, pp. 10–12. Tsipko, who is now a consultant in the Central Committee's International Department, traces the Soviet misinterpretation of human nature and the unrestricted power of the party-state to Marx, and emphasizes the importance of individual conscience and personal responsibility in developing private over collective interests.

[57]*Pravda*, Nov. 26, 1989; and the text of Gorbachev's response to questions from students in *Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1989.

[58]*Pravda*, Aug. 11, 1988. See also his statements in ibid., June 23, 1989, and in "Redefining Socialism at Home and Abroad," loc. cit., pp. 333–35.

[59]As cited in: A Conversation with Nikolai Shmelev and Ed A. Hewett, "A Pragmatist's Approach to the Soviet Economy," *Brookings Review* (Washington, DC), Winter 1988/89, p. 4. See also, Ed A. Hewett, "*Perestroyka* and the Congress of People's Deputies," *Soviet Economy* (Silver Spring, MD), January-March 1989, pp. 47–69.

[60]Gorbachev himself recognized in 1988 that "people are confused, wondering whether we are backsliding from socialist positions . . . and whether we are not revising Marxist-Leninist teaching itself." He added, "It is no wonder that 'defenders' of Marxism-Leninism have already appeared along with the mourners of socialism, who believe that both Marxism-Leninism and socialism are under threat" (*Pravda*, Feb. 19, 1988). By the fall of 1989, the ideological education of Soviet students was sharply diminished, a move that undoubtedly further alienated conservatives. For a representative sample of conservative thinking that attacks radical intellectuals, popular fronts, and Gorbachev's reforms as counterproductive and antisocialist, see Nina Andreyeva's latest statements in an interview in *The Washington Post*, June 28, 1989; and in her letter published in *Molodaya Gvardiya* (Moscow), July 1989, pp. 272–77. See also Ambartsumov in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, loc. cit.

[61]See Roy Medvedev's interview with Giuletto Chiesa in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 61; the interview with Yuriy Afanas'yev in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 22, 1989, p. 73; and the interview with Pryakhin, loc. cit., p. 92.

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discomfort,[62] many other party members, including Georgiy Pryakhin, a deputy chief of the Central Committee's Ideology Department, suggest that pluralism within the party may be a positive development. Pryakhin believes that intra-party tendencies will likely lead to the "emergence of parties within the party," and does not rule out the possibility of a multiparty system, although, in his view, such a development may be destabilizing.[63]

Why do many communist party members favor political pluralism? The influential scholar Yevgeniy Ambartsumov's recent thoughts on the "gratifying" moves toward pluralism in Eastern Europe apply equally well to the Soviet Union: "the communist party's political monopoly," he maintained, "has frequently resulted in its own degeneration."[64] Among other factors, lack of institutionalized competition has led to such a sharp decline in the CPSU's prestige and effectiveness that a saddened collective farmer, in a recent letter to *Pravda,* felt compelled to describe the party's present role as simply that of "a windbag, a doleful preacher of decrepit dogmas."[65]

Nevertheless, Gorbachev continues to insist that democracy is possible within the framework of a one-party system, although this view has not prevented him from appointing key advisors like Georgiy Shakhnazarov and Vyacheslav Dashichev who support political pluralism, or from appointing Abalkin, who is also on record as favoring a multiparty system, to the position of deputy premier.[66] Given support for political pluralism among members of the Inter-Regional Group in the Supreme Soviet and others, Gorbachev may be pulled willy-nilly on this issue, as he has on others, by the momentum of the changes he himself has unleashed.[67] Significantly, despite Gorbachev's strong opposition, a parliamentary motion in November to debate the removal of Article 6 from the constitution was only defeated by a few votes. The same week, in a televised exchange with students, the General Secretary stated that he "did not now see another political force" capable of leading the country, but he also reminded his audience that any article of the constitution, including Article 6, can be modified or eliminated.[68] Adding to the pressure on Gorbachev, in early December, Lithuania became the first republic to repeal the same phrase from its constitution.

PERHAPS the devolution of party control is already a foregone conclusion, the inevitable result of the growing consciousness among the Soviet people that they can exercise their freedom of choice. The remaining question, then, centers on the pace of change. Although historian Roy Medvedev supports the gradual development of a multiparty system, he warns that an opposition group at this time could endanger the emerging fragile democracy.[69] Other advocates of Western democratic values argue that as yet no institutions can absorb the explosion of political participation and contend that anarchy may result if Gorbachev does not strengthen his personal power at the expense of democratization.[70] However, an alternative argument holds that the increase in political mobilization militates against a reversal of reform or a coup against Gorbachev.[71]

The pace of change within socialist countries is also a critical issue, in part because it reverberates in unpredictable ways. For example, the symbolism of Chinese tanks crushing the pro-democracy movement in Beijing on the same day that Solidarity attained an electoral triumph in the unprecedented parliamentary elections in Poland was not lost on the Polish reformers.[72] Similarly, both Chinese and Romanian leaders are concerned about the burgeoning trend toward democracy and capitalism in Eastern Europe. The alternatives—democracy, repression, or anarchy—appear

[62]See Medvedev's comments in "April 1989—*Perestroyka* Continues," *Argumenty i Fakty,* No. 17, 1989, pp. 1–3; and his interview in *FBIS-SOV,* June 2, 1989, pp. 27–28. See also, the editorial in *Pravda,* Nov. 12, 1989.

[63]Interview with Pryakhin, loc. cit., p. 92. See also, Andreyev, "The Structure of Power and the Tasks of Society," loc. cit. Andreyev argues that the party has become fused with the bureaucracy and that its hold on power can only be broken by subordinating it to the public as well as to its membership. He recognizes, however, that attaining this objective will require a fierce struggle.

[64]Ambartsumov, "Not Agony but Turn to Life," loc. cit.

[65]Tat'yana Samolis in *Pravda,* Sept. 18, 1989.

[66]Interview with Roy Medvedev, loc. cit., p. 61.

[67]Gorbachev already speaks more about democratization than democratic centralism, and he has loosely embraced the idea of checks and balances. See *Pravda,* Nov. 30, 1988.

[68]Ibid., Nov. 17, 1989.

[69]Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge,* 2nd ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 1989, pp. 648–69 and 711; and Thomas Sherlock, "The Second Edition of Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge,*" Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* Aug. 4, 1989, pp. 17–19.

[70]Interview with Klyamkin and Migranyan, loc. cit., p. 10. See also, Leonid Gatkin "The Dead Seize the Living," *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Sept. 20, 1989; and Peter Reddaway, "Is the Soviet Union Drifting Towards Anarchy," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* Aug. 25, 1989, pp. 1–5.

[71]N. Mikhaylov in *FBIS-SOV,* Aug. 23, 1989, pp. 35–36; and Yuriy Levada in ibid., Nov. 1, 1989, pp. 75–78. Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov has also maintained that a turn from democratization to dictatorship was impossible because "the people would never agree to it." See his interview in *Argumenty i Fakty,* loc. cit. See also Viktor Yasmann's discussion of the factors mitigating against a coup in "The Internal Security Situation in the USSR and the Defense Council," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* Sept. 1, 1989, pp. 8–14.

[72]Timothy Garton Ash, "Refolution [sic] in Hungary and Poland," *New York Review of Books,* Aug. 17, 1989, p. 10.

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more starkly in societies that are still learning their own role vis-à-vis the state.

It is still premature to consider the fundamental revision of Soviet doctrine as heralding "the end of ideology." Indeed, *perestroyka* in domestic and foreign policy reveals the considerable elasticity of Marxist-Leninist ideology and "conceptual stretching" as a means of papering over contradictions between Soviet reality and the socialist utopia.

Nonetheless, Soviet leaders may wind up redefining the meaning of socialism and its place in the international system so thoroughly that its meaning bears little resemblance to original Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. The radical reinterpretation of such doctrinal concepts as peaceful coexistence and internationalism, and such ideas as market socialism, could ultimately lead to the transformation of the ideology's philosophical assumptions. If these assumptions lose their sacred status—despite Gorbachev's attempts to salvage the essence of ideology—it follows that the monopoly of party control may be the next victim of a self-generating process of social change. It is no wonder, then, that party functionaries, who remember well what Marx and Engels said about the bourgeoisie producing its own gravediggers, are reluctant to address the consequences for their own power of the revolution that is *perestroyka*.

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Evolving Center-Periphery Relations in the Soviet Polity

John P. Willerton, Jr.

DONNA BAHRY. *Outside Moscow: Power, Politics, and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet Republics*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1987.

JAN AKE DELLENBRANT. *The Soviet Regional Dilemma: Planning, People, and Natural Resources*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1986.

CAMERON ROSS. *Local Government in the Soviet Union*. London, Croom Helm, 1987.

JEFFREY W. HAHN. *Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988.

AS the "totalitarian," "administered-society," and similar models have given way to more complex understandings of an evolving Soviet system, many Western scholars have abandoned the view that meaningful political actions deserving of our attention only occur in Moscow. The new interest in Soviet politics at the republic level and below has generated numerous monographs, articles, and chapters on political activity at the Soviet periphery—some focusing on particular regions and others taking a comparative view of the entire country.[1]

The emergent literature on politics at the periphery, typified by the four studies reviewed here, demonstrates that we are in an improved position when it comes to examining political life at the regional and local levels. Increasing amounts of previously inaccessible data have come to light, particularly since the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost'*.[2] Moreover, more systematic and social scientific research techniques have enabled resourceful and creative researchers to mine both new and older information, identifying the patterns and subtleties of complex subnational politics. Longitudinal studies permit researchers to assess continuity and change under various national leaders. More sophisticated cross-regional studies make it possible to consider the relevance of nationality and developmental differences to center-periphery relations. As a result, researchers are now also better able to place focused case studies in an appropriate perspective.[3]

This new exploration of center-periphery relations, of the functioning of the policy process, and of the participation of numerous institutional and noninstitutional actors has forced us to rethink a number of basic assumptions about the Soviet system. In some cases, these assumptions need to be modified,

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[1]Other works in this vein in addition to those reviewed here are: Gregory Gleason, *National Federalism in the USSR*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988; Everett M. Jacobs, Ed., *Soviet Local Politics and Government*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983; Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1982; and Ottorino Cappelli, "Changing Leadership Perspectives on Centre-Periphery Relations," in David Lane, Ed., *Elites and Political Power in the USSR*, Hampshire, Edward Elgar, 1988, pp. 245–66.

A few earlier works also made substantive contributions to our understanding in this area: e.g., David Cattell, *Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government*, NY, Praeger, 1968; Ronald J. Hill, *Soviet Political Elites: The Case of Tiraspol'*, London, Martin Robertson, 1977; and William Taubman, *Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR*, NY, Praeger, 1973.

[2]An example of the potential scholarly fruits of the *glasnost'* period is Viktor Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1988, which presents considerable new Soviet demographic and census data.

[3]Examples of such studies are Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979; and Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics*, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1981.

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and in other cases, they are substantiated.

Foremost among these perspectives is the view that all-Union authorities are overwhelmingly dominant in directing the political life of Soviet society—setting the agenda for and regulating the behavior of all subordinate units and the society at large through a large and complex set of party and state institutions. In this setting, the actions of all actors at the republic level and below are seen as highly circumscribed. At best, they can in very limited ways adapt central directives to local conditions. Although the options open to local actors may have increased since 1953, their lobbying efforts are thought still to have only a marginal impact on policy-making. Tight organizational controls and a political culture at the center stressing hierarchy and deference are seen as reinforcing this system.

A second perspective assumes that rival institutional and political interests do exist within the Soviet polity, extending from the central regime down to the local governments. Although the totalitarian model and its variants depict a relatively unified set of party/state bureaucracies guided by a discernible policy program, even they, at least implicitly, acknowledge the existence of divergent interests within the polity. These interests are associated with different sectoral, regional, and institutional actors. While subordinate to the all-Union regime as a whole, certain sectors within this regime (the military-industrial complex), regions (the Russian republic), and institutions (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU]) are believed to be favored in the ongoing rivalries.

With regard to regional and ethnic rivalries, the all-Union authorities are compelled by potential centrifugal tendencies to espouse an egalitarian policy program. However, the stated commitment to regional and ethnic equality is viewed as highly suspect and largely cosmetic. Regional differences, for instance in per capita income, are seen to reflect deliberate political decisions—and not just differences in development. Strong political associations between Moscow and particular regions and ethnic groups are believed to provide much of the explanation for the disparities in conditions and treatment.

Third, it has been assumed that in politics at the periphery, the communist party has played a primary role legitimated by a full set of rules and norms. Western assessments of the Soviet policy process have directed little attention to non-party actors. Lower-level state and mass organizations have been seen as performing at best tertiary political roles. The system of local soviets existed to implement central policy and to buttress system legitimacy, but was of very little use in advancing local interests. Average citizens, and their elected representatives, were regarded as having little involvement in decisions affecting community life.[4] In the same vein, it has been generally assumed that mass participatory activities were symbolic, meriting minimal scholarly attention.[5] Participation appeared to be severely limited and to be channeled largely in directions desired by the political authorities.

THESE assumptions are closely scrutinized in Donna Bahry's broad examination of center-periphery relations as manifested in the politics of Soviet budgets. Employing data drawn from all republics in the post Stalin period, Bahry demonstrates that the political relationship between all-Union officials and actors on the periphery is complex and dynamic, not susceptible to simple generalization. Although Bahry confirms that all-Union authorities have been the more decisive actors, she also demonstrates that lower-level officials possess some means by which they can advance regional interests. We find here persuasive evidence of an elaborate, Byzantine bargaining process that favors incremental outcomes.

Bahry's careful examination of different budgetary sectors highlights the difficulty of generalizing about the influence of republic, regional, and local interests. In certain areas, where institutional prerogatives have continued to reside with all-Union agencies (e.g., the manufacturing industries), lower-level officials have consistently had little or no influence; about all they can do is to monitor the activities of the central ministries and their local subunits. And the data reveal that this has been true regardless of who has been in charge in Moscow. In areas of joint Union/republic jurisdiction (e.g., agriculture, construction, light industry, and the food industry), lower-level officials are found to have experienced growing policy latitude since the early 1950's.

What has this increased decision-making latitude in selected areas brought officials at the republic level and below? In the post-Stalin period, the budgets of republic, regional, and local units have grown faster than those of all-Union actors, but not fast enough to cope with an even more rapidly expand-

[4]The distinction drawn by Seweryn Bialer between "high" and "low" politics was meant to suggest, among other things, that lower-level actors could have some influence in regard to less important, generally local, issues. However, even in the domain of local politics, the general view was that citizens had little real influence or input. See Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 166–67.

[5]One of the few substantial works to explore these issues is Theodore H. Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

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ing range of tasks and responsibilities. Although by the mid-1980's, republic, regional, and local agencies accounted for nearly half of the Soviet budget, they still lacked adequate resources to address their full set of needs. As a consequence, the dependence of local officials on all-Union agencies has remained unchanged or even increased.

Bahry's analysis reconfirms the critical importance of the political structure and its manner of distributing power. Primary authority for making decisions and allocating resources in all areas is seen to have remained with all-Union authorities throughout the post-Stalin period. Lower-level actors have taken on a larger set of responsibilities, but those responsibilities have been specified and assigned by all-Union agencies, and are generally of a policy-implementing nature. Although more funds have been distributed among subordinate units, the decisions of these units must accord with central plans.

Only in the case of Nikita Khrushchev's *sovnarkhoz* reforms did the all-Union regime go beyond the allocation of new responsibilities and actually devolve some decision-making authority to actors at the periphery. And the results were not encouraging from Moscow's standpoint: regional officials exhibited their independence by redirecting resources to their own projects, ignoring or downplaying the goals of the center. Moscow's new leaders rather quickly undid these reforms, reasserting the center's dominant institutional position.

The Bahry study provides some insight into the elusive issue of how republic, regional, and local officials seek to advance their interests in the system. We have long been aware that political connections and other informal means are used by officials to advance their interests,[6] and we also know that officials at the periphery are increasingly able to articulate their concerns to all-Union authorities in important public forums.[7] But Bahry's systematic analysis of longitudinal and cross-regional data does not find these informal and formal mechanisms to have had a major impact on investment and expenditure decisions. In her view, an incrementalist explanation—i.e., basing this year's allocation to a given region on the prior year's allocation—is much more appropriate for explaining investment and expenditure results. Although the complex, multi-layered, bureaucratic process does provide most regional officials with many connections to particular higher-level institutions or politicians, these numerous connections often cancel one another out, so that no one appears to be particularly well-favored. The multiple checkpoints and controls of the immense Soviet system tend to promote compromise and relatively even-handed treatment of the competing regions (pp. 95–96).

The size and diversity of interests found within the party/state bureaucracy can also work to confound the political intentions of the center. As Bahry and Jan Dellenbrant note, Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev both promoted policies aimed at some redistribution of resources across regions. Yet with so many competing goals and rival institutions directing investment decisions, their efforts at cross-regional equalization were severely handicapped: major regional inequalities remained, or even worsened (see Bahry, pp. 164–65; Dellenbrant, pp. 109–12).

Beyond its substantive arguments, Bahry's volume reveals the payoffs of a more systematic, multidimensional approach to the study of the political processes linking Moscow with the locales. Bahry teases much out of limited planning, budgetary, and investment information.[8] She augments analysis of these data with a careful examination of public discussions of issues by officials on the periphery. Bahry is able to identify commonalities and differences among regional officials, as well as illuminate the broad contours of debate among competing interests. Analysis of CPSU Congress stenographic records and materials from Supreme Soviet budgetary sessions permits us to trace the evolving post-Stalinist issue-agenda.

DELLENBRANT's study of regional development, regional inequality, and the efforts of the Russian Slavic regimes at the center to achieve cross-regional equality leads to the conclusion, similar to Bahry's, that the Soviet political system is characterized by bureaucratic incrementalism and inertia. The persistent disparities in development and resources across republics Dellenbrant attributes to the behavior of numerous political actors with competing interests and differing competence and not just to indifferent and cynical all-Union regimes. Though central bureaucracies are said to exhibit little initiative in coping with ongoing inequalities, re-

[6]See, for example, T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, Eds., *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.

[7]See George W. Breslauer, "Is There A Generation Gap in the Soviet Political Establishment? Demand Articulation by RSFSR Provincial Party First Secretaries," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1984, pp. 1–25; and Peter Hauslohner, "Prefects as Senators: Soviet Regional Politicians Look to Foreign Policy," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), October 1980, pp. 197–233.

[8]This information has received little serious attention from students of Soviet politics, even though it has been been published by the Soviets since the mid-1950's. An important exception to this general pattern of neglect is Valerie Bunce, *Do New Leaders Make A Difference?*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981.

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gional officials are also seen as frustrating central intent through indifference or their inability either to effectively utilize resources or to spur greater productivity in their bailiwicks.

The extensive Soviet economic and investment data Dellenbrant presents remind us that Soviet statistical sources are potentially rich sources of necessary information. Yet, this monograph also reminds us that the application of appropriate measures and statistics is essential if those data are to be effectively mined. This is no easy matter when studying nondemocratic societies. It is particularly difficult when exploring a politically sensitive issue such as regional and ethnic inequality, where even less information than usual is available, and where the information that is provided by official sources is carefully sanitized.

Dellenbrant's examination of Soviet statistics on regional income, economic growth, and investment over several two decades tells us a good deal about capital investment trends, the degree of plan fulfillment, and the national income of the Soviet republics. We learn how individual republics have been performing, and the degree to which Moscow has been forthcoming with resources for them. Dellenbrant also quotes from directives of the all-Union regime apparently addressed to the trade-offs between nation-wide development and regional equality, and from appeals of regional officials for preferential allocation of resources. As a consequence, we are able to examine the activities of both all-Union and local actors involved in the conduct of Soviet center-periphery relations.

However, the author fails to bring these disparate data and analytical insights together to provide causal explanations for performance proclivities and inequality. Suggestive insights, not substantiated conclusions, can be gleaned from Dellenbrant's findings—for example, the observation that predominantly non-Russian regions appear to be at a disadvantage in the political center's allocation of resources. Dellenbrant suggests that "the evidence is not that Russian areas are especially favored by economic development but that Russians migrate to economically favored regions, where they gradually become the dominant population" (p. 171). Yet, this explanation is no more convincing than the argument that investment goes where Russians live: either hypothesis might be inferred from, but neither is proved by, the correlation of concentrations of Russian population and of economic favors.

Regarding center-periphery relations, Dellenbrant posits four broad conclusions. None of them represent departures from our common wisdom, but they bear repeating. First, he argues that there are differences in the socio-economic development of various republics, and we can be fairly precise in documenting them. Second, the center has not made the hard political decisions necessary to actually reverse these persistent inequalities; some all-Union authorities may genuinely have desired an equalizing of conditions across republics, but such desires were not translated into investment decisions, at least not during the Brezhnev and Andropov periods, the temporal focus of this study. Third, throughout the 1960's, the 1970's, and the early 1980's, there was a "continuous tug of war for funds" involving different regions and their officials, but the struggle failed to bring about any major reordering of investment priorities.[9] And fourth, regional policy measures during this period were implemented in such a way that they failed to improve the relative position of poorer republics such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; indeed, regional policy decisions tended to sharpen economic differences across the republics.

Throughout his analysis, Dellenbrant treats the central leadership as a single purposive agent in the conduct of relations with the periphery. This approach varies from that of Bahry, which emphasizes a complex set of different and often competing bureaucracies that, she argues, are primarily responsible for policy outcomes.

In differentiating the power and impact of central and regional authorities, Dellenbrant distinguishes between policy-making and policy-implementation. It is in the latter area, he argues, that regional actors are able to work around Moscow's decisions. Given the limitations of his data, this contention can only be partially substantiated. The informal correlation of regional interests, all-Union policies, and regional performance he presents is suggestive but not definitive.

CAMERON Ross's study of Soviet local governments provides more direct and convincing evidence that lower-level officials can affect the political process, not in the origination of policies, but in the local implementation of them, especially in such areas as finance, planning, and housing. He attributes their ability to do so to the very structure and norms of the political system, which impede central control over implementation. Decision-making power is excessively centralized, meaning that despite the many resources at their disposal, all-Union

[9]Dellenbrant also dealt with these budgetary struggles in an earlier monograph, *Soviet Regional Policy: A Quantitative Inquiry into the Social and Political Development of the Soviet Republics*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1980.

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actors are limited in their ability to monitor subordinate institutions—institutions that are often both organizationally and geographically distant. Moreover, the center has not, Ross contends, developed a set of standardized institutional structures and operating norms that link the diverse regional and local agencies into a more coherent and effective whole.

In this complex and often confused bureaucratic setting, seemingly all institutions have the ability and opportunity to safeguard—if not expand—their niches in the political process. In the finance area, for example, lower-level officials have powerful incentives to hide existent local income sources from all-Union authorities and to overstate resource needs so as to maximize the amount of funding they get from Moscow (all-Union officials determine federal revenue allocations as a differential between planned local expenditures and available local income). Thus, the very system of centralized planning and resource allocation—designed to strengthen the power of central authorities—encourages decentralized political processes.

The problems of excessive centralization go beyond the issue of resource allocation to the nature of centralized planning. Ross's case studies provide evidence that Moscow has great difficulty in developing appropriate norms for the more than 50,000 lower-level administrative units that operate in the modern Soviet polity. Norms based on all-Union averages or central planners' best estimates, by not taking into account specific communities' distinctive features, will undermine local officials' efforts at expanding local housing or providing necessary facilities and services. Similarly, problems in lower-level implementation of central directives could reflect a number of different circumstances and not simply conscious local resistance. As Ross concludes, the difficulty of implementing central policies locally often simply reflects "bureaucratic defects, problems of processing and coordinating information, and other *universal* bureaucratic *distortions,* which are magnified in the Soviet setting" (p. 182, emphasis in original).

What of institutional rivalries and their impact on policy implementation in local settings? Both Bahry and Dellenbrant addressed issues of regional competition. While acknowledging conflicting interests, Bahry's analysis did not reveal major long-term advantages or disadvantages to specific participants in the annual budget negotiations. Indeed, using aggregate data over a 30-year period, she found that even Politburo members were unsuccessful in attempts to bring advantages to their bailiwicks in the budgetary struggles. Dellenbrant's analysis did point to winners and losers in these struggles, although the causal explanation provided was not convincing. Ross's examination of issue-areas directly reveals the impact of institutional rivalry on the implementation of policy.

An example is housing. Living quarters have traditionally been connected to local enterprises under the jurisdiction of all-Union or Union-republic ministries. Since Stalin's death, the Soviet leadership has attempted to transfer housing to local control. Local officials looked forward to expanding their responsibilities, so long as they were provided adequate resources to repair and maintain the transferred housing. In practice, the necessary funds, staff, and repair facilities were rarely forthcoming, as ministerial officials who chose to relinquish control over housing often abandoned all concern for housing conditions. In other cases, however, ministries and their local enterprise directors resisted transferring control of housing to local soviets, fearing among other things that they would thereby lose control over a powerful means of attracting manpower. Their footdragging proved effective even in the face of pressures from Moscow: as of 1981, they still controlled nearly 60 percent of all Soviet housing. In this field, then, a complex set of interests motivated the many responsible central and local actors, and policy change proved to be difficult, with very different housing transfer outcomes to be found in the various regions.

Ross's exploration of party-state relations in local governance confirms the decisive power enjoyed by party organs at every authority level, and the resulting potential for "*podmena,*" the party's supplanting of governmental prerogatives. Yet, his case studies also reveal that state actors have certain resources of their own that can at least complicate party control. We have already noted the ability of central ministries, while themselves formally operating under party guidance, to ignore major initiatives endorsed by the central party leadership. Party officials at lower levels also find themselves vulnerable to the actions and interests of the Moscow ministries and their local agents. Local party leaders must live with the budgetary and planning decisions of ministries, even while ostensibly charged with controlling the activities of these ministries in the local setting.

Ross notes that lower-level party organs are much stronger in the setting of policy than in the implementation of that policy. The obstacles to party control over policy implementation are profound and basic to the Leninist system: they stem from the realities of an elaborate, centralized, and bureaucratized political system, and not from

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the political might of rival agencies. On this point, Ross's findings are compatible with those of Bahry and Dellenbrant: the Leninist political structure is most conducive to an incrementalism that favors long-established and well-ensconced bureaucratic interests.

THE first three books, and the broader literature they reflect, depict a Soviet political process dominated by institutional actors and interests. While revealing a politics at the republic level and below that is more intricate and dynamic than we often assume, they show that the substance of policy still reflects the basic interests and will of the political center, even if the latter is to a considerable degree itself the product of divergent and conflicting interests. But beyond these interests and those of dominant lower-level executive actors (e.g., party organizations, the executive committees of soviets, and other administrative agencies), what, if any, political role do the masses and their elected representatives have?

Our traditional understanding of the Soviet system has led us to discount the role of popular interests. The channels available for popular participation were commonly understood to assume socializing and legitimating roles in the Soviet system. There was a presumed need for some popular feedback, but "participation" meant something very different from what we are accustomed to in Western liberal democracies.[10] Therefore, Jeffrey Hahn's finding that there are very real possibilities for political participation in Soviet local government, even if relatively few Soviet citizens choose to avail themselves of them, is an important one.

Examining and evaluating mass political participation in the Soviet system is a challenging task, especially when that society is closed and authoritarian. Beyond identifying and illuminating the formal structures permitting participation, one must consider the political meaning of given participatory actions, their role in linking the citizenry to the governing elite, and their relationship to political change. Hahn's volume is one of the very few works that successfully explores these issues in the Soviet setting.

Hahn's careful and thorough research strategy enabled him to assimilate a wide range of information bearing on the effectiveness of mechanisms said to permit citizen involvement in local government. During a series of prolonged stays in the USSR, he interviewed a wide range of relevant officials, specialists, and voters. He consulted a broad array of documents and records of soviets and deputies. In addition, he was able to observe up close the workings of a single district, the Lenin district of Moscow. His case study of this district provided much contextual information for understanding the interests and behavioral proclivities of Soviet electors and their deputies. Potential concerns over the representativeness of the Lenin district are alleviated by Hahn's consideration of published and unpublished Soviet statistical data for numerous other regions and for the country overall.

Hahn's findings—reflecting data and information from the 1970's to the mid-1980's—bring some qualification to our basic understanding of the system of soviets, mass participation, and mass-elite relations. His study confirms that at the local level, as at the regional and all-Union levels, a small and powerful political elite dominates the policy process. This elite, however, is surrounded by a sizable group of interested lower-level officials, specialists, and ordinary citizens who choose for various reasons to involve themselves in the political life of their communities, in the process often advancing their own interests.

Drawing upon the logic of what he terms the "gored-ox" theory of politics, Hahn demonstrates that while most Soviet citizens are not active in the political process, they can become involved when their vital interests are at stake.[11] The local executive committee, which is the locus of governmental policy-making and which is dominated by the political elite, can be influenced by community interests through the local soviet that "elects" it. Although the formal means of influence open to the public and its representatives are circumscribed by higher-level interests, and are flawed, Hahn documents that they can be used in politically significant ways.

Do Soviet citizens come to elected representatives with their local concerns? Yes, we learn, although the number of actively involved citizens may be limited (perhaps 15 percent of the total population). The issues they raise are of a local nature (e.g., housing, services, transportation), but they are critical concerns to those affected. How do citizens make their concerns known? Various formal mechanisms exist, including voter mandates (*nakaz izbirateley*—proposals from constituents, see Hahn, pp. 135–36) to candidates, soviet deputy report meetings, consulting-hours for deputies and their constituents, and citizen submissions of proposals, dec-

[10]Jerry Hough has differed with this common view, finding participation in the Soviet Union more meaningful. See "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies*, January 1976, pp. 3–20.

[11]See Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1961, for a discussion of the different levels of participation that characterize types of American citizens and politicians. Dahl's framework provides the theoretical underpinnings of Hahn's study.

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larations, and complaints.[12] While each of these means has limitations, not the least of which is public pessimism about their efficacy, many citizens choose to use them. Hahn's work demonstrates that at least some elements in the general population do view their elected deputies as "ombudsmen" who can at least communicate citizen concerns to the political establishment.

But can these ombudsmen really do much for the citizens who elected them? We have traditionally assumed they cannot. Acting individually, they have little real political power. They certainly cannot set the local agendas, and they cannot get around the elaborate local and higher-level bureaucracies that implement policy. The information provided them by executive and administrative agencies is also limited. And as informal ombudsmen, the issues they may potentially deal with are limited to matters of what Seweryn Bialer called "low politics"—such as road repair needs, problems with health services, housing shortages, and requests for more schools.

However, as Hahn demonstrates—whether relying upon aggregate all-Union data on deputies' activities or his own observations of a soviet standing committee's session—deputies can raise telling questions for local authorities, they can make formal statements about a particular issue requiring an official agency response, and they can introduce proposals to pressure agencies to alter their behavior. Through the system of soviet standing committees, they can shape draft legislation, review the work of specific local organizations, and make executives more aware of particular constituent concerns. In short, the peoples' elected representatives have a number of means by which they can champion their constituents' interests and influence the political process.

Clearly, many of these processes entail interminable formalities and direct pressure from above to conform. The relatively high turnover of deputies, combined with the observable tendency for a small element to dominate the life of a soviet, further limit the potential for serious challenge. However, the legal mechanisms for popular influence are in place, they are used by citizens and their deputies, and policies are affected, even if these first steps do not yet constitute a "civic culture" in Hahn's estimation.

WHAT broad picture of the Soviet political system and regional and local politics emerges from these works? Hahn's study reveals that considerable participation exists at the grassroots level and that it often does have political significance. Bahry, Dellenbrant, and Ross illuminate regional and local settings where political life is equally dynamic and is characterized by elaborate practices through which interests are articulated and pursued. In the main, however, the image of a strong political center is reconfirmed, even though the center itself is composed of a diversity of competing interests complicating its exercise of power, and is also vulnerable to numerous lower-level pressures, especially in the critical process of policy-implementation.

All these studies show the unwieldiness and complexity of the interlocking set of party/state hierarchies, which favor incrementalist policies that safeguard established interests. However, the immensity of this set of hierarchies and the magnitude of the tasks to be performed also favor the sharing of more responsibilities with lower-level institutions and actors. As a result, the latter find themselves with more opportunities to influence the political process.

These volumes also demonstrate that republic, regional, and local governments now have increased resources with which to address problems; they generate more of their own funds than in the past, and they have more flexibility in determining how those funds are to be used. Yet, in the absence of any fundamental redistribution of political power, governments at the periphery are still heavily dependent on the center for many needed resources, and still operate within generally strict guidelines set out by all-Union authorities. Regional and local executive committees and finance departments may now be able to work out their own budgets, but their decisions are restricted by central planners and ministries.

All of these works reveal very strong interconnections binding the various all-Union, regional, and local actors into a more coherent whole. Each work also demonstrates that any single entity, even at the highest authority level, has real difficulties in initiating change. Bahry underscores this reality when she notes that the massive and elaborate Soviet system simultaneously safeguards, perpetuates, and obstructs interests. If regional officials, for instance, are not successful in advancing their causes, they can simply direct their pleas to alternative institutions and actors. They can—and have—raised issues again and again, contacting the long list of potential higher-level allies over succeeding years. The system halts a subordinate official's initiative, but leaves that official numerous other openings for further pursuing a given end. It is hardly surprising that the issue-agenda changes little from year to year.

[12]Proposals and declarations provide suggestions by a constituent on how the work of local government might be improved. Declarations, however, are more narrow in their scope and likely entail the more specific needs of a given constituent. Complaints generally involve the possible violation of the legal rights of a constituent. See Hahn, pp. 158–61.

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Any complex policy question is bound to involve the interests of numerous rival agencies and therefore requires much time for final resolution. Ross demonstrates in the important area of housing how all-Union directives, central ministerial needs, local enterprise interests, and local governmental desires all compete with each other, making any change in the status quo very slow. Even at the local level, the associations among the political elite, relevant administrative agencies, elected deputies, and the interested public all serve to make political change a torturous and unlikely prospect. Hahn's study reveals local participation as being as much a corrective to as a stimulus for change—at least for the pre-Gorbachev period.

Given these circumstances, it is not difficult to understand why most Soviet politicians and citizens make use of informal, extralegal means to promote their interests. These means, which include the reliance on *blat* (the use of connections) and the cultivation of extended networks, are not explored in these works. Both the elite and the masses are aware of the critical role of these informal arrangements in lubricating an often inflexible and status quo–oriented political system.

Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman have characterized the Soviet Union as manifesting what they term a "covert-participant political culture," in which individuals promote their self-interest through favors, manipulation, personal influence, and even money.[13] In this system, most persons outside of the top political elite are skeptical about their ability to influence policy-making, but they believe they can influence the way policies are implemented and thereby advance their interests. The notion of a covert-participant political culture helps to explain why so many Soviet citizens choose not to use the formal means of influence legally available to them. It also explains the expectations and resilience of lower-level officials. Those possessing a sense of political efficacy—whether they are of the elite or of the masses—are adept at using informal means to promote their interests.

THE FINDINGS in these volumes reveal the need for profound systemic change if the Soviet polity is to become more efficient and more effective. They also indicate that the impetus for systemic reform must come from both the top and the bottom of the political system. The authority to institute profound change can only be found in Moscow, but the willingness to reform the system must characterize many lower-level institutions and actors, down to and including those operating in the rural settlements.

Gorbachev-era efforts at addressing these problems and reforming the political system indicate that while the political center is taking the lead in initiating changes, the periphery is very much involved in the process. At the top, we see the streamlining of party and state bureaucracies. Moscow is making new efforts to better tap interests and perspectives on the republic level and below, and to balance branch and territorial concerns. At the lower levels, there is a new reliance upon the soviets to pressure bureaucracies. A reinvigorated system of soviets and elections helps, among other things, to enhance popular participation, raise expectations, and build up momentum for reform. Hahn's volume fully anticipated these reforms by noting that certain necessary preconditions for establishment of a civic culture in the Soviet Union were already in place before the Gorbachev period. For instance, the millions of soviet deputies who served in a monitoring capacity as members of standing committees have already been socialized to participate in the political life of the country.

However, these four books also point to an evolved and delicate balance of institutional, sectoral, regional, and other interests comprising the political system—a balance that surely favors some over others, but one that seemingly enables all established interests to safeguard their basic positions. Alteration of the elaborate institutional arrangements and practices identified by these authors will result in highly unpredictable consequences. Only the most far-reaching reforms—encompassing institutions, attitudes, and behavior—could significantly transform the identified Soviet proclivity toward policy rigidity and incrementalism.

[13]Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and 'Covert Participation' in Policy Implementation," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, WI). September 1984, pp. 603–21.

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Soviet Society under the Old Regime

Thomas F. Remington

DAVID K. WILLIS. *Klass: How Russians Really Live*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985.

SUSAN BRIDGER. *Women in the Soviet Countryside: Women's Roles in Rural Development in the Soviet Union*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

HORST HERLEMANN, Ed. *Quality of Life in the Soviet Union*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1987.

JAMES R. MILLAR, Ed. *Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

MERVYN MATTHEWS. *Poverty in the Soviet Union: The Life-Styles of the Underprivileged in Recent Years*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

ILYA ZEMTSOV. *The Private Life of the Soviet Elite*. New York, Crane Russak, 1985.

WHAT did Western scholars know about Soviet society on the eve of *perestroyka*, and how did they know it? The books under review represent a fair sampling of the state of Western thinking about the dynamics of social relations in the USSR on the basis of the sources available before *glasnost'* opened the floodgates of new information. Did scholars foresee Mikhail Gorbachev's radical reform program? Did we think Soviet society was fundamentally stable, or in a state of impending collapse? As demonstrated by the books discussed here, the mirrors our scholars and journalists hold up to the Soviet world also reflect the state of our own knowledge and the aims and interests we bring to Soviet studies.

These volumes fall into three methodological genres. Journalistic accounts offering first-hand experiences, stories about acquaintances ("Vanya wanted to write poetry, and to dream, and to read books," David Willis tells us at the beginning of his chapter on Soviet housing allocation), and morsels from the Soviet press have for years had a steady market among scholars, policy-makers, and the interested public.

A second genre relies on Soviet scholarly and press publications, combing them systematically in an attempt to reveal the typical and the anomalous in patterns of social behavior in a particular domain over a particular time span. Susan Bridger's careful examination of the structure of women's roles in rural society, which draws both on Soviet social science research and on Soviet newspapers, is exemplary in its use of this standard approach. Similarly, most of the contributions to Horst Herlemann's edited collection, based on an April 1984 conference at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (Washington, DC), draw mainly on Soviet publications.

Finally, we have a substantial body of research based on émigré surveys. The Soviet Interview Project (SIP), funded by the United States government and conducted by a team of eminent scholars, is the most comprehensive of the many studies drawing on surveys of émigrés who came out during the great wave of outmigration in the 1970's. The first volume of papers published from the SIP project, *Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR*, edited by the project director, James R. Millar, appeared in 1987 and employs the most advanced Western survey research techniques. Most of the authors of

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the SIP studies also draw upon Soviet data as a means to cross-check the validity and representativeness of the survey findings. Similarly, Mervyn Matthews's study of poverty complements Soviet data with an émigré survey, using each kind of source, in effect, to correct or validate the other.

NONE of the books under review here analyzes events or revelations from the Gorbachev period, although some were completed just after Gorbachev came to power. None, it is fair to say, anticipated the extraordinary public discussion or political liberalization that Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost'* initiated, nor did any envisage the adoption of a radical program of economic reform. Indeed, the authors generally avoided speculating about the future. Willis does argue that the yearning of ordinary Soviet citizens to enjoy various status-confirming privileges and benefits represents a long-term but slow-acting force for change. Writing in 1985, Willis saw no revolutionary movement developing in the near-term, however; and, as he notes, much of the widespread desire for better living standards is a conservative force. Still, if Willis failed to anticipate the explosion of new associational activity or the outbursts of popular violence occurring in the country's southern rim, he is hardly as easily faulted as Ilya Zemtsov who predicted that "no essential changes will occur in the tenor of Soviet life" because the new leaders will be just as "cautious, as indecisive, and as conservative as their predecessors" (p. 76).

It is also clear that before *glasnost'*, scholars and journalists alike were impelled to get inside Soviet reality, to penetrate the veil of secrecy, obfuscation, and propaganda. Thus, Willis's subtitle is "how Russians really live." Zemtsov wants to reveal "the *private* life of the Soviet elite" (emphasis added). The cover of the Millar volume depicts a man peering under a curtain, a picture first used in the *New York Times Magazine* in 1984.

What an almost inconceivable difference *glasnost'* has made in our use of Soviet sources! Insights on such subjects as the severity of the state budget deficit, inflation, alcohol and drug abuse, the crime rate, nationality tensions, elite corruption, and the appalling state of the health care system—won through enormous effort before *glasnost'*—have become commonplace since. Indeed, in numerous instances, pre-*glasnost'* Western assessments of these problems that were considered controversial (and even manifestations of "cold war scholarship") turn out to have been too mild in view of the shocking revelations appearing in official Soviet publications.

Moreover, the perspective of much of the Western literature that was based on Brezhnev-era data now appears somewhat outdated, because it tended to assume that the society was in or near a state of equilibrium.[1] Now it appears more likely that (much as Stephen Cohen argued[2]) Soviet society was passing through a period of decay brought about by the stifling of impulses for development. If Western scholars tended to underestimate the system's need for change, still more did we underestimate its capacity for radical response.

All three genres, then, ultimately depend on the quality and content of information provided by their

[1]The assumption that the post-Stalin system was basically stable underlies much of the literature of the Brezhnev era, although a shift seems to have occurred in scholars' theoretical premises between the early and late stages of Brezhnev's rule. To be sure, Western scholars relying on official sources published in the Brezhnev era were handicapped in their assessments by the same barrier that prevented open discussion of problems in the Soviet Union—the systematic suppression or whitewashing of any information that might have revealed the true severity of the social crisis.

A number of studies published in the late 1960's and early 1970's expressed a cautious optimism about the ability of the Soviet system to rationalize its Stalinist economic and political structures and thus cope more or less successfully with pressures to modernize. See, for example, Alexander Dallin and George M. Breslauer, "Political Terror in the Post-Mobilization Stage," in Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970, p. 214; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, Eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*, New York and London, Basic Books, 1970, pp. 40, 44.

A forceful case against the idea that the Soviet system had slipped into a morass of mediocrity and immobilism was made by Jerry Hough in "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1972, pp. 25–45. Hough argued that the evidence for change was at least as strong as the evidence for paralysis.

By the late 1970's and early 1980's, most scholars avoided optimistic prognoses and pointed to mounting pressure for reform. Yet, some expressed varying degrees of confidence that the Brezhnev leadership's acceptance of the imperatives of modern scientific and technical change, and of the corresponding need for a more dynamic and comprehensive system of policy-making, would enable Brezhnev's successors to rationalize the political system. See, for example, Erik P. Hoffmann, "Changing Soviet Perspectives on Leadership and Administration," in Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Robert Sharlet, Eds., *The Soviet Union Since Stalin*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1980, esp. pp. 88–89.

Others conjectured that the future would bring, at best, incremental change, forecasting that the likeliest of several scenarios was a continuation of the Soviet Union's inefficient, stagnant, but noncatastrophic present. See, for example, Blair Ruble, "Muddling Through," *The Wilson Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Winter 1981, pp. 126–38; and Paul K. Cook, "The Political Setting," in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*, Part 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 28.

[2]See, in particular, his "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union," in Cohen, Rabinowitch, and Sharlet, Eds., op. cit., pp. 11–31; *Rethinking the Soviet Experience*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985; and *Sovieticus. American Myths and Soviet Realities*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986.

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sources. In volume and quality, our opportunities are vastly greater in the period of *glasnost'* than they were previously, and the powerful division between "for inside" and "for outside" that cut through Soviet information is greatly diminished. Nevertheless, we still need to take account of the controls and biases affecting published information—e. g., the Gorbachev leadership's political need to discredit the previous regime.

In addition, when drawing general conclusions about the "system," we need to consider the factors that confine the value of our observations to certain places or periods of time. We must also be careful to avoid either allowing the subject to impose its own ideological concepts on the study or importing analytical categories that fit the reality poorly or not at all. For example, some of the conceptual tools employed in the volumes discussed here, such as gender roles, are unambiguous, while others, such as "middle class," sometimes obscure rather than clarify the major fault lines in Soviet society.

IN Susan Bridger's study of rural women, the analysis of social differentiation is put into a developmental perspective. Her starting point is the contemporary view that rural economic development frequently entails disadvantages for women by providing opportunities for male laborers to enter a cash economy while leaving women and children in worse subsistence conditions. To solve this problem, some radical writers reject market-oriented development schemes in favor of more comprehensive redistribution of rural land and income.[3]

Bridger closely examines Soviet historical experience to determine the effect of both the collectivization and the mechanization of agriculture on women's roles. She pinpoints a particular factor associated with the low status of Soviet rural women: the exclusion of women from mechanized jobs on farms, a process particularly marked in the 1950's. By the end of that decade, women made up fewer than 1 percent of all drivers, while 80 percent of all farm women had no specialty at all and performed mostly gang labor in the fields.

Bridger relates a number of aspects of rural women's lives to this rigid sex-role distinction in the division of farm labor, and she shows that these distinctions are breaking down at a glacial pace. Official regime policy is somewhat contradictory, because despite the concern with maximizing the effectiveness of the productivity of labor and defending the equality of the sexes in the labor force, a strong sense of "natural" gender role differences pervades society. Indeed, Bridger writes that "biological determinism has been granted academic respectability by Soviet educational theory" (p. 224). Women tend to respond with private solutions, leading to rising rural divorce rates, lower fertility, and increasing outmigration from the countryside. The last, in turn, has created what Soviet sources term the "bride problem" for young rural men, exacerbating the difficulty of keeping young and able-bodied male workers on the farms.

[3]Bridger observes that for some feminist writers, "the problem is not simply that policy makers fail to recognise the current productivity of rural women, or that drawing women into the market economy through home industries may lead to greater exploitation. Nor would the solution simply be greater female involvement in planning, they maintain. The question untouched by much of the literature is seen as far more fundamental and concerns the nature of the development process itself. These writers question whether women really have a great deal to gain from a model of development which involves integrating developing countries into the international market system" (p. 4).

ANOTHER glimpse of the "downstairs" of Soviet society is offered by Mervyn Matthews's book on poverty. Like his earlier studies of Soviet society, this volume reflects a careful attempt to draw general conclusions based on fragmentary data published in Soviet sources and supplemented by his own émigré interviews. The work concentrates less on the variation in the incidence of poverty across regions or over time than on the structure of household revenues and expenditures. Thus, although Matthews discusses the differential impact of poverty on various groups, he tends to treat poverty more as an economic than as a social phenomenon.

One question that Mathews could well have treated in greater detail is the degree of mobility into and out of poverty within and across generations. No doubt, on this—as on other points that merited more attention than they received (such as homelessness and vagrancy, or inter-nationality differences in the incidence of poverty)—Matthews was at a severe disadvantage because of the secretiveness with which the subject of poverty was treated in the Soviet media until recently.

Under *glasnost'*, the Soviet media have begun to shed a good deal more light on the subject of poverty. Matthews's figures hold up well, the crucial point in discussions of poverty being the average monthly per capita income taken as the poverty line. However, if the level of "minimum material security" is 75 rubles per month, as Soviet economists now assert,[4] more than 43 million people live in poverty. Whether the 75-ruble level remains appropriate in view of the acuteness of short-

[4]*The New York Times*, Jan. 29, 1989; William Moskoff, "The Aged in the USSR," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Sept. 15, 1989, pp. 7–9.

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ages and the acceleration of inflation is another matter.

THE contributions in the Herlemann collection offer brief sketches of various aspects of Soviet society, leaving it to the reader to draw from them a broader assessment of the "quality of life." Although Herlemann in his introductory essay and Robert Belknap in a short, shrewd opening comment acknowledge the difficulty of using the term "quality of life" without establishing first the subjective or objective criteria used by members of a given society to assess it, the volume regrettably lacks either a historical or a comparative perspective for judging the meaning of the data presented in the individual articles. With the benefit of hindsight, it is also clear that the volume should have devoted some attention to environmental pollution, which has emerged as one of the strongest sources of political protest since Gorbachev's accession to power.

Above all—and it is the fundamental question we must pose in considering all the books under review here—what shapes Soviet citizens' assessments of their quality of life? Which is the more salient: the relative superiority of living standards today as compared with 1953, or the felt decline since the late 1960's? Belknap asserts that solidarity and heroism have declined since Stalin's time, while the quality of life has improved. But he poses a crucial question when he asks whether citizens now have hope that the future will be better.

Quality of life is a composite measure built both of the material circumstances in which members of a society live and the yardsticks by which they evaluate those circumstances. Again and again we find confirmation of Ted Robert Gurr's theory that it is not deprivation or despair that drives people to rebel, but a rise in their expectations occurring faster than an improvement in their circumstances.[5] It is therefore of crucial importance to those who study Soviet society to understand the interaction of the material and perceptual aspects of the Soviet social reality, a task whose importance is underscored in a period of rapid change.

Although it is a good deal less insightful than, say, Hedrick Smith's[6] or Elizabeth Pond's[7] books, Willis's volume comes closest of the books under review here to meeting this challenge. For Willis, the strivings of Soviet citizens of all strata to enjoy the perks that come with influence, privilege, and other marks of status can be subsumed under the master concept of "klass."

Willis employs this term very broadly and loosely. It seems to mean any form of conspicuous consumption that distinguishes one person's means from another's. Willis also focuses upon a group that he calls the "rising class," apparently comprising anyone, from World War II invalids to the golden children of party bosses, who can claim any sort of exclusive privilege or benefit. What members of the "rising class" have in common, Willis says, is that they harbor "middle class" aspirations—meaning, evidently, that they want comforts, security, prestige, self-esteem, but not necessarily political freedom. Nevertheless, these aspirations, Willis argues, are exerting an inexorable pressure on the political rulers to expand the number of those entitled to a share of the good life.

Zemtsov also works with a conception of a potentially competitive relationship between the rulers and the larger class who enjoy the perquisites that come with proximity to power. But his book does not attempt to develop or demonstrate this point; it offers lurid exposés of old scandals, tidbits taken from journalistic accounts, and tables of undocumented data. In view of the numerous well-publicized scandals over the past several years, Zemtsov's point that the Brezhnev-era ruling elite was deeply corrupt is clearly valid, but the author's careless and superficial approach subverts the book's credibility.

IS Soviet society characterized by class divisions, and can the concept of class be the crucial conceptual link between the material conditions of Soviet life and the aspirations of the population? Many writers have seized on the notion of a new "middle class" as a base of support for Gorbachev's reforms, because the reforms hold out the promise of a better life in return for higher productivity.[8] Most who speak of the middle class treat it as a group defined by its interest in the consumption of social goods rather

[5]Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970.
[6]*The Russians*, New York, Ballantine, 1977.
[7]*From the Yaroslavsky Station*, rev. ed., New York, Universe, 1984.

[8]Seweryn Bialer, for example, describes Soviet society as one "socially dominated by a large new middle class, which may be politically fragmented and powerless but which sets the lifestyle for the society at large." See "Gorbachev's Program of Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects," in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, Eds., *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*, Boulder, CO, and London, Westview, 1988, p. 236. Gail Lapidus argues that the past decades have brought about an "embryonic civil society" increasingly capable of self-regulation and have transformed the Soviet Union into a society "with a highly differentiated social structure and an increasingly articulate and assertive middle class." See "State and Society: Toward the Emergence of Civil Society in the Soviet Union," in Seweryn Bialer, Ed., *Politics, Society, and Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, pp. 124, 125–26. For related interpretations, see Jerry Hough, *Opening the Soviet System*, Washington, DC, Brookings, 1988; and Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1988.

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than as a class of property owners whose political interests stem from their desire for security and market freedom in the economy. But very few Soviet citizens do not wish for better material conditions. The ambiguity of the term "middle class" reflects the amorphous quality of the Soviet social structure, tempting us to use it as a label for anyone who is neither a manual worker nor a political functionary.

However, thus far in the polyphony of Gorbachev's socialist pluralism no middle class interest seems to be speaking "for itself." The absence of a common stake in property rights means that groups mobilize around other interests, such as alarm over environmental destruction and the defense of primordial ethnic and national loyalties. Yet despite Joseph Berliner's conjecture, in his foreward to the Millar volume, that sophisticated multivariate statistical techniques have made the concept of class anachronistic in contemporary social science (p. xi), few are willing to dispense with the concept altogether.

The SIP study greatly deepens our knowledge of the relative weight of a variety of factors bearing on popular attitudes. James R. Millar and Elizabeth Clayton, in their essay in the Millar volume, note that housing is the strongest of the factors associated with respondents' sense of satisfaction (p. 39). In particular, those respondents (one-third of the total) who owned their own living units were more likely than others to express overall satisfaction with their living standard. From this observation, Miller and Clayton propose that as more Soviet citizens possess private apartments, dachas, and houses, the greater will be the reservoir of "middle-class stability" for the political regime. But because Soviet housing is a consumption benefit rather than a productive asset, members of the middle class are defined here less by what they produce than by what they consume.

By contrast, Brian Silver's analysis of the structures of political belief (in the Millar volume) demonstrates that higher levels of education (and, independently, lower age) are associated with lower levels of acceptance of traditional statist and collectivist ideological norms; here the term "middle class" is used to mean those with higher education. As Silver observes, this group's political disaffection is of considerable importance. How should it be explained? Perhaps the survey is picking up the alienating effects of the widening gap between expected and actual status as the Soviet economy did a progressively worse job over the post-Khrushchev era of finding appropriate employment for specialists and intellectuals.

This hypothesis would be supported by Millar's and Clayton's conclusion that higher levels of education are correlated with lower satisfaction overall. But the SIP study does not tell us much about how respondents formed their expectations. The relationships it reveals may well be contingent on respondents' estimates of what was possible for them and their children in the "era of stagnation." If so, *perestroyka* has surely wrought enormous changes in subjective satisfaction, both by raising hopes and reinforcing discontent.[9]

The Millar volume tends to stress values and beliefs over behavior and social structure. In addition to the chapters on levels of satisfaction and political beliefs, the book contains several chapters on perceptions, including perceptions of science, of social status, of the reasons for low productivity in the economy, and of the differential treatment of nationalities (but none on the treatment of Soviet Jews, despite the fact that most respondents were Jewish). Donna Bahry's and William Zimmerman's essays are exceptions in that they deal with patterns of political activism, as are the chapters by Aaron Vinokur and Gur Ofer on inequality in income and wealth, and by Barbara Anderson on the life-courses of Soviet women.

Although the Millar volume does not discuss the point, the findings both on attitudes and behavior are weakened by the fact that the variable of party membership, which other Soviet and non-Soviet surveys have found to be strongly correlated with patterns of opinion and behavior, was not investigated. Evidently émigré respondents could not be trusted to say truthfully whether they had belonged to the party, for the understandable reason that they feared the repercussions of admitting to having been a party member. Given the stress on the perceptual, moreover, it is surprising that so little attention was paid to the question of how core values and beliefs are formed and shared—to socialization, communication, and public opinion—or to the effect of life experiences on expectations and aspirations. Finally, despite the importance of primary-level ties in ordering Soviet society, no attention was given to patterns of friendship and marriage.

JUDGED according to how well our pre-*perestroyka* scholarship identified the social forces that have become visible under the impact of Gorbachev's program of reform, the six works reviewed here earn

[9]Interesting confirmation of the "sociotropic" character of Soviet public attitudes about *perestroyka* comes in the results of a poll conducted by Tat'yana Zaslavskaya's survey research center. Whereas only 28 percent of the respondents reported that their family's material well-being had declined in the last two or three years, more than 90 percent viewed the economic situation as bad or critical. See *The New York Times*, Nov. 5, 1989.

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mixed grades. The SIP study's finding that the more highly educated and the younger are more likely to have been dissatisfied with their life in the USSR is important, although the observation that higher education is also associated with higher levels of regime-supportive activism contradicts this point to some extent. The existence of widespread poverty and the rigid sex-role differentiation in the Soviet countryside suggest the magnitude of the social problems that a reforming leadership must confront. The widespread aspiration for material betterment does indeed present Gorbachev with both a challenge and an opportunity: if this quest can be harnessed to behavioral changes that increase productivity and output, it can help revitalize the economy. Left unsatisfied, the desire for higher living standards will fuel serious popular discontent.

But when we try to explain the interaction of the social and the political, or grasp the forces that lend coherence to collective action, our knowledge remains limited. For example, the 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies revealed a powerful common impulse in many regions of the country to defeat candidates viewed as representatives of the political establishment. Most outside observers probably underestimated the intensity of populist resentment of the ruling elite, a sentiment that could support both liberal and reactionary movements. We need studies of the intelligentsia, which has forcefully reasserted its traditional role as the mind and conscience of the society, as well as of the environmental movement and of national movements, both of which cut across class divisions. If real change comes about in property relations, so that private property gains legal equality with state property, then surely we will indeed see the rise of something like a bourgeoisie. Through his "wager on the strong" Gorbachev is betting that this class will be loyal to the state and to socialism while giving society a needed impetus to *perestroyka*.

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Understanding the Sino-Vietnamese War

William J. Duiker

ROBERT S. ROSS. *The Indochina Tangle*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1988.

EUGENE K. LAWSON. *The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict.* New York, Praeger, 1984.

KING C. CHEN. *China's War With Vietnam, 1979.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987.

THE Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979, together with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia that preceded it, drastically changed the political landscape of Southeast Asia. The war brought to an end the cold war rivalry between the Western states and the Soviet Union and China, which had dominated the politics of the region since the end of World War II, and divided Southeast Asia anew on the basis of the primordial forces of nationalism and historic distrust.

Given the crucial importance of the Sino-Vietnamese war for an understanding of future developments in Southeast Asia, it is hardly surprising that this conflict has aroused considerable interest among scholars and foreign policy observers of the region. Speculation has centered around a number of key issues. What were the origins of the war? How, when, and why did Chinese leaders decide to launch their invasion of Vietnam? How should the results of the war be evaluated? Did China realize its overall objectives or, as many observers have contended, was Beijing's attempt to teach Hanoi a lesson a failure? Finally, what are the future prospects? Is the present-day conflict between China and Vietnam based on concrete issues that are subject to resolution, or is it the product of deep-seated historic differences that transcend the concerns of the moment?

The three books under review here are among the latest in a spate of recent studies that seek to answer such questions and enhance our understanding of the dynamics at work in the region today. Each author has chosen to address a different issue connected with the war. Together, they provide new insight on the nature of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict and its implications for the future of Southeast Asia.

The subject of the origins of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict has developed into a heavily debated issue, despite the fact that many initially saw its causes as uncomplicated and straightforward. As tensions between Beijing and Hanoi heightened during the spring and summer of 1978, the official press in both countries focused on territorial disputes and the treatment of Chinese residents inside Vietnam as the main causes of those tensions. Beijing encouraged the view that these issues were determinative in provoking China's decision to "administer a lesson" to the Vietnamese.

From the outset, however, there were a few observers who were convinced that more important issues were at stake. Some saw the war as the product of historic rivalries—between China and Vietnam and between Vietnam and its own smaller neighbor, Cambodia. In their view, these rivalries, which had been submerged during the colonial era and the bitter cold war conflict that followed it, resurfaced with the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the removal of a Western presence from Indochina. The three new revolutionary states in the region inexorably began to refocus their attention and their energies on the unresolved historical claims left over from the precolonial era.

Other observers found the ultimate cause of the conflict not in the legacy of the past but in the superpower competition among China, the Soviet Union, and the United

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States that had shaped so much of the world since the end of World War II. To Zbigniew Brzezinski, US national security adviser under President Jimmy Carter, the Sino-Vietnamese conflict was less a re-creation of historical disputes than a "proxy war" in which smaller countries like Vietnam and Pol Pot's Cambodia served as surrogates for external powers like the Soviet Union and China.

TWO of the books under review here tackle head-on the issue of what caused the Sino-Vietnamese war. Robert S. Ross, author of *The Indochina Tangle,* undertakes an exhaustive analysis of the various issues involved in the dispute between China and Vietnam and concludes that the most fundamental cause of the war was Beijing's fear of encirclement by the Soviet Union. Taking as the basis of his analysis the theme put forward in 1971 by Peter Van Ness in *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy,* namely, that the most fundamental element in Beijing's foreign policy is China's relationship with the two superpowers, Ross contends that Chinese anxiety over the growing intimacy between Vietnam and the USSR, which was solidified by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in November 1978, was the critical issue that drove the Chinese to war with Vietnam early the following year. Beijing's objectives, according to Ross, were manyfold: to teach Vietnam a lesson, to force Hanoi to redeploy its armed forces along the Chinese border, and to protect China's credibility as a major power in Asia (p. 224).

Ross does not ignore the significant role played by factors other than China's anxiety over Soviet-Vietnamese relations in provoking the war. But it is his view that such issues as the territorial dispute and Hanoi's policy toward the Chinese in Vietnam were essentially derivative rather than primary causes of the conflict. He convincingly demonstrates that in its relations with other countries in the region, Beijing has consistently been able to resolve such problems through negotiations. China has also demonstrated its ability to overlook brutal mistreatment of the local ethnic Chinese population in the interests of Realpolitik, as in the case of Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia.

The issue of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which took place in late December 1978, is a more difficult challenge, not least because the invasion appeared to represent such a direct threat to Chinese national security. Yet even here, Ross contends that Hanoi's overthrow of the Pol Pot regime was in itself not a sufficient reason for the Chinese attack. Those who consider Cambodia a crucial factor must explain why it was so important. The answer, he says, lies in Beijing's fear that Vietnamese domination of Cambodia would contribute to Moscow's strategy of the encirclement of China. It was Hanoi's ties with the USSR, and not simply its desire to create a "special relationship" with neighboring Laos and Cambodia, that provoked Chinese action.

Overall, Ross makes a fairly convincing case for his thesis that fear of the Soviet Union was the driving force behind China's decision to launch its border attack in February 1979. His argument that the border dispute and the issue of the Chinese in Vietnam were essentially pretexts for action rather than a direct cause of the decision is especially well documented. Still, Ross's argument is not entirely satisfying. He does not effectively explain why, if preventing Hanoi from adopting a policy of "lean to one side" toward Moscow was so important, Chinese leaders did not make a greater effort to resolve other issues through peaceful means, nor why they did not adopt a more generous posture toward Hanoi's request for additional economic assistance shortly after the end of the Vietnam War. Beijing must have known that the Vietnamese would turn toward the Soviet Union, and that Moscow would respond with alacrity. His explanation that China's failure to prevent the Vietnamese tilt toward the Soviet Union after the Vietnam War can be ascribed to Hua Guofeng's inexperience and lack of a firm political base is plausible but speculative.

Ross also does not directly refute the views of those who contend that historical animosities within the region are at the root of the conflict. By adopting the "primary enemy" thesis and neglecting to investigate the complicated historical relationship between China and Vietnam, he leaves the impression that had there been no Soviet threat, Beijing would have had little interest in competing with Hanoi for influence in mainland Southeast Asia. In fact, there is considerable circumstantial evidence that Chinese leaders were concerned about Hanoi's penetration of its two neighboring Indochinese states long before Phnom Penh had become, in Beijing's eyes, Moscow's "junior partner" in Southeast Asia (p. 209). In sum, while Ross's essential thesis may be valid, there is no clear evidence that China would have acted differently even if the USSR had not been a factor in the equation.

In *The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict,* Eugene K. Lawson admirably fills the historical gap left unexplored by Robert Ross. Although the title suggests that the theme of the book is centered on the 1979 border war, it actually focuses on the complex relationship between the two countries during the Vietnam War, when China and North Vietnam were allies in the common struggle against the "imperialist forces" led by the

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United States. Lawson shows that under the apparently smooth surface of fraternal amity, unresolved disputes over territory, war strategy, and global view festered, making a mockery of the public image of ideological comrades-in-arms engaged in a joint struggle against the forces of global reaction. He concludes that by 1975, signs of the bitter disagreements that would lead to violent conflict four years later were already apparent.

Yet Lawson rejects what he calls the "conventional wisdom" that the two allies would inevitably clash as a result of their age-old rivalry. In fact, Lawson reaches essentially the same conclusion as Ross. Although much of the book is devoted to a painstaking analysis of the various issues that plagued the Sino-Vietnamese relationship prior to 1975, he contends that the most basic point of dispute in the late 1970's was the relationship that each had with the United States and the Soviet Union. In Lawson's view, the animosity that currently characterizes the relationship "is not the product of age-old rivalries but of the strategic choices made by each as to how to maximize its security and where—Moscow or Washington—each could obtain greater strategic benefits in an uncertain world" (p. 7). He does, however, admit that although the vital concern impelling Chinese leaders to action was Hanoi's relationship with the USSR, this relationship would not have been so developed, nor would Hanoi have felt so compelled to seek Moscow's protection—had the dispute between China and Vietnam not already reached a point of high tension and distrust as a result of other issues, many of them linked to the legacy of the past.

Through his detailed investigation of the dynamics of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship prior to the end of the Vietnam War, Lawson provides the reader with a vivid sense of the legacy of bitterness and frustration that made the Chinese unwilling to cater to Hanoi's concerns after the fall of Saigon—and eventually provoked Beijing into its angry determination to "punish" the Vietnamese for their perfidy. In his reference to the role of the superpowers in "overwhelming" the bilateral relationship, Lawson recognizes the crucial linkage between historical factors and contemporary security concerns that fueled the dispute and brought it to the point of open conflict in 1979.

A SECOND issue related to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict that has inspired considerable speculation among students of East Asian politics is the way in which China reached its decision to go to war. How and when did Chinese leaders decide to launch the attack? Were domestic factors involved, or was the decision based solely on foreign policy considerations? What role did the inner-party struggle that followed the death of Mao Zedong play in the process? Finally, what were China's objectives in planning the operation?

These issues form the central core of King C. Chen's *China's War With Vietnam, 1979*. Using fragmentary evidence culled from available documents as well as interviews with individual sources close to the Beijing leadership, Chen attempts to piece together the process by which China made the decision to launch its punitive invasion of Vietnam. Chen places the decision to go to war within the framework of the power struggle that engulfed the Chinese leadership after the death of Mao in September 1976. Like Ross, he concludes that Beijing was hampered in foreign policy decision-making by the power vacuum during the brief reign of Hua Guofeng. He sees no evidence of clearcut differences between Hua and Deng Xiaoping on foreign policy issues but, again like Ross, he portrays the emergence of Deng as a key factor in the Chinese decision to use force against the Vietnamese.

In Chen's account, the Cambodian issue played a central role in impelling China toward war. Until June 1978, most Chinese leaders still hoped for a peaceful resolution of the dispute with Vietnam and rejected calls for forceful action against Hanoi. They tried to rein in Pol Pot, calling on the Phnom Penh regime opt more moderate internal policies, and sought to mediate Cambodia's border dispute Vietnam.

But China's reluctance to move against Vietnam began to dissipate in mid-summer when officials in Beijing learned that Hanoi had reached a decision to overthrow the Pol Pot regime. Now Chinese leaders began to consider various options to punish the Vietnamese. According to Chen, the problem acquired a sense of urgency following the collapse of negotiations over the treatment of Chinese nationals in Vietnam and the signing by Moscow and Hanoi of the Soviet-Vietnamese security treaty in November (p. 27).

The final decision to act took place during the series of high-level meetings that led up to the momentous Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party in mid-December. Civilian and military officials differed over the nature of the most appropriate response, and the result appears to have represented a compromise. Like Ross, Chen sees the goals of the move against Vietnam as both psychological and concrete: to demonstrate China's credibility as a military force in Asia as well as to break Moscow's strategy of encirclement. In Chen's view, Deng appreciated the risks involved, but discounted them in advance. In high-level policy sessions, he report-

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edly argued that an attack would neither cause serious damage to China's modernization program nor have an unfavorable impact on world public opinion. Most important, he contended that a large-scale Soviet military response was unlikely in view of the limited number of Soviet troops on China's northern frontier.

According to Chen, Deng was also aware of the possibility that China might not achieve all of its military objectives but reportedly maintained that a military failure might serve the purpose of demonstrating to skeptics the need for modernization of China's weaponry and military tactics.

In Chen's view, the decision to go to war with Vietnam was also directly related to Beijing's contemporary decision to push toward normalization of relations with the United States. Deng moved up the date for his visit to the United States in order to accommodate military plans for the border attack and linked a final decision on the operation to the reaction of the Carter administration. According to Chen, Beijing did not require Washington's open approval for the operation, just its understanding. As it turned out, the Carter administration played into China's hands. Although Washington was concerned that the invasion could cause an adverse global reaction and advised against it, US sources did not publicly criticize the attack when it took place. Chen has also provided readers with a convincing reconstruction of the deliberations that took place in Beijing prior to the border offensive in mid-February. Much of his evidence is based on unverifiable sources, but it parallels and in some cases builds on many previous accounts and has the ring of truth. His portrayal of Deng's rationale for the attack and the recognition the results might be limited, is especially persuasive.

WAS war inevitable? Two of the authors, Lawson and Ross, argue that it was not. As stated above, Lawson concludes that the animosity was based less on historical rivalry than on strategic choices made on both sides. Ross agrees, and points out that Beijing had other options that might have reversed the drift toward war: Chinese leaders might have induced Hanoi to maintain its traditional policy of equidistance in the Sino-Soviet dispute by means of a generous aid program after the end of the Vietnam War, and they also might have tried harder to moderate the policies of the Pol Pot regime. Ross does, however, admit that these alternatives, while they existed in theory, were not particularly workable; the Chinese lacked the carrot required to persuade the Vietnamese to rethink their decision—taken long before the end of the Vietnam War—to lean toward Moscow.

After the withdrawal of Chinese military forces from Vietnam in March 1979, it was generally recognized—and conceded in private by official sources in China—that Beijing had not achieved all of its objectives in the border offensive. Chinese military performance on the battlefield had been disappointing, and Vietnamese resistance had been, in King Chen's words, "amazingly strong" (p. 107). Some observers went so far as to say that the Vietnamese, by their success in blunting the Chinese attack, had administered a lesson to the Chinese. Certainly China did not deter Hanoi from consolidating its hold on Cambodia and strengthening its existing ties with the USSR.

Nevertheless, two of the authors whose books are under review here contend that Beijing's failure was not as clear-cut as it seems. Chen, for example, argues that Hanoi was not the real winner in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, for in the process of fending off the Chinese challenge it was forced to abandon the balanced foreign policy originally crafted by Ho Chi Minh and accept a relationship of dependency on Moscow that puts Vietnam at the mercy of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Chen is also critical of Hanoi's decision to seek a dominant position in Indochina at the expense of riendship with China. The stronger Hanoi's "special relationship" with Laos and Cambodia, he asserts, the more it will suffer (p. 161). Clearly, in his view, the benefits that might derive from such a relationship are not worth the cost.

While less specific, Ross appears to agree with Chen. He concedes that China suffered high casualties during the war and did not achieve its primary goal of forcing Hanoi to abandon its intimate relationship with the Soviet Union. But he points out that had China not made known its extreme displeasure, the outcome would have been much the same. Vietnam would have attacked Cambodia in any case, thus contributing to Moscow's strategy of encirclement. In other respects, Ross argues that Beijing's anti-Vietnam strategy has succeeded. The border war demonstrated China's ability to adopt an aggressive foreign policy stance without seriously damaging its economic modernization program, and its diplomatic stance since the end of the war has led to the forging of an alliance with noncommunist states in Southeast Asia that has effectively isolated Vietnam from its neighbors in the region.

Like Chen, Ross is somewhat pessimistic about Hanoi's future prospects. He believes that China's ultimate goal is the total domination of Vietnam and, beyond that, hegemony in all of Indochina, and that Beijing is prepared to bleed Vietnam white in order to achieve this objective. Chen's unspoken as-

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sumption appears to be that the Vietnamese will eventually be compelled to accept the terms of their powerful neighbor.

NOT everyone will agree with the conclusions of these two authors. In fact, in the view of many observers of the regional scene, Hanoi's strategy has paid off handsomely. So far, the Chinese have been unable to dislodge the Vietnamese from Cambodia and, if present trends continue, Beijing may be forced to accept a negotiated settlement in Cambodia that provides international legitimacy to the present pro-Vietnamese government in Phnom Penh. In recent months, the anti-Hanoi alliance linking China, the ASEAN states, and several Western countries, has been badly split over the prospects of a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. Failure to achieve an agreement on this issue was a central factor in the collapse of the conference on Cambodia held in Paris last August.

China, however, is not without options of its own. Should Hanoi insist on the maintenance of its militant alliance with Phnom Penh as a condition of a settlement, fears of Vietnamese expansionism could revive among the ASEAN states, enabling Beijing to reinvigorate the anti-Vietnamese alliance and return to the policy of isolating Vietnam within the region. But even without the support of other states in the alliance, China remains capable of applying various forms of pressure on the Vietnamese, who are in desperate need of an interval of peace in order to turn their attention to the requirements of economic development. And, as King Chen has pointed out, Vietnamese leaders cannot afford to ignore the ominous possibility of a deal made at their expense by Moscow and Beijing.

Such problems pose excruciating choices for Hanoi. If one can argue, as Ross and Lawson do, that Chinese policy toward Vietnam is a consequence of its fear of the Soviet Union, one can also argue that Vietnam's strategy is based, above all, on its own fear of a resurgent and expansionist China. Although Vietnam's concern has undoubtedly been sharpened by the events of recent years, its roots lie in the past; history still powerfully influences the thinking of Hanoi's leaders.

After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, Vietnamese leaders felt that in order to guarantee Vietnam's survival against an arrogant and imperious China, they had no choice but to build a foreign policy on the twin pillars of a special relationship with Laos and Cambodia and close ties with Moscow. This strategy incurred high costs in terms of international isolation and economic stagnation, but officials in Hanoi insisted that national security interests were not negotiable, and expressed confidence that they could wait out the Chinese, as they had outwaited other adversaries during the Vietnam War. In recent years, however, signs of an impending reassessment have been appearing in Hanoi. The new leadership under General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh that was installed at the Sixth National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in December 1986 has indicated that economic construction is at the top of its priority list. As part of this new policy, official sources in Hanoi have hinted at the possibility of "new thinking" in the arena of foreign affairs. One sign of movement has been Vietnam's apparent willingness to accept a compromise settlement in the Cambodian dispute. A second sign has appeared in subtle hints that Hanoi is willing to make concessions in an effort to resolve its multifaceted dispute with China.

Hanoi has ample reason to seek a reduction in tensions with Beijing. Not only would it destroy the anti-Vietnamese alliance and release scarce resources for the program of economic modernization, it would also reduce Vietnamese dependence on Moscow and restore an element of balance to Hanoi's foreign policy. But a true reconciliation seems highly unlikely at this time. If the primary source of China's concern is Hanoi's relationship with Moscow, then an end to the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty would go a long way toward bringing about a stable and equitable relationship between China and Vietnam. But to the Vietnamese, the roots of Chinese behavior lie deep in history, and can only be influenced if Beijing is convinced that Hanoi has a powerful foreign friend. To the Vietnamese, the treaty with the Soviet Union is not the source of the problem, but the consequence.

IF THIS perspective is correct, a long-term solution to the Sino-Vietnamese dispute is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Both countries are now locked into an adversarial relationship that feeds as much on historical animosity and distrust as on contemporary disagreements. To Hanoi, a tributary relationship to China would be both humiliating and politically unacceptable. To Beijing, an independent and often fractious Vietnam is an affront to Chinese pride as well as a threat to its vulnerable southern flank. While a modus vivendi that sets aside such issues in the interest of better state-to-state relations should not be ruled out, it will take time for these often uneasy neighbors to reach an amicable and lasting solution to their differences.

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